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   Strategies & Market TrendsAnthony @ Equity Investigations, Dear Anthony,

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From: StockDung4/15/2008 11:46:54 AM
   of 122034
Wachovia's California nightmare
The 2006 purchase of Golden West has saddled the bank with a problem of growing proportions.

By Roddy Boyd, writer
Last Updated: April 14, 2008: 3:46 PM EDT

NEW YORK (Fortune) -- Wachovia investors are paying through the nose for the bank's ill-advised California gold rush.

Shareholders in Charlotte, N.C.-based Wachovia (WB, Fortune 500) were rocked Monday by a nasty one-two punch: a sudden (and dilutive) sale of common and convertible preferred stock, and the bank's first quarterly loss since 2001. Wachovia swung to a $350 million loss in the first quarter, reversing the year-ago $1.2 billion profit, as the bank posted weak numbers across its businesses. The breadth of the bank's losses stunned Wall Street, sending shares down 10%.

Though Wall Street was rife with whispers in recent weeks of a possible writedown at Wachovia, Monday's investor presentation makes for some sober reading. Among many other things, the bank took a $2 billion charge for "market-disruption" losses in the quarter, including a surprisingly high $729 million for unfunded loans and leveraged finance positions. Wachovia also took a $2.8 billion provision to cover credit-related losses.

The most compelling reading, however, concerns the former Golden West Financial, which Wachovia acquired in 2006 for $24.6 billion. And by "compelling," we mean cringe-inducing.

Golden West was a leading issuer of so-called option adjusted rate mortgages (ARMs) - loans that give borrowers the right to pay less than the full bill - with a portfolio now valued at roughly $120 billion. Wachovia's holdings of those loans are getting painful: Wachovia said its reserve for possible loan losses on Golden West's portfolio of Pick-a-Pay variable rate mortgages surged in the latest quarter to $1.1 billion, while late payments nearly doubled to 3.1% of the portfolio.

While a possible $1.1 billion loss hardly seems newsworthy in this era of multibillion writedowns, the fact that 58% of Wachovia's option ARM portfolio is based in California is problematic. Independent research boutique CreditSights argues that a new computer model put into use for Wachovia's risk management is implying losses of between 7% and 8% for the Pick-a-Pay portfolio. That could mean another $2 billion of potential losses. The bank estimated that 14% of the loans appeared to have negative equity, or loan-to-value percentages of greater than 100.

To be sure, Wachovia has avoided the high-profile meltdowns sustained by Bear Stearns (BSC, Fortune 500), which was sold last month to JPMorgan Chase (JPM, Fortune 500), and Citi (C, Fortune 500) and Merrill Lynch (MER, Fortune 500), both of which ousted their CEOs late last year after disclosing massive losses on mortgage-backed securities. Wachovia's chief executive, G. Kennedy Thompson, appeared contrite, telling investors that he was "deeply disappointed" by the bank's quarterly performance.

But last year, Kennedy was sounding optimistic. "We feel confident about the superior credit quality of our mortgage portfolio, the prospects for cross-selling our product set in Golden West markets, and originating Pick-a-Pay mortgages through traditional Wachovia channels," Kennedy told investors on last April's first-quarter conference call.

The bitter irony here is that, while option ARMs can be problematic for both the consumer and the mortgage holder in a housing collapse, Golden West was almost universally held to be the most conservative and ethical underwriter in that marketplace. CreditSights said calls Wachovia's management "top-flight," but says bank management was caught "off-guard" by the housing market's rapid collapse.

As bank investors are painfully aware by now, Wachovia executives aren't the only ones caught flat-footed in this market.

First Published: April 14, 2008: 2:24 PM EDT
Wachovia's big mortgage buy
The smart money saves WaMu
What Warren thinks...

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From: StockDung4/15/2008 11:48:50 AM
   of 122034
FORUM: A monster shunned? By Donn W. Vickrey
April 15, 2008

In the April 11 opinion piece "Shortchanged," Jonathan Johnson of wrote to express his concerns regarding "naked short selling." While I applaud Mr. Johnson"s dedication to a cause that he feels strongly about, I take issue with one of the basic premises of his thesis. Mr. Johnson argues that the financial press has somehow "short changed" Overstock"s battle with investment banking Goliaths and, therefore, neglected "the interests of increasingly disenfranchised small investors and victim companies." Perhaps Mr. Johnson should pay heed to Nietzsche"s advice that "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster."

