|To: h0db who wrote (134297)||5/24/2004 9:31:05 PM|
|From: Hawkmoon||Respond to of 280801|
|Hawk, have you ever led men in battle?|
Actually, since I'm no longer in the service, it's not relevant..(but the answer it no). But you claim to still be on active duty, and assumably that makes you a leader of men (or a very non-promotable Specialist).
But I don't have to be a combat leader to know one when I see it (or in this case, read about it).
But back to the point, what I presented you with was a individual WHO IS LEADING MEN IN BATTLE. Someone who is at the tip of the spear while you and I are sitting here playing armchair general..
When Shinseki retired last years as Chief of Staff of the Army, not one person from OSD attended the ceremony.
I know... I almost went because I felt so bad about that..
Or course, I had trouble with Shinseki because of that stupid idea of making everyone wear Black Berets made in China (they still look stupid).. I have a few buddies who are former Rangers and they weren't pleased either.
I'm saying that it is hard to conceive how it could have been handled worse.
Sure it could have.. It could have been handled just like Clinton "handled" it with Operation: Desert Fox back in 1998... Puff up the chest, throw a tantrum and throw a few bombs, and then just cave in again..
Could we have used more troops? Certainly.. Have there been delays in getting a handle on the insurgents and security situation there? Probably..
But as that solder fighting Sadr specified, there was simply no way we could have taken on Sadr previously while he still possessed some measure of support amongst the Shiites. We had to let him dig his own grave by pissing of people like Sistani to the point where he has given tacit support for taking Sadr out..
And one other aspect of this has been the delay in spending that reconstruction money.. It may actually have been a deliberate strategy aimed at creating a certain level of deperation on the part of the Iraqis for any kind of Iraqi government, indirectly lending it credibility and support that might have been lacking for any government that was still Baathist at heart... (I know this theory is a stretch, but it may have that result, nonetheless)..
Think about it.. maybe we sensed there would be terrorism used against Iraqis and maybe, just maybe, we recognized that only by having Iraqis terrorized by Baathist insurgents and foreign militants could we TRULY get them to support an interim Iraqi government.
If this was a strategy of permitting a planned level of terrorism to be inflicted upon Iraqis by these militants, its certainly not something that we could have come right out and discussed publicly..
But it could have a major impact on unifying people behind an interim government that stands strongly against terrorist factions.