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From: Covenant4/28/2012 11:31:43 AM
   of 3144
 
Re: CHK blowout under control

Good thing CHK is drilling for gas instead of oil. Gas doesn't have the same pollution issues. Gas also doesn't make profits.


After 68 hours, Chesapeake stops gas venting from Wyoming well blowout

Chesapeake Energy Corp. contractors have finally halted the flow of gas from a well in eastern Wyoming, approximately 68 hours after the company lost control of its well, the state's top oil and gas regulator says.

Aided by favorable winds, contractors this morning began pumping drilling mud into the well, located about seven miles northeast of Douglas, to stop the flow of natural gas from the blowout, said Tom Doll, Wyoming's oil and gas supervisor.

By 2 p.m., "the well capacity should be filled with drilling mud," he said.

Chesapeake lost control of its Combs Ranch Unit 29-33-70-1H well into the Niobrara Shale formation about 4 p.m. Tuesday. None of the employees on site were injured by the blowout, the company said.

While the company's air testing hasn't indicated any problems, Chesapeake officials asked nearby residents to evacuate. Fifty have now spent three nights in hotels in Douglas and Casper.

Chesapeake and its contractors hoped to regain control of the well on Thursday but were hampered by variable and shifting winds that kept venting natural gas in the area where crews needed to work.

Check back later for updates to this developing story.

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From: Covenant4/28/2012 11:38:18 AM
   of 3144
 
Re: Haynesville Shale

Data below is from Pothole Dodger on IV. It looks like the Haynesville shale will be stabilizing at around 2400 operating wells. We have been at that level all year with minor fluctuations both up and down. It should be safe to say Haynesville is no longer a growth basin because rapid decline rates should be more than offsetting new wells.

Louisiana Haynesville Wells
StatusWaiting OnNon-
DateProducingCompl, etc.DrillingPermittedTotalProducing
01/06/119034591283561846943
01/13/119314421283551856925
01/20/119475011332841865918
01/27/119595121282701869910
02/02/119625101282971897935
02/10/119844861282961894910
02/18/1110044661283381936932
02/24/1110364371253471945909
03/03/1110434301253721970927
03/10/1110554671223401984929
03/24/1110904871213092007917
03/31/1110975001223092028931
04/07/1111244731223132032908
04/14/1111294681223212040911
04/21/1111584391223292048890
04/28/1111674491143262056889
05/05/1111824501123292073891
05/13/1112014721122912076875
05/10/1112014711123012084883
05/19/1112194621083072096877
05/26/1112374541053132109872
06/02/1112364831042882111875
06/09/1112554671072962125870
06/16/1112754481073122142867
06/23/1112914341053212151860
06/30/1113054211043192149844
07/07/1113274201053022154827
07/14/1113553921053112163808
07/22/1113734171052902185812
07/28/1113734301132722188815
08/04/1113734361122582179806
08/11/1113734421112432169796
08/18/1113694321072322140771
08/25/111385464952042148763
09/01/111376460962032135759
09/08/111466448952112220754
09/15/111482439942212237755
09/22/111498430932312252754
09/29/111514421922412268754
10/06/111530412912502283753
10/13/111538408912552292754
10/20/111568375912692303735
10/27/111591381942542320729
11/03/111613367942582332719
11/10/031636353932632345709
11/17/111651362952462354703
11/01/111666371972302364698
12/01/111678360972352370692
12/08/111690349962412376686
12/15/111713326962462381668
12/22/111736303962512386650
12/29/111743297952672402659
01/05/121753287952742409656
01/12/121779263932772412633
01/19/121805239912812416611
01/26/121827217912732408581
02/02/121837266792282410573
02/09/121858305571682388530
02/16/121879286591672391512
02/23/121880294611552390510
03/01/121888295611482392504
03/08/121907284561562403496
03/15/121920272591522403483
03/22/121921279501492399478
03/29/121926279491422396470
04/05/121941277411372396455
04/12/121946277411342398452
04/19/121947276461332402455

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To: Covenant who wrote (2372)4/28/2012 12:10:18 PM
From: alertmeipp   of 3144
 
Re: i am not picking the bottom here, just pretty sure it wont be the

more bad press start popping out one after another.. make me wonder what's behind it.

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To: batman10023 who wrote (2366)4/28/2012 12:17:17 PM
From: alertmeipp   of 3144
 
Re: i am not picking the bottom here, just pretty sure it wont be the

I think it's close to 20billions including all VPPs. I saw it somewhere before.

