We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

   PoliticsMilitary Strategy Board

Previous 10 Next 10 
To: LindyBill who wrote (1425)12/5/2013 3:21:03 AM
From: unclewest
4 Recommendations   of 11914
For those not familiar with the "euphemisms" Snake-Eater is an old nickname for Green Berets.
Yards is the old nickname for Montagnards…pronounced Mountain yards.

The Snake-Eaters and the Yards

The Vietnamese tribesmen who fought alongside American Special Forces won the Green Berets’ admiration—and lost everything else.
By Rebecca Onion

Wounded Green Berets are evacuated by helicopter from a camp in Plei Me, South Vietnam, in November 1965.Photo by AFP/Getty Images

In 1965, syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak used a frontier metaphor to describe the American Special Forces’ advisory role with Vietnamese tribesmen. “Assume that during our own Civil War the north had asked a friendly foreign power to mobilize, train, and arm hostile American Indian tribes and lead them into battle against the South,” they wrote.

If that historical hypothetical suggested wild possibilities, Evans and Novak used it advisedly. For four years, Special Forces had been training an oppressed minority group in guerrilla tactics, providing them with weapons and acting as de facto aid workers in their communities. When Americans remember Vietnam, we often think of the war as having three major actors: the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, and the American military. But there was another player: the Montagnards.

The indigenous Montagnards, recruited into service by the American Special Forces in Vietnam’s mountain highlands, defended villages against the Viet Cong and served as rapid response forces. The Special Forces and the Montagnards—each tough, versatile, and accustomed to living in wild conditions—formed an affinity for each other. In the testimony of many veterans, their working relationship with the Montagnards, nicknamed Yards, was a bright spot in a confusing and frustrating war. The bond between America’s elite fighters and their indigenous partners has persisted into the present, but despite the best efforts of vets, the Montagnards have suffered greatly in the postwar years, at least in part because they cast their lot with the U.S. Army. In a war with more than its share of tragedies, this one is less often told but is crucial to understanding the conflict and its toll.

The Montagnards, whose name is derived from the French word for mountaineers, are ethnically distinct from lowland, urban Vietnamese. In the early ’60s, writes military historian John Prados, almost a million Montagnards lived in Vietnam, and the group was made up of about 30 different tribes. The Montagnards spoke languages of Malayo-Polynesian and Mon Khmer derivations, practiced an animistic religion (except for some who had converted to Christianity), and survived through subsistence agriculture.

In the early ’60s, the Green Berets were supermen of the Cold War: tough, smart, and canny.

When the United States Special Forces first arrived in Vietnam in the early 1960s, the Montagnards were already decades into an uneasy relationship with Vietnam’s various central governments. Before their withdrawal, the French had promised to give the Montagnards protected land—a promise that vanished with them. The Communist government of North Vietnam had included the right for highlander autonomy in its founding platform in 1960, but many Montagnards were uneasy about Communist intentions. Meanwhile, South Vietnam’s President Ngô Ðình Di?m had begun to settle refugees from North Vietnam in the highlands. His government neglected education and health care in the Montagnard areas, assigning inexperienced and ineffective bureaucrats to handle their needs.

Tensions between the Vietnamese and the Montagnards were ratcheted up by racism. Vietnamese called the tribal people m?i, or savage. Prados recounts a story of a “young Vietnamese woman who told an American, in all seriousness, that Montagnards had tails.” Stereotypes about the “primitive” nature of the tribesmen— unfounded beliefs that they were all nomadic and lived by slash-and-burn farming—made it easier for the government to advocate the expropriation of their lands.

* * *

Meanwhile, in the United States, American Special Forces were taking on an increasingly large role in American military planning and strategy. The Cold War seemed to demand a decentralized, versatile style of fighting. In 1961, John F. Kennedy, a proponent of such irregular warfare, authorized the use of the iconic green beret, a symbol that would capture a nation’s imagination. In the early ’60s, the “Berets” were seen as the supermen of the Cold War: tough, smart, and canny.

