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   Technology StocksBoeing keeps setting new highs! When will it split?


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To: Eric who wrote (3650)5/9/2024 9:32:07 PM
From: longz
   of 3679
 
ERIC====>>> Boeing 737 catches fire and skids off the runway in Senegal, injuring 10 people | AP News

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From: John Koligman5/15/2024 12:02:12 PM
   of 3679
 
Justice Department says Boeing breached 2021 agreement that shielded it from criminal charges over 737 Max crashes
PUBLISHED TUE, MAY 14 20246:33 PM EDTUPDATED TUE, MAY 14 20247:43 PM EDT

KEY POINTS

  • Boeing broke a 2021 settlement that protected it from criminal prosecution over two fatal crashes of the 737 Max, federal prosecutors said.
  • Boeing must respond to the U.S. Department of Justice by June 13.
  • The DOJ said Boeing violated the agreement by failing to set up and enforce a compliance and ethics program to detect violations of U.S. fraud laws




Boeing 737 MAX airplanes are pictured outside a Boeing factory on March 25, 2024 in Renton, Washington.
Stephen Brashear | Getty Images

Boeing violated a 2021 settlement that protected it from criminal charges tied to the fatal 737 Max crashes, opening the company up to potential U.S. prosecution, the Department of Justice said Tuesday.

Federal prosecutors said in a court filing in Texas they are still determining “how it will proceed in this matter” and that Boeing will have 30 days to respond.

The airplane manufacturer broke the agreement by “failing to design, implement, and enforce a compliance and ethics program to prevent and detect violations of the U.S. fraud laws throughout its operations,” the DOJ said.

Boeing denied those claims.

“We believe that we have honored the terms of that agreement, and look forward to the opportunity to respond to the Department on this issue,” Boeing said.

In January 2021, Boeing agreed to pay $2.5 billion to settle a conspiracy charge with the Justice Department. After a roughly two-year probe, the DOJ accused the company of concealing information about its Max plane that had been involved in two crashes that claimed the lives of all 346 people on board.

Boeing had admitted that two of its 737 Max technical pilots “deceived” the Federal Aviation Administration about the capabilities of a flight-control system on the planes that was later implicated in the two crashes, the Justice Department said at the time.

“This is a positive first step, and for the families, a long time coming. But we need to see further action from DOJ to hold Boeing accountable, and plan to use our meeting on May 31 to explain in more detail what we believe would be a satisfactory remedy to Boeing’s ongoing criminal conduct,” Paul Cassell, a lawyer for crash victims’ families said in a statement on Tuesday.

The plane-maker has been under heightened federal scrutiny after a door panel blew out midair from a 737 Max 9 operated by Alaska Airlines on Jan. 5. A preliminary investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board said bolts that hold in the door plug, which fills an optional emergency exit, didn’t appear to be in place.

The near-tragedy has created a fresh crisis for Boeing, just as it was trying to stabilize its production and improve its reputation after the 2018 and 2019 crashes.

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To: Eric who wrote (3650)5/21/2024 5:37:07 PM
From: longz
   of 3679
 
Singapore Airlines: 1 dead, 30 injured after ‘severe turbulence’ rocks Boeing 777 (msn.com)

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From: John Koligman5/22/2024 2:14:43 PM
   of 3679
 
Frank Shrontz, 92, Dies; Led Boeing in the Last of Its Golden Years
Known for his leadership and his commitment to company culture, he left as chief executive in 1996, opening the door to a corporate makeover.


Frank Shrontz in 1991. He led Boeing through a restructuring that produced one of the most successful commercial aircraft ever put into service, the 777.Credit...Reuter Raymond/Sygma, via Getty Images


By Clay Risen

May 22, 2024Updated 11:59 a.m. ET

Frank Shrontz, a widely admired executive who led Boeing in the 1980s and ’90s, a decade of spectacular growth in both its bottom line and its prestige as one of the world’s premier aerospace companies — a period very different from its current crisis of public confidence — died on May 3 at an assisted living home in Seattle. He was 92.