>what is the NAV using the current price deck for oil/gas?
I don't know, won't be pretty as gas assets is pretty much a wipeout and oil assets are not proved up yet.

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To: Covenant who wrote (2373)4/28/2012 2:20:00 PM
From: Covenant   of 3144
 
Re: Brother can you spare a few hundred million?

Exclusive: Chesapeake board member lent money to CEO McClendon
By Brian Grow and Anna Driver

(Reuters) - As Chesapeake Energy Corp.'s board of directors moves to distance itself from loans taken by CEO Aubrey McClendon, documents reviewed by Reuters show that at least one former board member had undisclosed personal financial ties to him in the past.

Now-retired board member Frederick Whittemore lent money to McClendon in the late 1990s, the documents show, even as Whittemore helped determine how much the CEO should be paid to run Chesapeake.

This week, the energy giant reversed an earlier statement that its board was "fully aware" of up to $1.1 billion in personal loans that McClendon has taken in the last three years. "The board of directors did not review, approve or have knowledge of the specific transactions engaged in by Mr. McClendon or the terms of those transactions," the company said.

In June 1998, documents filed in Oklahoma County court show, McClendon had a financial relationship with Whittemore, a veteran Wall Street executive who served on Chesapeake's board from 1993 until 2011. For all eighteen years on Chesapeake's board and at the time of the loan, Whittemore served on Chesapeake's compensation committee. In that capacity, he helped determine how - and how much - McClendon would be paid. He also served as a member of the corporate governance and audit committees.

Whittemore, now 81, did not respond to messages left at his office and home.

Ron Hutcheson, McClendon's personal spokesman, acknowledged the existence of the loan but said the deal between Whittemore and McClendon ended in March 1999. He did not say whether the debt was repaid.

Provided with a copy of the financing documents and asked for comment, former Oklahoma governor and current Chesapeake director Frank Keating said in an email that he would "refer this to our legal team for review and response as appropriate."

Although nearly 14 years old, the McClendon-Whittemore deal raises a number of concerns, some analysts said. Among them: whether a board member who helps determine McClendon's salary should have a separate, private financial relationship with the CEO he oversees.

"For an independent board member on the compensation and corporate governance committees to be doing a deal with the CEO, that's something that would be inappropriate governance and that should be disclosed," said David Larcker, a corporate governance specialist and professor of accounting at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business.

Whittemore, who worked for more than 20 years at Wall Street giant Morgan Stanley and its predecessors, was chairman of the American Stock Exchange from 1982 to 1984, according to a biography compiled by Forbes.

Because the underlying loan agreement is private, the total value and precise terms of the financing agreement between McClendon and Whittemore remain unclear. The documents reviewed by Reuters refer to a "Security Agreement dated effective May 20, 1998 between the Debtor, and the Secured Party." The debtor is identified as McClendon, and the secured party as Whittemore.

A summary of the collateral pledged by McClendon shows he granted Whittemore all "right, title and interest" in a company called Chesapeake Investments LP. That firm was established and run by McClendon. It was regularly used to hold stakes McClendon acquired in each new oil or gas well drilled by Chesapeake, both before and after the financing deal with Whittemore, according to mortgage documents filed in Oklahoma, Texas and Louisiana reviewed by Reuters.

The well investment program is a unique perk that Chesapeake gives McClendon - an incentive that Whittemore helped oversee during his years on the board in his role as a member of the compensation committee. McClendon used Chesapeake Investments to borrow against the well interests he obtained through the program. Chesapeake Investments is now known as Arcadia Resources.

Given the dearth of details on the loan, some analysts weren't certain what to make of the arrangement.

"On this specific issue, it's difficult to say whether there is a conflict - unethical or even questionable - from my viewpoint, unless you knew what assets were underlying the debt obligation," said Raymond Deacon, a managing director at investment bank Brean, Murray, Carret & Co in Boston. "If (McClendon) was using company assets as collateral or interests in his ownership of wells, I think there is a clear conflict and it should have been disclosed."

On Thursday, Chesapeake's board announced it was negotiating an early termination of the well perk program, which was set to expire in 2015. The board also has launched a review of McClendon's related-party loans, and the Securities and Exchange Commission opened an informal inquiry into the well perk program.

The moves come in the wake of a Reuters investigation last week that showed McClendon has borrowed as much as $1.1 billion in the last three years to fund the costs of well stakes granted to him by Chesapeake. Most of the loans were made by EIG Global Energy Partners, an investment management firm that has invested $2.5 billion in Chesapeake along with other investors.