Starting in 1961, in an initiative at first run by the CIA, the Special Forces moved into the Vietnamese mountains and set up the new Village Defense Program (a forerunner of the better-known Strategic Hamlet Program). The Montagnards’ forested mountain homelands, which ran along the Cambodian and Laotian borders in the western portion of Vietnam, were prime highways for North Vietnamese forces to move men and materiel. The Viet Cong, understanding the way the Southern government discriminated against the tribes, promised much if the tribesmen would defect—and some did. But the VC also preyed on isolated villages, taking food and pressing Montagnards into labor and military service.

When Kennedy visited Fort Bragg in 1961, the Green Berets demonstrated their skills by catching, preparing, and eating a snake.

The working relationship between Green Berets and Montagnards began in the Village Defense Program. Detachments of 12 Green Berets trained Montagnards, drawn from the tribe dominant in the surrounding area, into “civilian irregular defense groups,” or CIDGs. The idea was that a security zone would radiate outward from each camp, with CIDG serving as defense forces, advised by small groups of American Special Forces and South Vietnam’s own special forces, the LLDB. With help from the Navy’s Seabees, Special Forces built dams, roads, bridges, schools, wells, and roads for Montagnard groups, and Special Forces medics provided rudimentary health care. By December 1963, 43,000 Montagnard defenders guarded the area around the first camp, Buon Enao, from the Viet Cong, while 18,000 Montagnards were enlisted in mobile strike forces, which were deployed by air to spots where conflict broke out.

In interviews, Special Forces often described the people they were training as loyal, honest, and friendly and compared them favorably to Vietnamese allies. In 1970, Gloria Emerson of the New York Times visited a CIDG camp at Dakseang. The Green Berets there were uninterested in being interviewed, but she managed to ask them some questions about the Yards:

When they talk of the Montagnards—uncorrupted by the cities, physically superior to most South Vietnamese, less sophisticated in their outlook—the Americans are fiercely possessive ... Because the Green Berets enjoy their own toughness, they appreciate some of the more primitive aspects of the Montagnards’ habits.

The tribal customs were strange; but then, the regular Army found Special Forces’ ways odd. Edward E. Bridges, a Green Beret who was at Fort Bragg when Kennedy came to visit in 1961, remembers that as part of their demonstration for the visiting president, the men caught, prepared, and ate a snake. The nickname “ snake eater” stuck to the Special Forces. The Berets, who often made jokes about the Yards eating dogs and seemingly unpalatable vegetation, saw something of their own values in these ways.

In many anecdotes, Special Forces veterans describe their interactions with the Montagnards as full of bonhomie. “The Vietnamese strike me as being a rather sour people,” a Beret pseudonymously identified as “Lieutenant Pretty” told fellow Beret Joseph Patrick Meissner. “The Yards, however, find much humor in things. They’re easy to get along with.”

Russell Mann, who served as a medic in the Special Forces, told Hans Halberstadt one of many funny stories soldiers traded about the Yards. Mann was assigned to teach a group of Montagnards how to throw grenades. “Montagnards culturally do not throw,” he said. “They have no games that require throwing. They don’t even throw rocks at their chickens.” Mann trained his students, who were “more than willing to humor the crazy Americans as long as they got to kill some Vietnamese,” to throw progressively larger items, with an actual grenade toss as the “final exam.”

When a poorly placed grenade, lobbed over a berm, rolled back down the slope toward a student and his instructor, both had to dive into a muddy trench. “The subsequent mud-soaked exit was a source of great amusement to the tribesmen,” Mann said. Eventually, he said, “I developed a great fondness for the Yards. If it was a slow day, I would occasionally dive into the trench just to amuse them.”

The tribal customs were strange; but then, the regular Army found Special Forces’ ways odd.

The Green Berets also admired the Montagnards’ fighting prowess, noting their loyalty. As Bridges told an interviewer, the Green Berets believed that “the Montagnards made excellent soldiers.” They were used to working in teams: “They were very good at small unit tactics and seemed to know instinctively how to protect their flanks. In a way, combat was almost like a family situation with them: you protect your brother and your brother protects you.” Bridges added, “I found them very brave under fire. They wouldn’t hesitate to run out and help a team member who was in trouble.”

Perhaps the most respected group of indigenous fighters was the Nung, an ethnic Chinese minority from North Vietnam that had emigrated south as the Communist government took power. The Special Forces often used Nung as bodyguards, as they were a dependable source of security while the Berets were recruiting and training local tribesmen.

