re Korea:
Thanks, good article.
Yes, I am more worried about Korea than Iraq. For better or worse, it is within our means to "solve" Iraq through Regime Change. I don't see that as an option with N. Korea.
I had not realized we had agreed to a nuclear-free S. Korea with inspections to verify.
<South Korea, its habitual toughness vitiated by America's string of concessions, had launched its own policy of conciliation>
Sunshine came from internal S. Korean politics, in the face of opposition from Washington. He implies, (and this is the NeoCon Party Line) that there would be no appeasement of enemies by our allies, no Sunshine policy in S. Korea or elsewhere, if the U.S. had consistently shown Resolve and Vigor. Truth is (and will be) exactly the opposite. That is, the more unilateral sabre-rattling the U.S. does, the more we look like a Rogue State to S. Korea, the more support Sunshine will have. How much of a coalition did we end up with, after a rigidly Vigorous Iraqi policy for the last year? We ended up with all our natural allies embracing a Sunshine policy toward Iraq. Precisely the opposite of what the NeoCons expected and predicted from their policy of unswerving unstoppable Resolve.
<by showing Kim proper respect, Carter had achieved a "miracle": the basis for a new agreement.>
The word for this is "diplomacy". What does it cost us, to be polite? The NeoCons shout abuse, engage in endless name-calling (and not just of our opponents, but our allies too; name-calling and demonizing seems to be their response to any opposition anywhere). NeoCons give lip service to the idea of war as a "last resort", yet won't talk, won't even be minimally polite, and thereby convince everyone that war is their FirstAndOnlyResort.
<In the ensuing months, Washington and Pyongyang reached an "Agreed Framework" under which North Korea would freeze its existing plutonium program. In exchange, it was to receive:
<A. two light-water reactors>
Never delivered.
The U.S. has stalled on providing the light-water reactors to North Korea and they have yet to begin construction.
(Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2001).
Although the 1994 Agreed Framework obligated the consortium to complete construction of both light water reactors by 2003, years passed without any action other than building the infrastructure needed to support the construction project. The U.S. calculated that North Korea would not long survive its economic difficulties, and that if construction of the reactors could be delayed long enough, they need never be built. Newly elected President Bush openly expressed his disdain for the 1994 Agreed Framework. It was only in August 2002 that cement was finally poured for the foundation of the first reactor, at Kumho on the eastern coast.
globalresearch.ca
<B. pending their completion, 500,000 metric tons of heavy oil annually, amounting to about 40 percent of the country's fuel consumption.>
This was the only provision of the agreement we had fulfilled. On November 14, 2002, those oil shipments were suspended. On December 12, 2002, N. Korea announced they would restart the nuclear facilities shut down by the Agreed Framework.
<C. In addition, various trade and diplomatic restrictions.....were to be lifted.>
Specifically, we promised:
The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.
3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the
Ambassadorial level.
4) provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
ceip.org
Some of these promises were vague, using words like "reduce", "move toward", "as progress is made". But, in the 9 years since the Agreed Framework, there has been no movement at all, toward any of these goals.
The United States and North Korea committed to move toward normalizing economic and political relations, including by reducing barriers to investment, opening liaison offices, and ultimately exchanging ambassadors.
The Clinton administration made some progress on fulfilling this aspect of the framework toward the end of its second term, most notably when then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang in October 2000. Additionally, in June 2000, Washington eased longstanding sanctions against North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Export Administration Act, clearing the way for increased trade, financial transactions, and investment. Pyongyang is still prohibited, however, from receiving U.S. exports of military and sensitive dual-use items and most related assistance.
Both sides commit not to nuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The United States must "provide formal assurances" not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Pyongyang is required to "consistently take steps" to implement the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The United States' most recent commitment to this obligation was in the October 12, 2000 Joint Communiqué between Washington and Pyongyang. The relevant portion reads: "The two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity."
Bush administration officials have said several times that the United States has no intention of attacking North Korea. A January 7, 2003 joint statement from the United States, Japan, and South Korea reaffirmed this commitment in writing, stating that the United States "has no intention of invading" North Korea.
The Bush administration, however, has sent mixed signals about its intentions toward North Korea. Pyongyang argues that the United States has not lived up to its commitment because President George W. Bush called North Korea part of an "axis of evil" in January 2002. North Korea also accuses Washington of targeting North Korea for a "preemptive nuclear attack."
In September 2002, the Bush administration released a report which emphasizes pre-emptively attacking countries developing weapons of mass destruction. It explicitly mentions North Korea. In addition, a leaked version of the Bush administration's January 2002 classified Nuclear Posture Review lists North Korea as a country against which the United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons, although it does not mention pre-emptive nuclear strikes.
armscontrol.org
Sanctions against North Korea by the United States has not been fully lifted, nor have both parties upgraded bilateral relationship to the Ambassadorial level. In the beginning of 2002, Bush named North Korea as a part of the axis of evil and later in March, the administration's Nuclear Posture Review specifically named North Korea as a possible target for a pre-emptive nuclear strike by the U.S.
ykuusa.org
"The Bush Administration has created a situation where the North Koreans are pushed into a corner. And their bad behavior becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that allows the Bush Administration to say, 'I told you so'," says Moon Chung-In, a specialist on North Korea at Yonsei University.
www3.sympatico.ca
We have given the N. Koreans good reason to think, "There is no reason to talk to the Americans. There is no reason to attempt a negotiated settlement; they are habitual liars, they have a track record of breaking their agreements. The only way to deal with these NeoCon Cowboys, is Force and the Threat Of Force; they respect nothing else. We need nuclear weapons, or they will do Regime Change on us." The mirror image of what the NeoCons say about N. Korea. Reciprocal demonization.
<even if we struck a grand bargain there would be no way of knowing that the other side was keeping its word>
The implications of this belief, is that the only way we can be safe, is to do ShockAndAwe, Regime Change, and Nation Building, in N. Korea and everywhere else that might develop WMD. A hopelessly ambitious plan. A fantasy of OverReach. Utopian.
A realistic, workable, real-world plan:
First, offer to negotiate, and offer to give them everything they want (except reunification on their terms), in return for everything we want (except Regime Change in N. Korea). Explicitly renounce Regime Change as a U.S. policy goal.
Message 18701268
Second, if they refuse the above Carrots, then (and only then) do we try the Stick. (You do remember, war is supposed to be the last resort?) Tell them that we would consider a mass artillery barrage of Seoul (for any reason) to be the use of a "weapon of mass destruction", and we would respond with tactical nuclear weapons instantly, as many as necessary to end the attack. Second, tell them we will start a selective blockade of N. Korea. All ships leaving their harbors will be inspected, and we will confiscate WMD, delivery vehicles (=missiles); also technology, materials, components for same. This will only work, of course, if S. Korea and China don't allow those items to be exported through them. So, we need to talk to them, and do whatever horse-trading is necessary, to present a united front on this semi-blockade. The only way we'd get them "on board" re blockades, is if we first "get on board" re Sunshine.
<Not only does the North's belligerence leave us no choice but to "think" about war, we cannot exclude the possibility of initiating military action ourselves.>
And that's the NeoCon bottom line. Pre-emptive Regime Change using unlimited violence, is the only solution, to this and every other problem. All negotiations are appeasement. This is the kind of thinking I'd expect from survivalist groups polishing their Bowie knives in the mountains of Idaho. The fact that it's coming from the intellectual wellspring of the U.S. government, the AEI, is profoundly frightening. |