Investors and analysts have criticized Chesapeake's board for failing to monitor McClendon's borrowing against his share of company wells. They contend his personal borrowing may create conflicts of interest that could put McClendon at odds with Chesapeake shareholders.

(Editing by Blake Morrison and Michael Williams)

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To: alertmeipp who wrote (2376)4/28/2012 3:18:24 PM
From: batman10023   of 3144
 
Re: i am not picking the bottom here, just pretty sure it wont be the

how are you investing in the company without knowing exactly how much debt is in front of the equity?

also, i am not really an energy guy - is not knowing the NAV standard in energy investing? for financials you always want to know the NAV (book value) even if you know it's not clean/100% accurate. Not sure what the protocol for energy companies is.


Re: i am not picking the bottom here, just pretty sure it wont be the

I think it's close to 20billions including all VPPs. I saw it somewhere before.

>what is the NAV using the current price deck for oil/gas?
I don't know, won't be pretty as gas assets is pretty much a wipeout and oil assets are not proved up yet.

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To: Covenant who wrote (2377)4/28/2012 3:20:08 PM
From: batman10023   of 3144
 
Re: Brother can you spare a few hundred million?


if he's gone, it's in less than a month... if he survives this onslaught i doubt it. but it would be impressive.

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To: batman10023 who wrote (2379)4/28/2012 3:29:12 PM
From: Covenant   of 3144
 
Re: Brother can you spare a few hundred million?

Yeah, this is escalating fast. I think CHK will be good for a quick trade if you wait until Aubrey gets fired, buy CHK immediately, and then dump it within a few days.

In the meantime, CHK will probably continue to drift lower with more shorts pig piling on every day.

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To: Covenant who wrote (2338)4/28/2012 3:39:04 PM
From: Covenant   of 3144
 
RE: Paying off Aubrey

Aubrey milks cash out of CHK like it is a dairy cow.



Tough Talks Loom at ChesapeakeCompany Could Have to Pay CEO to End Contested Well-Ownership Perk

By RUSSELL GOLDNow come the awkward negotiations at Chesapeake Energy Corp., as the board and CEO Aubrey McClendon wrangle over how to end a controversial perk that has left Mr. McClendon deeply in debt but with a big potential payoff.





bloomberg newsAubrey McClendon holds controversial stakes in gas-drilling sites such as the one above in Pennsylvania.

If oil-patch precedent is anything to go on, the company could end up having to pay millions of dollars to buy out Mr. McClendon's right to take a small stake in every oil or gas well Chesapeake drills as long as he covers his share of the costs.

That program has come under intense scrutiny by regulators and the board in the past couple weeks, after they learned that entities the Mr. McClendon controls had arranged for loans of up to $1.4 billion to cover the expense of his participation in the program.

Mr. McClendon received these loans from a private-equity group, EIG Global Energy Partners, which was negotiating to buy hundreds of millions of dollars of Chesapeake assets.

Faced with an outcry from shareholders, the newly assertive board said Thursday it wouldn't renew the program when it expires in 2015 and would negotiate an earlier end to it, which will require an amendment to Mr. McClendon's employment agreement.

In 2005, shareholders approved a 10-year extension to the program, which was incorporated into Mr. McClendon's contract. In addition to the well-participation program, he earned total compensation valued at $17.87 million last year, mostly in stock awards.

Mr. McClendon could seek a payment for giving up what is contractually his, analysts say— though some warn against such a move. "That would leave a very bad taste in investors' mouths," said Fadel Gheit, an energy analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. "If I were his advisor, I would urge him to drop it and move on."

Spokesmen for Chesapeake and Mr. McClendon declined to comment on the negotiations and declined to elaborate beyond a press release issued on Thursday.

Chesapeake's aggressive push to develop gas and oil from shale rocks has helped create a U.S. energy boom. It and other companies have been so successful at finding natural gas that the price of the fuel recently hit a 10-year low. But low natural-gas prices have pushed Chesapeake's share price down 47% over the past year, as have concerns about corporate governance, debt and financial complexity.

There is a precedent for paying to close out an executive's stake in energy wells. Chesapeake co-founder Tom L. Ward , who had the same well-participation deal during his tenure at the company, had a similar program at SandRidge EnergyInc., another Oklahoma City-based energy company which he joined as CEO in 2006. He was allowed to take a 3% stake in every well the company drilled.