His son Craig confirmed the death.

Although he spent the bulk of his career at Boeing, Mr. Shrontz, who had a law degree and an M.B.A., was an unlikely choice to lead a company that prided itself on letting engineers and not businessmen set the pace.

Yet during his time at the helm — he became president in 1985, chief executive in 1986 and chairman of the board in 1988 — he led Boeing through a growth market, a recession and a thorough restructuring that produced one of the most successful commercial aircraft ever put into service, the 777.

Mr. Shrontz was known as a calm hand at the company till, with an everymanager’s feeling for the rank and file. He walked the floors at the factories around Boeing’s headquarters in Seattle, and he regularly met with groups of employees to hear their views and gather ideas.



Mr. Shrontz in 1985. He was known as a calm hand at the company till, walking the floor at Boeing and regularly meeting with groups of employees.Credit...Peter Liddell/The Seattle Times

“Frank Shrontz is who I think about when people ask me who the Boeing C.E.O. needs to be,” Richard Aboulafia, the managing director of AeroDynamic Advisory, said in a phone interview.

His tenure started on a high note in the late 1980s, a boom time in commercial aircraft sales. But then came a pair of challenges: the recession of 1990 and 1991 and the end of the Cold War, which punched a hole in Boeing’s defense business.

Mr. Shrontz saw the downturn as an opportunity. Among other initiatives, he pushed Boeing into the space industry, landing a contract to build parts of the International Space Station. He also created teams drawn from different parts of the company — engineers, designers and manufacturing specialists — to develop and build aircraft, while investing heavily in what was then a novel technology: computer-assisted design.

The first major result of Mr. Shrontz’s restructuring was the 777. Designed from the ground up, it went from conception to production in just five years, astounding the industry. And it cost just $4 billion to develop, a figure dwarfed by the hundreds of billions the company has earned from it.

Yet he insisted that success had not gone to his head, or to Boeing’s.

“I don’t think any private company can consider itself to be bulletproof,” he told The Los Angeles Times in 1991. “I think as soon as you start getting complacent in that regard, you’re heading for serious problems. We run scared, and we think that’s the way it should be.”



Mr. Shrontz in 1986. He spent most of his career at Boeing before stepping down as chief executive and president in 1996 and as chairman a year later. Credit...Scott Takushi/The Seattle Times

Frank Anderson Shrontz was born on Dec. 14, 1931, in Boise, Idaho, the son of Thurlyn and Florence (Anderson) Shrontz. His father owned the only licensed Schwinn bicycle retailer in the city.

He studied law at the University of Idaho, graduating in 1954 and, after spending two years in the Army, enrolled in Harvard Business School. He received his M.B.A. in 1958, the same year he joined Boeing.

He married Harriet Ann Houghton in 1954. She died in 2012. Along with his son Craig, he is survived by another son, David, and two grandchildren. A third son, Richard, died in 2017.

Mr. Shrontz left Boeing in 1973 to join the Department of Defense, where he served as an assistant secretary of the Air Force and then as an assistant secretary of defense. He returned to Boeing in 1977, at which point he was singled out as a potential top executive.

He was assigned to run three of the company’s busiest programs, overseeing the 707, 727 and 737 jetliners. While many people in the company were focused on the glamorous 747, Boeing’s massive intercontinental jetliner, he invested heavily in the 737, a smaller workhorse of a plane — and his bet paid off, as domestic travel grew in the early 1980s, both in the United States and in foreign markets.

Mr. Shrontz stepped down as chief executive and president in 1996, and as chairman a year later. His departure coincided with another internal revolution at Boeing: In 1997 the company bought one of its major rivals, McDonnell Douglas, and in 2001 it moved its headquarters to Chicago from Seattle. (It is now based in Northern Virginia.)

The company had long relied on internal hires to occupy its upper ranks, but the influx of McDonnell Douglas executives changed everything. A new emphasis on profits and cost-cutting led to decades of underinvestment in safety and engineering, a change documented in the 2022 Netflix documentary “ Downfall: The Case Against Boeing.” The result, critics say, is a company very different from the one Mr. Shrontz ran.