On July 6, 1964, in a stellar example of collaboration between the Special Forces and indigenous troops, Capt. Roger H.C. Donlon, his group of 12 Green Berets, 60 Nung, 311 CIDG troops, and an Australian adviser, fended off a late-night attack on their isolated camp near Nam Dong village, repelling 900 North Vietnamese in a five-hour battle. Donlon, who was wounded four times but continued to direct the defense of the camp, earned the first Congressional Medal of Honor to be awarded in Vietnam. He gave particular credit to the Nung.

Nam Dong would eventually become part of American popular culture, featured in Robin Moore’s novel The Green Berets and the John Wayne film adaptation, both of which popularized the collaboration between Special Forces and indigenous allies by way of burnishing the mystique of the Green Berets.

* * *

Not all Special Forces troops were united in their good opinion of the indigenous forces’ fighting prowess. Meissner also interviewed some Green Berets who described Montagnard soldiers as undisciplined, though these informants allowed that Vietnamese discrimination against the Montagnards in matters of pay, provisioning, and the distribution of difficult duties exacerbated the trouble.

American soldiers mediating between Montagnards and Vietnamese repeatedly found themselves in difficult positions. Many of them believed that the tribesmen got a raw deal from the Vietnamese and were inclined to look with sympathy upon Montagnards’ enmity towards the government. The official American position, however, was to encourage national unity.

This awkwardness worsened in 1964 and 1965, as political circumstances made it harder and harder for Americans who might have sympathy for the Montagnards. After the coup against Di?m in 1963, the succession of military leaders that took control in Saigon pursued ever-more restrictive policies regulating Montagnard life. In response, some highlanders formed FULRO, a group whose initials, in French, translate to the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races.

In September 1964, FULRO-allied Montagnards in five Special Forces camps rebelled, killing 80 South Vietnamese troops and taking 20 Americans hostage. Eventually, Special Forces personnel in the camps managed to talk the rebels into laying down their arms. Howard Sochurek was on the scene for National Geographic and published an article in the January 1965 issue that documented the tense situation and credited the Special Forces with “pulling the firing pin from the revolt of 3,000 mountain soldiers.” Capt. Vernon Gillespie appeared in the photographs accompanying Sochurek’s article dressed in Montagnard clothing: a long loincloth, tunic, and bare feet. Gillespie saved the Vietnamese in his camp by negotiating a ceremony in which he, the Vietnamese commanding officer, and a Montagnard chief performed a two-hour rite of friendship.

After the uprisings, Saigon made some concessions to Montagnard demands but refused to allow tribal autonomy. Saigon also made a formal protest to the United States, alleging that the arming of the Montagnards had proceeded without the regime’s knowledge or consent and that the U.S. had assisted the highlanders in their rebellion.

In a way, combat was almost like a family situation with them: you protect your brother and your brother protects you.

Former Green Beret Edward E. Bridges
The episode also exacerbated tensions between Special Forces and the Army. The Special Forces commanders of the camps were relieved of their posts, and, as Gillespie told Halberstadt, headquarters tried to “whitewash the whole event.” Edwards writes that Gillespie was later reprimanded for having worn the Montagnard costume in photographs and “for telling a general officer that the general didn’t know enough about the Montagnards to interfere in that part of the country.”

In the mid-1960s, responding to South Vietnamese pressure and acknowledging that it had become difficult to successfully defend the isolated camps against attack, the Americans dismantled the Village Defense Program in its original form. The most highly trained Montagnard troops, those in the mobile strike forces, were redeployed in base camps along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. As Prados points out, “this move clearly aimed at closing off a large potential source of arms for FULRO adherents,” since many decommissioned CIDG militia members would have to surrender their weapons.

* * *

The Montagnards moved into the second half of the 1960s living ever more precarious lives. From a humanitarian perspective, their situation worsened, and the Green Berets felt powerless to help them. Master Sgt. John J. Self, interviewed by Sochurek for National Geographic in 1968, told of the lack of supplies and food for the Montagnards who lived near his camp. (The Special Forces camps often contained not only the enlisted Montagnards, but also their families, who insisted on staying near their loved ones.) “We are trying to help them, but there are only 12 of us here and 8,000 of them,” he said. “If just sitting down and crying about it would do some good, I’ll tell you something—I’d sit down and cry.”