Given Mr. Johnson"s stated agenda, I find it ironic that his employer,, has a long history of lashing out at critics who dare to express a contrary opinion. Since July 2004, has consistently engaged in what the New York Times described as a "campaign of menace" (Feb. 25, 2006) wherein the Internet retailer has accused a broad assortment of analysts, investors, journalists, politicians, regulators and others in an improbable conspiracy to drive down its share price. For whatever reason, it"s the publishers of contrary viewpoints that have received the harshest treatment from, including a libel suit filed against my firm, an independent research company called Gradient Analytics, and targeted public criticism on more than 20 individual journalists. A half a dozen of those journalists also received SEC subpoenas in regards to Overstock"s "jihad."

The campaign of menace was escalated in late 2005, when Overstock apparently approached another disgruntled issuer, a Canadian drug firm called Biovail Corp., to join in the "jihad." Biovail"s role in the "jihad" is particularly disconcerting in light of a recently filed SEC complaint (March 24, 2008) alleging that "Biovail and [its] senior executives engaged in a pattern of systemic, chronic fraud that impacted its public filings of quarterly and annual reports over the course of four years."

According to Overstock Chairman Patrick Byrne"s own admissions, he "had a hand in" Biovail"s decision to file suit against 27 critics, including Gradient and analysts at Bank of America and Gerson Lehrman, by "sharing his wealth of information" with executives at the Canadian firm (New York Times, Feb. 25, 2006). Unfortunately for those caught in the cross-fire, Biovail"s retaliation has included not only costly litigation but a plethora of other dirty tricks such as hiring private investigators to harass analysts and conduct surveillance on firm principals. Other examples of issuer retaliation include several individuals who posed as potential clients to gain access to the offices of two of Biovail"s critics, the use of a stolen logon ID and password to access a Gradient server from the office of a Biovail attorney (IP address and login activity dutifully documented), and a decidedly slanted "60 Minutes," episode that obscured key facts and attempted to shift the blame from executives whom the SEC now alleges to have committed accounting fraud.

While the price paid by analyst firms is often steep, we must not lose sight of the fact that the most significant damage from issuer retaliation is the adverse impact on the investors who Mr. Johnson and Overstock claim to be advocates for. First, there is the direct impact on investors who are misled when an issuer successfully eliminates dissenting opinions by retaliation against contrarian analysts and journalists. Since filing its vexatious lawsuit in February 2006, Biovail shareholders have lost over half of their investment. Overstock shareholders have faired even worse. Second, there is the indirect impact that occurs when investors lose confidence in a system that strongly discourages analysts and journalists from expressing legitimate concerns.

The SEC has had the problem of issuer retaliation on its agenda now for nearly three years. The last word out of Washington came on Sept. 1, 2005, when SEC Chairman Christopher Cox responded to concerns expressed by Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden, indicating that the commission was "reviewing this matter and is currently considering several possible solutions for recommendation." A hand written note from the chairman, written at the bottom of the letter, also indicated that, "This is indeed a concern and we will tackle it." Our representatives and regulators must act now to tackle the problem of issuer retaliation before it gets any worse.

As for Mr. Johnson and his employer, if it is truly the small, disenfranchised investor that you are advocating for, please take a look in the mirror. It is only a matter of time before Mr. Hyde once and for all takes over from the good Dr. Jekyll.

Donn W. Vickrey is cofounder and editor-in-chief of Gradient Analytics Inc.