In 2008, SandRidge ended the program and bought out Mr. Ward's interests for $67.3 million. SandRidge said it ended the program to retain a greater working interest in future wells, thus boosting its reserves. Mr. Ward's accumulated well stakes were about one-tenth the size of Mr. McClendon's current holdings.

In the past, the Chesapeake board has been very supportive of Mr. McClendon, the company's co-founder. In 2008, after he had to sell most of his Chesapeake shares because of a margin call, it gave him a one-time $75 million retention bonus.

But relations between directors and Mr. McClendon are now strained, according to some people close to the board, which is said to be disappointed in his financial activities. The directors say they didn't know the specifics of his activities. Corporate-governance experts have taken the directors to task for their lack of oversight.

The board is looking into all financial relationships between Mr. McClendon and companies that conduct business with Chesapeake. The Wall Street Journal has reviewed documents that indicate loans to Mr. McClendon from a variety of Wall Street banks that do business with Chesapeake, including Bank of America Corp. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., and Wells Fargo & Co.

The well-participation program has been both a blessing and a curse for Mr. McClendon. Through thousands of small, 2.5% slices, he has amassed enormous holdings of oil and gas. He said in a statement that these wells contained 705 billion cubic feet of natural gas and 17.6 million barrels of oil.

Mr. McClendon estimated the future value of his stake was $852 million, but the cost of financing these wells has mushroomed. Last year, he was required to pay $457 million and sought financing from EIG. In exchange, he signed over future well production until the loan is repaid, plus a share of the profits.

The Securities and Exchange Commission is conducting an informal probe into the arrangement.

—Ben Lefebvre contributed to this article.Write to Russell Gold at russell.gold@wsj.com

A version of this article appeared April 28, 2012, on page B3 in some U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Tough Talks at Chesapeake.

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To: Covenant who wrote (2381)4/28/2012 3:42:28 PM
From: Covenant   of 3144
 
RE: Paying off Aubrey

How Chesapeake Energy Can Be Saved (From Itself): OpinionEric Rosenbaum
04/27/12 - 03:00 PM EDT


NEW YORK ( TheStreet) -- Poor, misunderstood Chesapeake Energy( CHK) CEO Aubrey McClendon. He's really the victim, isn't he, in the current controversy over his fiefdom otherwise known as a publicly traded company owned by shareholders.

One thing is likely: No matter what anyone else thinks -- including some of the biggest pension funds in the world that would like to see the Chesapeake CEO put on a leash -- McClendon probably thinks he is the one being unfairly targeted.

Last November, when I had the chance to interview McClendon on the sidelines of a conference in New York, it wasn't too long after the first in what's now been worked into a Moby Dick-sized volume from the collected financial press attacking the embattled CEO of the second-largest oil and gas driller in the U.S. after Exxon Mobil( XOM). Chesapeake is actually No. 1 in terms of the number of rigs actively drilling on U.S. land right now.

I asked McClendon about the New York Times piece in which Times writer Ian Urbina referred to Chesapeake as more or less being a Ponzi scheme - the print "shot across the bow" so to speak -- and McClendon answered in a way I found curious. He didn't respond to the accusations directly, but with somewhat of an exasperated look of a naif who has lost his innocence. He riffed on what a long-time reader of the Times he has been. The Chesapeake CEO seemed to feel personally wounded by the piece, stabbed in the back by a publication with which he has long began his mornings:

"I read the New York Times every day for 30 years, and now I say gosh -- I never read the editorial page because I understood the bias there - I didn't understand just straight stories could be so biased."

The "bias" as McClendon likes to view it, has now hit a crescendo in the aftermath of the Reuters investigation into the CEO's controversial well ownership. Controversy is nothing new for Chesapeake or McClendon, but with natural gas prices at a decade low and shareholders at a boiling point, it's a perfect storm for "death spiral" talk about Chesapeake.

I even received a comment on Thursday from a city council member in a Texas town where Chesapeake dominates the drilling who asked, "We wonder how vulnerable our town is to a Chesapeake bankruptcy. "

Yes, Aubrey, it's come to this. Short interest in Chesapeake shares has been on a steady rise, reaching close to 9% of the company's float as of mid-April, and increasing by roughly 62% since a year-ago. It could simply be a trade on the descent in natural gas prices -- Exco Resources( XCO), another proxy on natural gas prices has a similar short interest chart over recent months -- or it could be the beginning of the "death spiral" that some, including Real Money columnist Dan Dicker, see coming for Chesapeake as the David Einhorns of the hedge fund world see a fresh, and valuable carcass, to carve up.