If the 1960s found Montagnard life disrupted by combat, the 1970s were disastrous for the tribes. The Special Forces turned the command of remaining Montagnard mobile strike force groups over to the Vietnamese in 1970, and the transition did not go well, with the traditional conflicts between the two groups souring their collaboration. After the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in 1972 and 1973, the Montagnard situation worsened further. Tribesmen who had been moved from their traditional lands for security reasons returned to find their former homelands occupied by Vietnamese refugees. More than 150,000 Montagnards became refugees themselves, as fighting between the North and South intensified in the central highlands.

By the time the hostilities between North and South Vietnam ceased, around 200,000 Montagnards had been killed and 85 percent of their villages leveled.

Some American Special Forces personnel continued their involvement with the tribes in civilian capacities after the military had officially withdrawn. Jacques Leslie of the LA Times and Philip A. McCombs of the Washington Post both interviewed Ed Sprague, a former Special Forces master sergeant. Sprague returned to work with USAID in Phu Bon Province, spending his days driving around back roads in a car with Montagnard assistants, visiting tribesmen in his capacity as USAID adviser for economic development.

The Sprague stories were, in some respects, humorous accounts of a seemingly eccentric man—McCombs described Sprague as he “lounges in his tribal dressing gown” in his “spacious, modern compound on a jungle hilltop surrounded by watchful Montagnard guards.”

But Sprague’s commitment, if unique in degree, was a vestige of the long-standing Special Forces affection for the tribes. Amid the chaos of the 1975 fall of South Vietnam, Sprague took 2,000 tribesmen to the beach at Nha Trang, where the group hoped for an American evacuation. Help was not forthcoming.

Despite the isolated efforts of some former Green Berets and of the government ministers appointed to help ethnic minorities, the Montagnards suffered in postwar Vietnam. By the time the hostilities between North and South Vietnam ceased, according to historian John Fredriksen, around 200,000 Montagnards had been killed and 85 percent of their villages leveled. Known to have fought with the Americans, the Yards entered a new phase of repression under the Communists. Many of their remaining leaders were thrown in prison or escaped across the border to Cambodia. There, the Khmer Rouge imprisoned and killed those it could find.

In 2001, according to Human Rights Watch, about 1 million highlanders lived in four Vietnamese provinces, along with 3 million ethnic Vietnamese. The Vietnamese raise coffee in state-owned plantations on former Montagnard land. Many Montagnards have now converted to Christianity—a fact that increases their vulnerability as a minority in a Communist country.

Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, some 3,000 Montagnards with combat records have emigrated to the United States. The tribesmen chose to settle in a cluster in North Carolina, in part because of the strong Special Forces presence near Fort Bragg. The Special Forces Association, a veterans’ group, has assisted with the process of immigration, circulating images of refugees who claimed to be veterans, in hopes of finding former Green Berets who could verify their stories.

* * *

Special Forces veterans seem to see the abandonment of the tribes as part and parcel of the larger American amnesia surrounding Vietnam. As with the related Hmong people of Laos, many of whom fought with the CIA in the “Secret War” and then petitioned to emigrate to the United States, the Montagnards’ plight has become politicized, their abandonment seen as analogous to the general neglect American service members felt upon returning from the war. Discussions of the tribes’ plight on pro-military message boards focus on the Montagnards’ loyalty, Christianity, and sense of duty, drawing a contrast between the worthy Yard immigrants and an ungrateful American public. The fight to help Montagnard refugees enter the U.S. has created strange bedfellows, as the Special Forces have advocated for tribesmen alongside organizations like Human Rights Watch.

To the extent that most Americans know of the Montagnards, it is likely through film. The wide gap in style and sentiment between the jingoistic Wayne vehicle The Green Berets (1968) and Francis Ford Coppola’s meditative, almost nihilistic Apocalypse Now (1979) is often cited as symbolic of the way American public opinion turned on the war in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are Montagnards in both movies. The tribesmen in Green Beretsare simple, childlike victims whose appearance on screen is accompanied by a variation on the Oriental riff. And to a cynical eye, the highland group that surrounds Col. Kurtz in Apocalypse Now is but a living manifestation of the soldier’s madness. Their loyalty to Kurtz, their superstitions, and their traditions of animal sacrifice are all decoration for the former Green Beret’s ultimate descent into “the horror.”