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From: StockDung4/15/2008 12:21:53 PM
   of 122034
FURTHER MTXX VINDICATION!! The Robins Group LLC (CRD #41894, Portland, Oregon) and Marcus Whitney Robins
(CRD #870347, Registered Principal, Portland, Oregon) submitted a Letter of
Acceptance,Waiver and Consent in which the firm was censured, fined $25,000, $5,000
of which was jointly and severally with Robins. Robins was suspended from association
with any FINRA member in any capacity for 20 business days and fined an additional
$31,458.59, which includes disgorgement of $16,458.59 in financial benefits received.
Without admitting or denying the findings, the firm and Robins consented to the
described sanctions and to the entry of findings that the firm permitted research
analysts, including Robins, to execute sales of securities in research analyst accounts
in a manner inconsistent with their recommendations, as reflected in the most recent
research reports the firm published. The findings stated that the firm permitted
research analysts, including Robins, to execute transactions of securities issued by
companies that the research analysts followed in research analyst accounts 30 days
before and five days after the publication of a research report concerning the
companies. The findings also stated that the firm authorized stock transactions that
NASD Rule 2711(g)(3) prohibited, purportedly based on an unanticipated change in
the personal financial circumstances of the beneficial owner of the research analyst
account, and failed to maintain written records regarding the transactions and the
justification for permitting themfor three years after the dates when the transactions
were approved. The findings also included that the firm, acting through Robin,
published research reports another analyst had written regarding a company, but the
report did not disclose that the company had compensated the analyst within the past
12 months. FINRA found that the firm published research reports regarding a company
and failed to disclose that the company had compensated a business entity affiliated
with the firm within the past 12 months. FINRA also found that Robins published
magazine articles, which a research analyst considered to be public appearances, and
failed to disclose to the publisher that he or a member of his household had a financial
interest in the securities of the companies, and the firm failed to maintain records of
the articles sufficient to demonstrate Robins’ compliance with the applicable disclosure
requirements of NASD Rule 2711(h) for three years after the articles were published.
In addition, FINRA determined that the firm failed to adopt or implement written
supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that it and its employees comply
with NASD Rule 2711.Moreover, FINRA found that the firm published on its Web site
an inaccurate list of its registered persons, including its research analysts, and the
companies covered by their research, because some of the persons had terminated
their association with the firm.
The suspension in any capacity was in effect from March 17, 2008, through April 14,
2008. (FINRA Case #2005001863901)

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To: StockDung who wrote (103308)4/15/2008 12:28:55 PM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell
   of 122034
I always wondered about Overstock's IR department. Now it's clear: "IR" stands for Issuer Retaliation. Thanks for posting that.

- Jeff

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From: SamAntar4/15/2008 1:10:32 PM
   of 122034
To's Audit Committee:

Free advice from Minkow, Antar, and Simpson (SEC guy that busted me)

Kindest regards,

Sam E. Antar (former Crazy Eddie CFO and a convicted felon)

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From: a-hole4/15/2008 3:08:47 PM
   of 122034
Greenberg is leaving Marketwatch. Anyone know why?

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To: a-hole who wrote (103312)4/15/2008 3:53:56 PM
From: kknightmcc
   of 122034
According to Herb Greenberg:

11:43:11 AM April 15th, 2008
On a Personal Note…
Just a bit of housekeeping – actually, house cleaning!

On May 1, I’m leaving MarketWatch, Dow Jones and traditional journalism to start an independent research firm with my friend, Debbie Meritz, an analyst/accountant who has been a very good source of ideas in the past.

I’ve devoted my career to journalism, starting in elementary school by delivering copies of the Miami News from my bicycle, to my first job out of college in 1974 as the first business reporter for the Boca Raton News.

I’ve since been part of the evolution of modern business journalism, working from beat reporter to correspondent to columnist to blogger.

When Debbie and I first started talking about the idea of setting up a research firm, it seemed like the next logicial step, just as it did when I left traditional print journalism 10 years ago to join the fledging online world.

Change is never easy, especially leaving a place as great as MarketWatch, which has been my home for the past four years. But change is also exciting and I’m looking forward to the next adventure.

Until then… you’re stuck with me for a few more weeks.

The beat goes on…

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From: StockDung4/15/2008 4:46:18 PM
   of 122034
UPDATE 2-US research firm countersues Web retailer Overstock
Tue Apr 15, 2008 1:14pm EDT
(Adds Overstock comment, trial date, byline)

By Martha Graybow

NEW YORK, April 15 (Reuters) - Gradient Analytics Inc has countersued (OSTK.O: Quote, Profile, Research) and the company's chief executive, Patrick Byrne, contending they waged a smear campaign after the research firm published unflattering reports about the online retailer.

In a 2005 lawsuit, Overstock accused Gradient of conspiring with hedge fund Rocker Partners, now known as Copper River Partners, to write negative research reports about the retailer and drive down its stock price. The hedge fund took a short position in the stock, which allowed it to profit from the stock decline, according to Overstock's claims.

Gradient said it filed its lawsuit on Monday after the California Superior Court granted its motion to bring the counterclaims. It accuses Byrne of libeling the research firm in remarks made to reporters, money managers and market analysts during conference calls and media interviews from 2004 to 2006.

"Public companies cannot have license to libel research firms and use litigation to retaliate against analysts who are critical of their business," Gradient President and CEO Brad Forst said in a statement on Tuesday.

The research firm accuses Overstock of defamation, tortuous interference with prospective business relations, and unfair business practices.

Overstock General Counsel Mark Griffin said there was "nothing new in this cross claim" and that the company was studying whether it could have the research firm's lawsuit dismissed.