In recent years Boeing has suffered a series of accidents and disasters. Within six months in 2018 and 2019, two Boeing 737 Max airliners crashed, one in Indonesia and the other in Ethiopia, killing 346 people.

Both crashes were traced to misfiring anti-stall sensors. A 2020 investigation by the U.S. House of Representatives found that the company had dismissed employee concerns about the sensors, and in 2021 Boeing agreed to pay $2.5 billion to settle fraud charges.

More accidents followed, including an incident in January in which a door plug on an Alaskan Airlines 737 Max blew out. (No one was seriously injured.) On May 14 the Department of Justice found that the company had violated the terms of the 2021 settlement.

Earlier this year Boeing’s chief executive, Dave Calhoun, and Larry Kellner, the chairman of the board, announced that they would step down.

Since his retirement, Mr. Shrontz had rarely spoken directly about the decline of his old company’s reputation. But his views were not hard to parse from interviews.

“There was a lot of pride among the people,” he said of Boeing in an interview with The Puget Sound Business Journal in 2015. “It was kind of a family feeling, a feeling you don’t find at modern companies where people are much more likely to hire in, stay for a few years and move on.”

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From: John Koligman5/23/2024 1:42:13 PM
   of 3679
 
Boeing expects a 2024 cash burn, slow recovery of airplane deliveries amid crisis, CFO says
PUBLISHED THU, MAY 23 202411:20 AM EDTUPDATED AN HOUR AGO

KEY POINTS

  • Boeing’s CFO forecast the company would have negative free cash flow in 2024 as manufacturing troubles persist.
  • Boeing has slowed production since a door plug blew out of a nearly-new 737 Max 9 in January.
  • Aircraft deliveries won’t likely improve in the second quarter from the first, CFO Brian West said.




An American Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight from Los Angeles approaches for landing at Reagan National Airport shortly after an announcement was made by the FAA that the planes were being grounded by the United States in Washington, U.S. March 13, 2019.
Joshua Roberts | Reuters

Boeing will burn through cash this year and deliveries of new planes won’t improve in the second quarter from the first, as the manufacturer deals with a host of production challenges tied to its best-selling planes, the company’s CFO Brian West said Thursday.

A month ago, West forecast Boeing would generate free cash flow “in the low single-digit billions.” The new forecast shows the mounting costs of the planemaker’s latest crises.

Boeing burned through nearly $4 billion in cash in the first quarter and West said that figure could be similar or “possibly a little worse” in the second quarter, but that the company would likely return to generating cash in the second half of 2024.

The company’s aircraft deliveries in the first quarter fell to the lowest level since the pandemic. The bulk of a plane’s price is paid when it’s handed over to a customer.

Boeing’s shares were down 5% in midday trading after West’s comments at a Wolfe Research industry conference

“We have frustrated and disappointed our customers because of some of the production supply chain issues that we’re up against,” West said at the conference. “And while I understand that frustration, the most important thing we can do for our customers and the supply chain in the industry is to focus on the actions that are underway as we speak so that we could stabilize this production system, improve quality, and get more predictable.”

Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun in March said he would step down by the end of the year, and the company replaced the chairman and chief executive of its commercial airplane unit. Leading up to the shakeup, CEOs of major airline customers complained about delivery delays and difficulty planning flights because of surprise disruptions.

Boeing’s latest production issues surfaced after a door plug blew out midair from a nearly-new 737 Max 9 at the start of the year, just as the company was trying to repair years of reputational damage from two fatal Max crashes in 2018 and 2019.

The accident increased federal scrutiny of the company, whose executives have vowed to stamp out production flaws and regain the trust of regulators, airline customers and the public.

Next Thursday, Boeing leaders are set to meet with the Federal Aviation Administration to present the company’s plan to improve its quality control, the FAA said. The agency gave Boeing 90 days to complete the plan starting in late February.