We have been the fiercest allies of the Americans. But not of the Generals or of the Politicians: of the soldiers.

Montagnard leader Kok Ksor
But a look at the movie through Montagnard eyes challenges this interpretation. In a 2002 interview on the Degar Foundation’s website with leader Kok Ksor, who has lived in the United States since seeking asylum after he led a Montagnard protest against the Communist government in 2001, Ksor speaks of Apocalypse Now as emblematic of the relationship between the Special Forces and the Montagnard.

Ksor began working for the Americans in 1960 when he signed on as a messenger carrying word between Americans and his tribe. Later, he ran messages to exiled FULRO leaders living in Cambodia. WatchingApocalypse Now with the interviewer, Ksor began to weep. The alliance with the Special Forces is one that he still holds dear, even as he mourns everything else that has happened to his people.

Telling of Viet Cong atrocities, he adds that he felt his people had been “used” by the American government, which “allowed that the Viet Cong attack our villages ... and promised that at the end of the war they would help us attain independence.” To this bitter assessment, Ksor adds a firm confirmation:

We have been the fiercest allies of the Americans. But not of the Generals or of the Politicians: of the soldiers, of the non-commissioned officers. For us it was people who had come to help us, had come to die of [sic] a country that was not our own.

Yes, the loyalty of the tribe around Colonel Kurtz in the film is real.

As Ksor acknowledges, the Special Forces couldn’t set American policy or dictate Vietnamese attitudes toward the tribes, so their good intentions had limitations. No matter how hard some Green Berets wished for and worked for better lives for the Montagnards, the end result of the war, for the tribes, was disaster.

"Those who hammer their guns into plows, will plow for those who do not."

- Thomas Jefferson

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read

From: LindyBill12/5/2013 6:14:13 AM
   of 11914
Intelligence: Forensics As A Weapon
Next Article ? NAVAL AIR: Indian Carrier Tribulations Are Not Over
December 5, 2013: Information from the past is becoming a more important factor is present and future conflicts. In Iraq, American troops collected an enormous amount of data that is expected to be useful in the future. This included data and material collected after each (well, most) incidents where American troops were in combat. Typically troops are assigned to conduct their own CSI (Crime, or, in this case, "Combat" Scene Investigation) of each incident. In addition to several hundred thousand of these reports, there are about 100,000 just covering IEDs (improvised explosive devices, mainly roadside bombs) that include recovered fragments of the bombs. These databases are computerized, something which makes them a lot more useful for military researchers and planners. In fact, before the 1980s, when computerization became inexpensive and easy to implement, a lot of such military data was largely unknown to those who could use it and difficult to analyze in any event.

For example, during the Vietnam War the U.S. Army began studying each combat incident (that produced American casualties) with the same through investigative techniques it had earlier adopted for accidents. The accident investigation was meant to find common patterns that could be changed to avoid future accidents. It was believed the same useful lessons could be learned from analyzing combat incidents. Thus participants were interviewed, maps of the incident created and even the fragments taken from dead or wounded troops was retained, along with some of their medical records. Those records survived the war, but were "lost" until an enterprising Navy doctor (who began his military career as an enlisted SEAL in Vietnam and after medical school ended up teaching at the DoD Medical School) hunted them down in the 1980s and put the data on a computer for analysis. The results of that analysis was amazing (showing patterns of successful, and unsuccessful attacks.) So by the 1990s, with everyone in the military using a PC, and powerful (easy to operate) database software available, the military CSI drill became standard and increasingly useful. By the time the Iraq war came along, everyone was into thorough reconstruction of combat events. The reason was simple; to find out where the mistakes were and correct them. In the past the analysis had to be done using data stored on punched cards and subjected to analysis using card sorting equipment. The mainframe computers didn’t become affordable until the 1970s and even then good statistical software and random data access was not cheap enough to make intense analysis possible. That all changed with the personal computer and microchip revolution that got started in the 1970s and matured by the 1990s.