"We knew this was coming. It has been filed late in the proceedings," he said. "We have been going more than two years defeating Gradient at every stage of the litigation. All major court contests Overstock has won. We fully expect to win this one."

Overstock's lawsuit is set to go to trial on Sept. 9.

Shortly after Salt Lake City-based Overstock brought the case in 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission launched a probe into whether Scottsdale, Arizona-based Gradient helped manipulate stocks.

In February 2007, the SEC informed the research firm that it had ended the investigation and no enforcement action had been recommended, according to Gradient.

Overstock shares were down 2.3 percent to $13.49 in Tuesday afternoon trading on the Nasdaq. (Editing by Derek Caney and Tim Dobbyn)

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From: StockDung4/15/2008 4:58:57 PM
   of 122034
Some news out today on yet another Herb Greenberg victimized company:

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Savvides & Partners/PKF Cyprus, et al., Civil Action No. 06 CV 2223 (S.D.N.Y.)

Litigation Release No. 20527 / April 15, 2008
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2810 / April 15, 2008
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Savvides & Partners/PKF Cyprus, et al., Civil Action No. 06 CV 2223 (S.D.N.Y.)

PKF Cyprus Agrees to Injunction in Fraud Settlement in Connection With Audits of AremisSoft; Agrees to Pay $261,565 in Civil Penalties, Disgorgement and Prejudgment Interest
Savvides & Partners/PKF Cyprus (PKF Cyprus), a Cyprus-based accounting firm, has consented to the entry of a final judgment in the Commission's case charging it engaged in fraud in connection with its 1999 and 2000 audits of AremisSoft Corporation. The firm agreed to settle without admitting or denying the allegations in the Commission's complaint. The settlement, which is subject to Court approval, would permanently enjoin PKF Cyprus from violating or aiding and abetting violations of the anti-fraud, reporting, books and records and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws: Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Exchange Act Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13b2-1. As part of this settlement, and following the entry of the proposed final judgment against it, PKF Cyprus, without admitting or denying the Commission's findings, has consented to the issuance of an administrative order pursuant to Rule 102(e)(3) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, suspending it from appearing or practicing before the Commission as an accountant, with the right to apply for reinstatement after five years. PKF Cyprus will disgorge $106,513, which includes fees received as a result of its engagements to audit the financial statements of AremisSoft, with prejudgment interest of $48,539, and a $106,513 civil money penalty.

In its complaint filed March 21, 2006, the Commission alleged that PKF Cyprus issued audit reports for AremisSoft subsidiaries in 1999 and 2000 signed by former firm partner Pavlos Meletiou (also named as a defendant in the complaint) that falsely stated that its audits were conducted in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (U.S. GAAS) and that the subsidiaries' financial statements were fairly presented in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP). The false financial statements of these companies were included as part of AremisSoft's consolidated financial statements filed with AremisSoft's year 1999 and 2000 Forms 10-K filed with the Commission, and in AremisSoft registration statements. The complaint also alleges that the PKF Cyprus audit workpapers prepared by Meletiou during the 2000 audits of two AremisSoft subsidiaries, found in a trash heap outside AremisSoft's Indian offices, included phony customer and bank confirmations. The complaint further alleges that Meletiou attended meetings with senior AremisSoft executives in which the AremisSoft financial fraud was openly discussed.

For additional information, see Litigation Release No. 19622 / March 22, 2006.


AremisSoft: Not Answering Questions, Not
Telling the Whole Story
By Herb Greenberg
Senior Columnist
7/6/01 3:31 PM ET

Not telling the whole story, lapses in explanations or simply not answering
questions continues at AremisSoft (AREM:Nasdaq - news - commentary).
Most of the focus, so far, has been on whether the company last year
received $7 million from Bulgaria's National Health Insurance Fund, as
AremisSoft claims, or $1.7 million, as has been claimed by the fund. The
company has not explained the discrepancy.

But that's not the only question AremisSoft won't address.

Consider the case of Info-Quest, a Greek company. In 1999 Info-Quest
bought 3 million shares of stock from AremisSoft and AremisSoft CEO
Lycourgos Kyprianou. Then, last year, Info-Quest said in an SEC filing that it
had bought another 692,923 AremisSoft shares "from AremisSoft." Funny,
AremisSoft never disclosed selling any shares to Info-Quest then. So, if not
AremisSoft, from whom did Info-Quest buy the shares? (I ask only because
according to its SEC filings, Info-Quest deposited the proceeds, in escrow,
with AremisSoft's attorneys, which suggests the shares are from AremisSoft
or insiders.)