Other problems have also sprung up, including a pause on deliveries of 737 Max planes to China to review batteries for the cockpit voice recorder. Boeing said in a statement that it is working with “our Chinese customers on the timing of their deliveries as the Civil Aviation Administration of China completes its review of batteries contained within the 25-hour cockpit voice recorder assembly unit.”

Parts shortages have also slowed deliveries of 787 Dreamliners, Boeing has said. American Airlines last month said it would cut some international flights because of delays of the wide-body jets. Other carriers, including United Airlines and Southwest Airlines, said they had to scale back some of their growth and hiring plans because of delayed Boeing jets.

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From: longz5/26/2024 10:17:26 PM
   of 3679
 
ERIC--->>> BOEING--->>> 12 people injured during turbulence on Qatar Airways flight (wvtm13.com)

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From: John Koligman5/30/2024 7:07:03 PM
   of 3679
 
More cash burn for longer?

FAA won’t clear Boeing to increase 737 Max production for several months, agency head says
PUBLISHED THU, MAY 30 20248:28 AM EDTUPDATED 3 HOURS AGO

KEY POINTS

  • Boeing’s departing CEO Dave Calhoun and other top leaders met with the Federal Aviation Administration to present its safety plan.
  • The FAA in February gave Boeing 90 days to come up with a quality improvement plan in the wake of a near-catastrophic door plug blowout on an Alaska Airlines flight in January.
  • Boeing spelled out improvements in employee training, platforms for workers’ concerns and the reduction of out-of-sequence work




Boeing 737 Max 8 fuselages manufactured by Spirit Aerosystems in Wichita, Kansas are transported on a BSNF train heading west over the Bozeman Pass March 12, 2019 in Bozeman, Montana.
William Campbell | Corbis News | Getty Images

It will likely be months before the Federal Aviation Administration clears Boeing to increase production of its bestselling 737 Max, the head of the agency said Thursday.

The FAA in January barred the manufacturer from boosting production of the planes weeks after a door plug blew out midair from a new 737 Max 9, just minutes into an Alaska Airlines flight. Federal safety investigators found that the bolts that hold the panel in place appeared not to have been installed before the plane was delivered to Alaska Airlines last year.

Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun and other top company leaders met with FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker and other agency officials earlier Thursday to present a quality improvement plan that the agency gave Boeing 90 days to produce, in which the company outlined its efforts to improve staff training and production practices at its factories.

“We will not approve production increases beyond the current cap until we’re satisfied,” Whitaker said. He said there isn’t a timeline but it wouldn’t likely be in the next few months.

Whitaker said at a press conference after the roughly three-hour meeting that Boeing’s work was far from complete and that the strong agency oversight of the company would continue.

Whitaker’s comments suggest a long road ahead for Boeing to ensure manufacturing quality. Meanwhile, it’s grappling with a crisis that has drained cash from an iconic U.S. company eager to improve its reputation after two fatal Max crashes in 2018 and 2019 killed 346 people. Whitaker is scheduled to brief lawmakers on the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on June 4.

“Boeing has laid out their roadmap, and now they need to execute,” he said.

The FAA said its senior leaders will meet with Boeing every week to review their performance metrics.



Federal Aviation Administration Administrator Mike Whitaker speaks at a news conference on the FAA’s work to hold Boeing accountable for safety and production quality issues, at the Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters on May 30, 2024 in Washington, DC.
Andrew Harnik | Getty Images

Boeing has reduced its production of the Max to stamp out production flaws, improve manufacturing processes and address increased FAA oversight.

Resulting aircraft delays have meant airline customers, such as United and Southwest, have had to redraw their growth plans.

Boeing has produced an average of 21 Max planes a month over the last three months, according to an estimate from Jefferies, well below the target rate of around 38 per month that it disclosed in mid-2023.

Lower production drives up costs, and fewer aircraft deliveries deprive the company of cash because airlines pay for the bulk of the plane’s price when they receive it.