This data revolution first made itself felt in Iraq. After the defeat of Saddam's armed forces in 2003 fighting continued with hit and run attacks by Saddam loyalists and Islamic radicals. These attacks hit a peak of about 30 a day in early November 2003. Each such incident was treated to the full CSI drill. Photos were taken, maps drawn, troops and witnesses interviewed and damage (if any) inspected, along with enemy weapons or munitions (if available). Officers and NCOs then examined each incident and look for things U.S. troops might have done to avoid getting hit, or to strike back at the ambushers. Since all of these incidents went into one database, it was also possible to look for patterns. Oddly enough, because of this CSI database, American investigators know more about enemy tactics than most enemy fighters. This is because the Iraqi opposition consists of several pro-Saddam or anti-Western factions, and these groups cannot easily communicate with each other. While the attackers kept trying different types of attacks, coalition forces just as quickly developed new defensive measures. There's nothing really new in these small combats, for the basic ideas have been around for decades and most are clearly described in paper and CD-ROM versions of al Qaedas "how to be an Islamic terrorist" manual. But the CSI work lets commanders know how well defensive measures are working, and which units are better at it than others. While the CSI operations take time and effort, the payback in information is literally a life saver.

As the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan continued the U.S. added new technologies and hardware as they became available. The “computer revolution” of the 1970s was really the beginning of a tech revolution that saw a sharp increase in the availability of new technology. The military is still scrambling to make the most of these new and, for most, unexpected technologies. One of the more useful bits of tech was the new software that made it possible to quickly find patterns that were otherwise undetectable and indecipherable. That sort of thing had been developing for over a century (since the invention of the punch card and mechanical tabulating devices, a technology that lasted into the 1980s). Suddenly you not only had unimaginable amounts of data but you had it anytime, anywhere as long as you had an Internet connection. In theory this should have been a tremendous advantage for those who had it. But it did not work out that way immediately. It took a few years for the troops to get everything working together. Now it’s taken for granted that data, captured anywhere, can be quickly processed (scanned, translated, and analyzed for useful patterns) and return (sometimes in hours or less) useful leads.

It was largely luck that much of this database and networking magic showed up about the same time as September 11, 2001. As expected in a new war there quickly developed unexpected new ways of fighting using the unexpected new technologies. Under the pressure of combat (which tends to dispense with all the usual peacetime delays and “we can’t do that” attitudes) solutions were quickly found that made the most of the new tools.

The best solutions were often the result of borrowing from commercial or government operations that were already using the new tech successfully. Thus the military was soon in touch with those that had already developed solutions to using the database/network/analytic software opportunities successfully. This connection was frequently made because of reservists (who were already users of these new tools) called up to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the most useful of these experienced users were the detectives, policemen, and other law enforcement specialists who found themselves under fire in Iraq or Afghanistan and wishing they had some of their new database tools from their civilian job. It wasn’t long before the army and marines had the new law enforcement tech and it changed warfare, and especially irregular warfare, forever.

A major innovation was the tremendous increase in the use of biometric (fingerprints, iris, facial recognition) identification. Before long the U.S. had developed tools that enabled combat troops to use biometrics on the battlefield. The main tool was called SEEK (Secure Electronic Enrolment Kit). This is a portable electronic toolkit that collects biometrics from people anywhere and at any time. This included fingerprint scans, eye (iris) scans, and digital photos of suspects. All this eventually ends up in a master database, which eventually contained data on millions of terrorists, suspected terrorists, their supporters, and other "persons of interest." Troops in the field can carry part of that database with them in their SEEK kits, so that wanted people can quickly be identified and captured. This is what the American commandos did on the 2011, Osama bin Laden raid. While DNA tests (which take hours to perform, on not-so-portable equipment) are the best form of ID, if you have fingerprints, iris scans, and a photo you are nearly as certain. Even just fingerprints and the face scan/photo is pretty convincing.

In Afghanistan the government used SEEK kits to collect data on nearly two million Afghans, so these people could be issued very secure (hard to fake) ID cards. For the government, this makes it more difficult for criminals, Taliban, and Islamic radicals in general to infiltrate the government or just operate freely. The U.S. has long been collecting biometrics from those they arrest, or otherwise encounter and want to positively identify. This data makes it easier to figure out who is naughty and who is not.