I asked that question on June 22, in an email to AremisSoft Executive Vice
President Paul Bloom, as well as an official of Info-Quest, and both responded
that shares were bought from "selling shareholders," not AremisSoft.
(Info-Quest followed up with an amended 13-D that included the clarification.
This was the second of my inquiries, in recent weeks, that resulted in an
amended SEC filing related to AremisSoft. The first was its 10-K, which was
amended after I made an inquiry by email about why AremisSoft didn't include
a signed copy of its independent auditors report. Talk about lapses!)

OK, so who were the selling shareholders? Neither AremisSoft nor Info-Quest
will say. Bloom said he would forward my question, though didn't say to whom
he was forwarding it. (I never received a response from the forwardee.) If the
sellers were insiders, shouldn't the sellers have filed the sale with the SEC?
Or were these unregistered shares sold in a private transaction? Or were the
shares from nonexecutive holders who owned the shares long enough to avoid
an above-the-radar filing on the SEC's EDGAR system? Whatever the case,
it's a simple question to which there undoubtedly is a simple answer.
(Info-Quest has since dumped a large chunk of its AremisSoft holdings, with
most of the sales in recent weeks. No explanation was given for the sales.)

Next, there's a question about who AremisSoft Chief Financial Officer Michael
Tymvios really works for. His bio in AremisSoft's prior proxy statements says
that from 1991 to 1999 he was a partner at Morison International, which
AremisSoft describes as "a certified public accounting firm" based in the
United Kingdom. However, Bridgette Ovesen, executive director of Morison,
told my associate, Mark Martinez, that Tymvios wasn't a partner at Morison
because Morison has no partners.

Instead, she says, Tymvios is a partner at his own Cyprus accounting firm,
Patsalides & Tymvios, which is a member of Morison's network. (That's
confirmed, oddly enough, by Patsalides & Tymvios' Web site, which bills the
firm as "an associate member" of Morison. One of its specialties, by the way,
is helping set up offshore companies.) Ovesen adds that Tymvios is still a
partner in Patsalides & Tymvios, and his firm is still part of the network. So
which one is his full-time gig? Being CFO of AremisSoft or being partner in his
own accounting firm? I asked Bloom about Tymvios on June 29, via email, and
he never responded to the question. But (surprise, surprise) in an SEC filing
today, the company revised Tymvios' bio (the third change following one of my
questions!) to indicate that his relationship with his accounting firm lasted
from 1991 to 1999. (But that's not what Morison's Ovesen says!) And
AremisSoft also changed its description of Morison from being "a certified
public accounting firm" to " a network of independent accountants, tax
advisers, business consultants and lawyers." (Can't help but wonder what
other details will need to be revised.)

Oh, and that bit about Morison being an accounting firm? Not exactly.
According to Morison's Web site, Morison is a "world wide network of
professional business advisers, founded in 1990." I asked Bloom about
Tymvios last Friday, via email, along with several other questions, including
whether the company would ever respond to my prior question about who the
selling shareholders were. Bloom responded, but about something else I had
asked -- not about Tymvios or the identity of the "selling shareholders" who
sold to Info-Quest.

The question Bloom did respond to was why AremisSoft doesn't disclose,
somewhere in its proxy, that AremisSoft CEO Kyprianou is also
"nonexecutive chairman" of GlobalSoft, a Cyprus company in which
AremisSoft owns a 7.1% stake. (According to GlobalSoft's listing on the
Cyprus Stock Exchange, Kyprianou is also president of GlobalSoft.)
AremisSoft has disclosed Kyprianou's dual chairmanships in various press
releases and other public filings, but not in the one place you would expect to
see it: the proxy. Why not? Because, according to a company press release
Bloom referred me to, Kyprianou doesn't "directly" own any stock in
GlobalSoft. (He indirectly owns it through AremisSoft, in which he owns 3.78
million shares, or 9.62%.)

Which brings us to GlobalSoft (officially listed on the Cyprus exchange as
L.K. GlobalSoft, with the L.K. standing for Lycourgos Kyprianou): In April,
AremisSoft announced plans to boost its GlobalSoft stake to a controlling
59.5%. Last month, AremisSoft abruptly canceled the plan. Since then, the
stock of GlobalSoft, which makes software, has plunged, which is not good
news for GlobalSoft's nine largest investors, who bought majority control of
GlobalSoft's stock in late 1999.