Boeing Chief Financial Officer Brian West on May 23 said that the company expects to burn cash this year instead of generating it. For the current quarter alone, Boeing expects to use about $4 billion.

Boeing executives have acknowledged that the new plan won’t turn things around immediately.

“The 90-day plan ... is not a finish line,” West said at an investor conference last week. “We look forward to the feedback that we’ll get after next week.”

Boeing’s report detailed steps it’s taken to invest in its workforce, which is composed of thousands of new employees after experienced staff took exit packages during the pandemic. The manufacturer also said it would improve safety culture and eliminate defects.

The company said it has added 300 hours of training material and introduced workplace coaches. It said it is also clearing more time on managers’ schedules to be present on factory floors instead of in meetings.

The company said it has also reduced so-called traveled work, where required tasks on the planes are done out of sequence.

“We are confident in the plan that we have put forward and are committed to continuously improving,” said Stephanie Pope, chief executive of Boeing’s commercial airplane unit, who was appointed in March after an executive shake-up at the company. “We will work under the FAA’s oversight and uphold our responsibility to the flying public to continue delivering safe, high-quality airplanes.”

The manufacturer also included in its report information about factory “stand-downs,” in which it paused work to have conversations about potential improvements on production lines with employees. The manufacturer implemented those brief work pauses in the months after the Alaska Airlines door plug blowout.

Calhoun, who said he would step down by the end of the year, told staff in April that the company has received more than 30,000 “ideas on how we can improve” and that “speak up submissions” — concerns raised by staff — and comments were up 500% over 2023.


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From: longz6/7/2024 5:57:39 PM
   of 3679
 
ERIC====>>> BOEING===>>> Flames shoot from Air Canada Boeing jet moments after take-off: ‘We’ve got an engine fire holy s–t!’ (youtube.com)


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From: John Koligman6/10/2024 2:08:42 PM
   of 3679
 
A Big Decision for Boeing’s Next C.E.O.: Is It Time for a New Plane?
Some analysts say building a new plane soon would help the company regain ground it has lost to Airbus. But doing so would be difficult and expensive.

Credit...Palesa Monareng

Listen to this article · 8:08 min Learn more



By Niraj Chokshi

  • June 10, 2024


More than a decade ago, executives at Boeing made a pivotal decision: To keep up with the company’s main rival, Airbus, they gave up on the idea of developing a new airplane and raced to update the 737, the company’s most popular jet.

That effort culminated in the 737 Max, which had two fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019 and attracted more scrutiny this year when a panel blew out of one of the planes during a flight in January. The jet’s troubles have left Boeing behind Airbus in the global market for single-aisle planes, which it once dominated.

Now, Boeing, which is expected to appoint a new chief executive by the end of the year, has to make another critical choice: When should it develop its next brand-new plane?

If the company missteps, it could spend billions of dollars and still lose market share to Airbus, which is based in Toulouse, France. Both manufacturers also face a distant but rising threat from China and growing pressure to cut planet-warming emissions.

“That will be one of the most important decisions for whoever steps into the C.E.O. role,” said Ken Herbert, an aerospace and defense analyst at RBC Capital Markets. “Their legacy is going to be defined by what they do with the portfolio.”

Boeing declined to provide comment for this story.

Commercial planes are generally divided into two groups. Narrow-body, or single-aisle, planes like the 737 typically carry 100 to 200 passengers on domestic U.S. flights. Wide-body, or twin-aisle, planes can take more passengers farther — from, say, New York to London or Tokyo.

Boeing and Airbus sell many more narrow-body jets, but airlines are increasingly demanding larger versions of those planes because of limited gates and runway capacity at many airports and growing demand in travel.

The Max was designed to compete against the Airbus A320neo family of planes. Experts say the verdict in that contest is clear: Boeing lost. Airlines around the world have ordered many more of the Airbus jets, especially the largest, the A321neo. The European company’s lead was solidified after the Max crashes — which experts traced to poor design and engineering decisions — and the ensuing 20-month global ban on the plane.