Wall Street analysts seem to think McClendon will survive, and that he still holds the trump card. After five years of acquiring almost every drilling lease right that exists, McClendon can always sell something to make ends meet (and not necessarily just to benefit his personal stake in the wells).

Maybe so, but given how slow the Chesapeake board of directors was to respond to the lingering controversy over an aggressive, risk-taking CEO, here are a few suggestions for options to save Chesapeake rather than take the chance that the status quo returns again, until the next controversy.

Idea No. 1: Name former Exxon Mobil CEO Lee Raymond chairman of Chesapeake

There's already talk that the best thing the board could do to show it's reining in the CEO would be to strip him of the chairman title. Who would make for a better chairman figurehead than the former ExxonMobil CEO Lee Raymond, who is often trotted out as a spokesman for the U.S. oil and gas industry. Think of it as similar to when government has a crisis to deal with -- say the financial crisis or 9/11 ---and they bring in some famed (retired) senator or congressman to commandeer a committee and produce a huge report on what went wrong and how to fix it.

Instead of the Chesapeake Energy Independent Commission on the Chesapeake Energy Crisis, it would simply be an independent chairman with a marquee name.

Bringing in Raymond as chairman might also help undo a little of the damage done to Chesapeake's shares, as it would inevitably drive speculation that Exxon Mobil would eventually acquire Chesapeake, maybe baking a little premium into shares and a deal which, if consummated, would finally bring an end to McClendon's tenure.

If Raymond isn't up for the job, and neither Chesapeake's board or McClendon is about to make take this step, there are other ways to instill confidence in the broken investment story and win shareholders back ...

Idea No. 2: Get Warren Buffett to provide an investment vote of confidence

One of Warren Buffett's long-time investment lieutenants, Lou Simpson, is on the Chesapeake board of directors. Simpson retired from Berkshire Hathaway( BRK.BH)last year, but we bet he still has his long-time buddy Buffett's number and could place a call to Omaha.

Would Buffett do for Chesapeake what he has done in the past for Goldman Sachs( GS), GE( GE), and Bank of America( BAC)?

If Chesapeake is as undervalued on a net asset value basis as Wall Street seems to think it is, Simpson could make the case to Buffett that Chesapeake is a great value investment. But Buffett hasn't been much of an oil and gas investor lately. Other than a tiny stake in ConocoPhillips( COP) shares, Berkshire is markedly underexposed to the exploration and production business. Berkshire sold the last little bit of Exxon Mobil shares it owned last year.

As he has stepped up his investment in railroads and utilities and through the utility sector, coal and energy infrastructure, Buffett hasn't dived deep into the capital intensive exploration and production space. But if Simpson can get Warren on the line, hey, what's the harm in a phone call between old friends with similar investment philosophies?

Given that Buffett hasn't shown an inclination to pony up big bucks for bailouts beyond his financial sector sweet spot, Chesapeake may have to consider taking further steps to counter allegations of a conflict of CEO interest, including ...

Idea No. 3: Package McClendon's well holdings into a joint venture and sell to the Chinese or Total

The controversy that has led to the current calls for McClendon's ousting comes back to the Founder Well Participation Program and the CEO's stake in company wells and the fact that he has tied personal loans to the value of the well holdings.

This presents two conflicts of interest: 1) the company could make decisions to sell certain assets based on McClendon's personal portfolio needs, and 2) the company could prioritize certain wells for drilling development based on the ones where McClendon has financial interest.

The board said this week it won't renew the program when it ends in 2015 and is negotiating with McClendon for an early termination of the program, but that doesn't imply that it will unwind the existing well stakes that McClendon has, which would require unwinding both his personal stakes in the wells and the loans in which the well stakes are used as collateral.

With Chesapeake saying it is going to sell its entire Permian basin stake in the third quarter, there will inevitably be questions about whether there was a personal reason for McClendon to part with these assets over others, and that will exist for every sale going forward. Chesapeake could fully disclose each and every well in which McClendon has a holding, well by well, and complete transparency might help.

However, it might just be better to do what McClendon does well: Create a joint venture in which McClendon can sell the well stakes to a third party, such as a Chinese national oil company or European energy giant like Total( TOT), two investors with whom McClendon has had dealings in the past.

This wouldn't just be a convenient method of providing remuneration to McClendon for his well stakes while removing the conflict of interest, but it would also be one more chance for McClendon to show off the wheeling and dealing talent that got him into this mess -- I mean that sets him apart from other CEOs -- in the first place.