All this began during the war in Iraq. At the same time the Department of Defense adopted many practices that major police departments had long employed to track down criminals. Troops in Iraq, especially reservists who were police, noted that the war in Iraq was mostly police work (seeking individual terrorists among a large population of innocent civilians). One of the more useful techniques for this is biometrics. That is, every time the troops encounter a "person of interest," they don't just take their name and address, they also use SEEK to collect the biometric data. The fingerprints are particularly useful because when they are stored electronically you can search and find out immediately if the print you have just lifted from somewhere else, like off the fragment of a car bomb, is in there or not. The digital photos, from several angles, are also useful because these pictures are run through software that creates a numeric "ID" that can be used by security cameras to look for someone specific, or for finding someone from a witness description. Other nations are digitizing their mug shots, and this enables these people to be quickly checked against those in the American database.

Often bomb makers are found because of fingerprints lifted from bomb fragments. Later raids frequently encounter suspicious characters but no evidence that justifies an arrest, until the fingerprints are checked against the bomb maker and SEEK datavase. The database of IED fragments were also checked for design techniques, which can indicate which individual or team built a particular bomb. This use of fingerprints led to the identification of over a thousand people involved in making bombs. At least a hundred were put on terrorist watch lists and many were eventually arrested or killed. This included several Iraqis who made it to the U.S. as refugees (along with 70,000 other Iraqis). These men were arrested and prosecuted.

It only takes about two minutes per subject to use SEEK to take the biometric data, so any suspicious characters are quickly added to the master database. Now, after several years of this, raiding parties know to grab any guy who seems to panic at the sight of the biometrics equipment coming out. The terrorists know that biometrics is bad news for them and they fear it. Combat troops now get training on how to use the biometrics gear and everyone now accepts that this stuff is a powerful weapon in the war against terrorists. Adapting this expertise to creating very difficult-to-fake IDs is not a large leap but it's not one that will result in many press releases.

There’s always a downside and for espionage organizations the use of biometric information for identification documents, like passports and those used to access heavily guarded facilities, has become a major problem. The use of biometrics does its job very well keeping out spies, terrorists, and saboteurs. The downside is that it also limits the activities of your own spies. This has led to efforts by espionage agencies to get around this "problem." The espionage organizations will not comment on what, if any, solutions they have come up with. That is to be expected.

While biometrics is one success story for the sudden appearance of the data advantage, there were many areas where getting most out of data is still a work in progress. For example, military intelligence hoped that the networks and better data tools would make it easier to get new information from troops (just back or still in the middle of raids and patrols) to those who collect and analyze it and get the results of that analysis right back to the troops. Delays in doing this has always been a major problem because the analysis usually got back to the troops too late. Now, in theory, that should no longer be the case. But, all too often, it still is a problem. The chief obstacle is the troops and a lack of time, plus the distraction of being in a firefight or otherwise preoccupied with life-threatening situations. By trial and error solutions are being worked out.

Meanwhile, the intel analysts at all levels (battalion up to the very top) have learned a lot from the BI (Business Intelligence) industry, which has developed a lot of powerful research and marketing tools that have direct military application. This is all very geeky but the simple description is software that can quickly find patterns to huge quantities of data or activity. Thus the urgency with which troops grab enemy laptops or even large piles of paper records (even al Qaeda keeps lots of records). The troops know that quickly putting this stuff through a scanner, translation software, and analytics software will usually produce some new suspects to go after and often a current address as well.

The military also has lots of valuable historical data to mine. For example, there are detailed records of soldier and marine casualties. The army restricts access to the data, as it can provide the enemy with useful information on how effective they are. Some basic data is made public, but the details will be locked up for a decade or more. Studying this data is a full time job for many people in the military, and there is a constant stream of suggestions resulting from this analysis, and those suggestions often turn into yet another small decline in combat deaths.

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read

From: LindyBill12/5/2013 9:03:38 AM
   of 11914
Navy Doubles Down on Carrier-Launched ‘Blackjack’ Drone
21 Danger Room by Allen McDuffee

After more tests completed last month, the Navy and Marines decided that the RQ-21A Blackjack drone is worth the gamble. They're putting money on the program that could provide them with a dedicated multi-intelligence drone in a matter of months.

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last ReadRead Replies (1)

To: LindyBill who wrote (1428)12/5/2013 8:45:27 PM
From: unclewest
4 Recommendations   of 11914
When drones can defeat a large land-based force and and successfully occupy and retain control over terrain and large civilian populations, I'll be mightily impressed.