In 2019, for the first time, Airbus had more passenger planes flying around the planet than Boeing did, according to Cirium, an aviation data provider.

The Max remains popular, especially with airlines in the United States, which have a long history of flying Boeing planes. The company is working to fill about 4,300 orders for the Max, a backlog worth hundreds of billions of dollars. But Airbus has sold far more of the A320neo family, with more than 7,100 outstanding orders for the three variants of that plane.

Boeing still leads when it comes to larger, twin-aisle planes, but Airbus’s dominance in the lucrative single-aisle market could prove self-reinforcing, experts said. With more sales coming in, Airbus can invest more in research and development. With more planes flying, it can earn more from selling spare parts and providing services.

“The entire time Boeing has been running around putting out fires, Airbus has just been running their business,” said Ron Epstein, an aerospace and defense analyst at Bank of America.

Boeing has also squeezed all it can out of the 737, which debuted in the late 1960s. In developing the Max, the company pushed that plane’s structure to its limits. Its next plane is likely to be one that it builds from the ground up, aviation experts said.

It was not clear what that new jet might look like or when it might arrive.

Dave Calhoun, Boeing’s chief executive, has said the company won’t roll out a new plane until the mid-2030s — partly because such a monumental effort would be worthwhile only when companies like General Electric, Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney introduced more efficient engines.

But building a new plane could help Boeing fill an important gap in the market for larger-narrow-body jets, some experts said.

Airbus’s most popular plane, by far, is the A321neo, which has the most seats and can travel the farthest of the company’s three neo models. Boeing’s answer to that plane, the 737 Max 10, does not fly quite as far and has yet to be approved by regulators.

Mr. Epstein of Bank of America estimated last year that Boeing could sell 6,500 larger single-aisle jets to airlines, mostly to replace smaller narrow-body planes. That jet could be developed in seven to eight years for an investment of up to $20 billion, with Boeing generating at least five times as much in gross profits, he said at the time.

Some aviation experts also argue that Boeing and Mr. Calhoun have been too cautious about committing to a new plane, which they said could be more efficient even without waiting for new engines. Newer materials, different kinds of wings and other advancements could help Boeing achieve meaningful improvements, they said.

“If you present the airlines with a reasonably good plane, they’ll take it,” said Michel Merluzeau, an analyst at AIR, an aerospace and defense consulting firm.

The longer Boeing takes to build a new plane, some said, the longer Airbus has to expand its lead. And while new engines promise big gains in efficiency, they may fall short in practice. Airlines may also be slow to buy planes powered by those engines, especially after problems with the current generation’s engines, which have needed more and longer repairs than expected.

But others said it could be wise for Boeing to wait. If the company moves too soon, Airbus could swoop in with an even newer, better aircraft.

Most analysts expect Airbus to release a new plane in the middle of the next decade, around the same time that Mr. Calhoun has targeted. Aviation experts disagree on whether Airbus would move first or wait to follow Boeing, but say the European manufacturer is well positioned for either approach.

Developing a new plane is a huge undertaking. Unlike wide-body planes, narrow-body jets are sold in larger numbers and, thus, need to be churned out rapidly; Boeing and Airbus aim to produce dozens every month. To accommodate that pace, Boeing will have to develop a complex production system and prepare its suppliers. Airlines will also probably have to be willing to train pilots for a new jet, an expensive and time-consuming process.

Ultimately, any new plane will also have to last for decades, Mr. Calhoun said in an interview with Aviation Week, a trade publication, last year.

“Twenty years is a disaster; 30 years is a disaster,” he said. “They’ve got to last 50 years.”

Of course, Boeing would not be starting from scratch. The company and Airbus are constantly developing and issuing new techniques, technologies and tools. Boeing can apply lessons learned elsewhere, for example, from developing the wide-body 787 Dreamliner, which it first delivered to an airline in 2011, or the coming 777X, a more efficient version of an existing wide-body Boeing plane whose wing the company will make in house with composite materials.