In its prospectus (according to a translation from Greek), GlobalSoft said the
shares were shifted to those investors to "obtain a further broadening of the
capital base." Interestingly, six of those investors were registered on the
same day by the same attorney in the British Virgin Islands -- just two weeks
before they received the GlobalSoft shares. (For what it's worth, several
months earlier, an investment partnership whose sole purpose is managing
Kyprianou's stock option investments -- Sincock Holdings -- was registered
in the British Virgin Islands, using the same attorney. Kyprianou is identified
in an SEC filing as Sincock's investment manager.)

Not answering questions and not telling the whole story extends to
AremisSoft investor Irwin Jacobs, who seems to be acting as the de facto
spokesman for AremisSoft. Jacobs has taken numerous swipes at this
column in recent weeks for its coverage of AremisSoft. Much of Jacobs'
commentary, though, has been message board-esque: not telling quite the
whole story (and then not alerting readers when he changes the information).

On June 8, for example, Jacobs wrote on his Web site that Info-Quest had
publicly stated its intention to sell 1.5 million shares of AremisSoft "over 12 to
18 months. I understand," he wrote, "that they have already sold one million
shares." He then said he believed an SEC filing by the company to sell
another 500,000 shares "should complete their selling program." He added
that the Info-Quest sales "shouldn't be of any concern" because they're not
dilutive to existing holders and to his knowledge Info-Quest "is actually
looking for a price above $15 for their shares."

Jacobs later altered his letter (without any notice that it had been changed) to
remove the mention of price. For good reason: As it turns out, based on its
amended 13-D last week, Info-Quest actually sold nearly 2.2 million shares,
not 1.5 million. And the selling continues well beyond June 8 -- until June 27,
at prices that dipped below $13. What's more, earlier this week, Info-Quest
filed to sell another 480,000 shares. What does Jacobs think of Info-Quest's
sales now? He didn't respond to my email last week asking why there was a
discrepancy between what he wrote and what actually happened.

Not answering questions is common for companies under fire. But for a
company to simply ignore some questions, while answering others, is off the
baseline. Then again, so is the entire AremisSoft story.

Editor's note: In a lawsuit filed Tuesday in U.S. District Court in San
Francisco, AremisSoft claimed and a number of hedge funds
conspired to drive down the price of the software maker's stock. Click here to
read more.

Herb Greenberg writes daily for In keeping with TSC's
editorial policy, he doesn't own or short individual stocks, though he owns
stock in He also doesn't invest in hedge funds or other
private investment partnerships. He welcomes your feedback and invites you
to send any to Herb Greenberg. Greenberg also writes a monthly column for

Brian Harris assisted with the reporting of this column.

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From: StockDung4/15/2008 6:12:36 PM
   of 122034

"My firm Lebed Biz LLC has been compensated by a third-party (Doug Furth) 1,250,000 free-trading shares of SPNG for a one-month investor relations contract. I have already sold these shares. Never invest into a stock we discuss unless you can afford to lose your entire investment. For our full disclaimer go to: "

Sent: 4/15/2008 5:37:03 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time
Subj: Alert - SPNG just reported BREATHTAKING earnings!

SPNG just reported HUGE earnings... their 10-Q has been filed and a press release should be out shortly.

SPNG's 3Q revenues were $1,281,704 up 359% from 2Q revenues of $278,976!

SPNG's 3Q net income was $188,482 up 2,074% from 2Q net income of $8,668!

SPNG's 3Q net income on an annualized basis is $753,928.

SPNG finished the quarter with 196,294,078 shares outstanding. Based on that, SPNG's annualized EPS based on 3Q results would be $0.00384.

A modest P/E ratio of just 20 would value SPNG at $0.0768!

SPNG closed today at only $0.025!

SPNG also said in their 10-Q, "we have orders of approximately $18,391,702, which we anticipate will be filled by January 17, 2009". This means in the next three quarters SPNG will see SIGNIFICANT growth and the 3Q numbers that just came out... although HUGE... are ABSOLUTELY NOTHING compared to what's to come!

I believe SPNG is about to EXPLODE and this could become one of our BIGGEST plays ever!


My firm Lebed Biz LLC has been compensated by a third-party (Doug Furth) 1,250,000 free-trading shares of SPNG for a one-month investor relations contract. I have already sold these shares. Never invest into a stock we discuss unless you can afford to lose your entire investment. For our full disclaimer go to:

Jonathan Lebed

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