Until then, my bets are on the US Army and US Marine Infantry and all the fire support available to them.

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last ReadRead Replies (2)

To: unclewest who wrote (1429)12/6/2013 12:22:23 AM
From: LindyBill
   of 11914
When drones can defeat a large land-based force and and successfully occupy and retain control over terrain and large civilian populations

I hope we can be smart enough never to do that again.

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last ReadRead Replies (1)

To: LindyBill who wrote (1430)12/6/2013 3:42:51 AM
From: unclewest
1 Recommendation   of 11914
I hope we can be smart enough never to do that again.

I share your hope, but considering all the major wars of the 20th century (see below), followed by Afghanistan and Iraq in this century, and thinking about the bellicose regimes we continue to be confronted by, and the amount of pure profit generated by the industrial part of our war machine, I believe my hope is on very shaky ground.

There seems to be no end limit to some men's desire to impose pain on other humans. Ever more countries are developing weapons that are capable of delivering a knockout punch - even to us. And there is enough evil in some of those countries to attempt it. The notion that mutually assured destruction (MAD) will prevent war has (in my view) become obsolete, if it ever really existed.

The madmen of the world feed on the vulnerable. If weakness creates vulnerabilities, we are working our way to a bad outcome.

1914-1918 World War I
1915-1918 Armenian Genocide
1917 Russian Revolution
1918-1921 Russian Civil War
1919-1921 Irish War of Independence
1927-1937 Chinese Civil War
1933-1945 Holocaust
1935-1936 Second Italo-Abyssinian War (also known as the Second Italo-Ethiopian War or the Abyssinian War)
1936-1939 Spanish Civil War
1939-1945 World War II
1945-1990 Cold War
1946-1949 Chinese Civil War resumes
1946-1954 First Indochina War (also known as the French Indochina War)
1948 Israel War of Independence (also known as the Arab-Israeli War)
1950-1953 Korean War
1954-1962 French-Algerian War
1955-1972 First Sudanese Civil War
1956 Suez Crisis
1959 Cuban Revolution
1959-1973 Vietnam War
1967 Six-Day War
1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War
1990-1991 Persian Gulf War
1991-1995 Third Balkan War
1994 Rwandan Genocide

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read

To: unclewest who wrote (1429)12/7/2013 5:30:43 PM
From: Glenn Petersen
   of 11914
Drones are a tool, not a solution.

The unveiling of the RQ-180:

Message 29270023

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last ReadRead Replies (1)

To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1432)12/8/2013 4:29:28 AM
From: unclewest
6 Recommendations   of 11914
Drones are a tool, not a solution.

Concur, only a tool, and only one tool in a kit bag already full of tools

My point is boots on the ground managing all the direct and indirect fires available from all resources is the solution.
No war has been won without it.

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read

From: Hoa Hao12/11/2013 8:25:52 AM
2 Recommendations   of 11914
85-year-old U.S. Army sniper veteran proves he hasn't lost his skills as he picks off a target at 1,000 yards
By Simon Neville

He may be 85 years old, but when Army sniper veteran Ted Gundy was given the chance to show off the skills he used in World War Two, he proved he could still keep up with the very best.

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last Read

From: FJB12/13/2013 9:34:36 AM
   of 11914
Chinese warship, US missile cruiser nearly collided in Sourh China Sea standoff...
BY: Bill Gertz
December 13, 2013 5:00 am

A Chinese naval vessel tried to force a U.S. guided missile warship to stop in international waters recently, causing a tense military standoff in the latest case of Chinese maritime harassment, according to defense officials.

The guided missile cruiser USSCowpens, which recently took part in disaster relief operations in the Philippines, was confronted by Chinese warships in the South China Sea near Beijing’s new aircraft carrier Liaoning, according to officials familiar with the incident.

“On December 5th, while lawfully operating in international waters in the South China Sea, USS Cowpens and a PLA Navy vessel had an encounter that required maneuvering to avoid a collision,” a Navy official said.

“This incident underscores the need to ensure the highest standards of professional seamanship, including communications between vessels, to mitigate the risk of an unintended incident or mishap.”

A State Department official said the U.S. government issued protests to China in both Washington and Beijing in both diplomatic and military channels...

Share RecommendKeepReplyMark as Last ReadRead Replies (2)
Previous 10 Next 10