The company is also working on experimental technologies. With NASA, Boeing is developing a longer, thinner wing supported by braces, a design known as the Transonic Truss-Braced Wing. It also maintains a research program known as the ecoDemonstrator, which uses modified planes to test new technologies. Both Boeing and Airbus are also separately experimenting with the use of sustainable fuels, which can be made from used cooking oil, waste, corn and other materials.

Aviation experts said building a new plane could generate new enthusiasm for the company after its recent problems.

“If they can make it easier for people to like them, I think they’ll find there is quite a lot of support out there for a new, improved Boeing,” said Rob Stallard, an analyst who covers both Boeing and Airbus at Vertical Research Partners.

Niraj Chokshi writes about aviation, rail and other transportation industries. More about Niraj Chokshi

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From: John Koligman6/14/2024 12:57:26 PM
   of 3679
 
F.A.A. Investigating How Counterfeit Titanium Got Into Boeing and Airbus Jets
The material, which was purchased from a little-known Chinese company, was sold with falsified documents and used in parts that went into jets from both manufacturers.


A Boeing manufacturing facility. The company has been under intense scrutiny after a series of recent mishaps and safety issues.Credit...Logan Cyrus/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images


By Mark Walker

Reporting from Washington

June 14, 2024, 5:00 a.m. ET

Sign up for the On Politics newsletter. Your guide to the 2024 elections. Get it sent to your inbox.

Some recently manufactured Boeing and Airbus jets have components made from titanium that was sold using fake documentation verifying the material’s authenticity, according to a supplier for the plane makers, raising concerns about the structural integrity of those airliners.

The falsified documents are being investigated by Spirit AeroSystems, which supplies fuselages for Boeing and wings for Airbus, as well as the Federal Aviation Administration. The investigation comes after a parts supplier found small holes in the material from corrosion.

In a statement, the F.A.A. said it was investigating the scope of the problem and trying to determine the short- and long-term safety implications to planes that were made using the parts. It is unclear how many planes have parts made with the questionable material.

“Boeing reported a voluntary disclosure to the F.A.A. regarding procurement of material through a distributor who may have falsified or provided incorrect records,” the statement said. “Boeing issued a bulletin outlining ways suppliers should remain alert to the potential of falsified records.”

The revelation comes at a moment of intense scrutiny of Boeing and the broader aviation industry, which is reeling from a series of mishaps and safety issues. In January, a door panel blew off a Boeing 737 Max 9 jet while it was in flight, prompting several federal investigations. In April, Boeing told the F.A.A. about a separate episode involving potentially falsified inspection records related to the wings of 787 Dreamliner planes. Boeing reported to the F.A.A. that it might have skipped required inspections involving the jet’s wings and that it would need to reinspect some of the Dreamliners still in production.

On May 30, Boeing submitted a plan to the F.A.A. outlining safety improvements it planned to make and committed to weekly meetings with the agency. Dave Calhoun, the Boeing chief executive, is set to testify on Tuesday before a Senate panel on the company’s safety issues.

The use of potentially fake titanium, which has not been previously reported, threatens to extend the industry’s problems beyond Boeing to Airbus, its European competitor. The planes that included components made with the material were built between 2019 and 2023, among them some Boeing 737 Max and 787 Dreamliner airliners as well as Airbus A220 jets, according to three people familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. It is not clear how many of those planes are in service or which airlines own them.

Spirit is trying to determine where the titanium came from, whether it meets proper standards despite its phony documentation, and whether the parts made from the material are structurally sound enough to hold up through the projected life spans of the jets, company officials said. Spirit said it was trying to determine the most efficient way to remove and replace the affected parts if that ended up being necessary.

“This is about documents that have been falsified, forged and counterfeited,” said Joe Buccino, a Spirit spokesman. “Once we realized the counterfeit titanium made its way into the supply chain, we immediately contained all suspected parts to determine the scope of the issues.”