Deep-pocketed, big balance sheet investors aren't the only ones who can help...

Idea No. 4: Invite Carl Icahn back for lunch

It wasn't that long ago when Carl Icahn disclosed a 5% stake in Chesapeake Energy, and in retrospect, it was the single greatest catalyst for Chesapeake shares in the past few years. In fact, I'm not so sure Icahn even knew what a quick and profitable payday he was in for when he disclosed the Chesapeake stake.

Shareholders of the company bid up shares to $35 -- almost twice today's value -- when the news broke, however, Icahn didn't hang around for much longer than one lunch with McClendon seeing how much value he had created in shares just by showing up.

In retrospect, this frenzied trading activity in Chesapeake shares was the calm before the storm. The fact that Icahn's investment led to such a sharp reaction showed just how frustrated Chesapeake shareholders had become and how ripe the company was for some activist action.

Certainly, that ripeness has only intensified as the shares have dropped to an even lower mark than when Icahn invested in the low $20s, and the argument about the underlying value of the company's "great collection of assets" still attracts plenty of attention.

For those shareholders who were betting that Icahn was in it for one of his typical long activist campaigns, and who didn't sell out when Chesapeake shares hit $35, they could sorely use another SEC filing from Icahn revealing a new stake in Chesapeake.

Nevertheless, another quickie profit for Icahn -- and Icahn can't be relied on for more than that, as he tends to monitor his investment with a watch as opposed to the calendar -- may not solve the problems for Chesapeake or its shareholders.

Drastic action may be required...

Idea No. 5: Exxon Mobil creates hedge funds to short Chesapeake Energy and buy up all of its debt

Big Oil villain Exxon Mobil is already considered to be among the most secretive companies in the world, operating with all the influence of a sovereign nation. Therefore, maybe it wouldn't be too much of a stretch for Exxon to create hedge funds purely for the purpose of shorting Chesapeake to the hilt. Exxon could simultaneously buy up all of Chesapeake's debt and ultimately send the company into bankruptcy so it can pick up, and/or pick apart the pieces. This could be done either in tandem with Raymond being named independent chairman of Chesapeake, or not.

While this idea is meant to be tongue in cheek, it's also really just a logical extension of Exxon's existing strategy, and a trading vehicle to complement its nuts-and-bolts approach to oil and gas sector production.

As TheStreet has previously written, for all of Chesapeake's attempts early this year to slow production as a way to rescue natural gas pricing, the single biggest impediment to the plan was Exxon Mobil's what-me-worry attitude about drilling no matter how low natural gas prices sink. In the end, more bankrupt natural gas companies only creates more cheap acquisitions for Exxon Mobil.

After a stabilization in the price of natural gas around the $2 mark this week, many experts expect prices to head lower this summer to the $1.50 to $1.75 range, and reach, if not go below, the cash costs of gas producers. Meanwhile, Exxon's earnings this week showed even greater natural gas production versus oil -- though even Exxon said during its conference call with analysts that an attempt is underway to move to more liquids-rich U.S. drilling basins.

In the final analysis, if Buffett won't invest, and McClendon won't sell his well holdings, and Icahn's Oklahoma lunch invite was a one-time event, and Raymond can't or won't be added to Chesapeake's reputation war chest (like former Berkshire Hathaway executive Simpson) this Exxon hedge fund concept might be the best option to save Chesapeake, by destroying it.

In fact, as the talk about a Chesapeake "death spiral" picks up, other hedge funds are probably hard at work and already thinking about how best to pick the company's bones clean. The easy short money in Chesapeake Energy shares was from $25 down to $17.50. Now the hard work begins, and not just for McClendon.

McClendon said to us last November of his company's aggressive land acquisition strategy over the past five years, "This has been a very short window and you either win or lose and the only way to make sure you are a loser is to sit it out."

At that time, McClendon said the land grab in natural gas acreage was over and that there was a year or so left in the land grab for oil acreage in the shale. When we asked him if the company would sell itself lock, stock, and barrel to a major once the last land grab was over, McClendon laid his vision clear: Not a chance.

"After that, we move into full steam development of what we have. There is nobody bigger than us with the resources we have onshore to do the job. There is nobody else to turn the company over to, so we move away from the five or six year period, which will feel like an eternity to some investors, and move from asset capture to development, and when we make that move, it will be an exciting time."

Whether or not McClendon will still be around for that exciting time has never seemed more legitimate a question to ask than it does right now.

-- Written by Eric Rosenbaum from New York.

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