The titanium in question has been used in a variety of aircraft parts, according to Spirit officials. For the 787 Dreamliner, that includes the passenger entry door, cargo doors and a component that connects the engines to the plane’s airframe. For the 737 Max and the A220, the affected parts include a heat shield that protects a component, which connects a jet’s engine to the frame, from extreme heat.

Boeing and Airbus both said their tests of affected materials so far had shown no signs of problems.

Boeing said it directly purchased most of the titanium used in its plane production, so most of its supply was unaffected.

“This industrywide issue affects some shipments of titanium received by a limited set of suppliers, and tests performed to date have indicated that the correct titanium alloy was used,” Boeing said in a statement. “To ensure compliance, we are removing any affected parts on airplanes prior to delivery. Our analysis shows the in-service fleet can continue to fly safely.”

Airbus likewise maintained that “the A220’s airworthiness remains intact.”

“Numerous tests have been performed on parts coming from the same source of supply,” an Airbus spokeswoman said in a statement, adding, “The safety and quality of our aircraft are our most important priorities, and we are working in close collaboration with our supplier.”

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency did not respond to a request for comment.

Spirit has suffered from quality issues and financial troubles in recent years, and it came under new scrutiny this year after the episode in January involving the door panel of the 737 Max, whose fuselage it makes.

The problem illustrates the complex global supply chain used in producing modern jetliners, and the story of what appears to have gone wrong involves companies in China, Italy, Turkey and the United States.

The issue appears to date to 2019 when a Turkish material supplier, Turkish Aerospace Industries, purchased a batch of titanium from a supplier in China, according to the people familiar with the issue. The Turkish company then sold that titanium to several companies that make aircraft parts, and those parts made their way to Spirit, which used them in Boeing and Airbus planes.

In December 2023, an Italian company that bought the titanium from Turkish Aerospace Industries noticed that the material looked different from what the company typically received. The company, Titanium International Group, also found that the certificates that came with the titanium seemed inauthentic.

Turkish Aerospace Industries did not respond to a request for a comment.

Spirit began investigating the matter, and the company notified Boeing and Airbus in January that it could not verify the source of the titanium used to make certain parts. Titanium International Group told Spirit that when it bought the material in 2019, it had no clue that the paperwork had been forged, according to Spirit officials.

Francesca Conti, a general manager for Titanium International Group, said that the episode was under investigation and that she could not provide additional details. “We are cooperating with relevant authorities to address any issue eventually identified,” she said in an email.

The documents in question are known as certificates of conformity. They serve somewhat as a birth certificate for the titanium, detailing its quality, how it was made and where it came from, Spirit officials said.

People familiar with the situation said it appeared that an employee at the Chinese company that sold the titanium had forged the details on the certificates, writing that the material came from another Chinese company, Baoji Titanium Industry, a firm that often supplies verified titanium. Baoji Titanium later confirmed that it had not supplied the titanium. The origin of the titanium remains unclear.

“Baoji Titanium doesn’t know about the company and has no business dealing with this company,” the firm said in a statement to The New York Times.

Without knowing where the material came from or how it was handled, it is impossible to verify the airworthiness of the parts, said Gregg Brown, the senior vice president for global quality at Spirit.

“Our quality management process relies on the traceability of the raw materials all the way from the mills,” Mr. Brown said. “There has been a loss of traceability in that process and a documentation challenge.”

Spirit officials said they had started testing titanium parts to make sure aviation-grade material was used. The company is testing components that are still in stock and that are on undelivered fuselages.

So far, Spirit’s testing has confirmed that the titanium is the appropriate grade for airplane manufacturers. But the company has been unable to confirm that the titanium was treated through the approved airplane manufacturing process. The material passed some of the materials testing performed on it but failed others.

Mr. Buccino, the Spirit spokesman, said the company was working with customers to identify the affected planes. Aircraft that are already in service will be monitored by airlines and removed from service earlier than normal if warranted, he said. More likely, he said, the affected parts will be removed during routine maintenance checks regardless of whether the titanium checks out.

Olivia Wang contributed reporting from Hong Kong. Kitty Bennett contributed research.

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