Strategies & Market Trends | The Financial Collapse of 2001 and Beyond


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To: KyrosL who wrote (90279)5/16/2012 6:56:32 AM
From: TobagoJack   of 100673
 
Two years ago friends in Germany told us they only accept euros printed in Germany.
Have not studied the euro fine print.
Wondering what would happen as n when Greece exits euro and all Greece-printed euro cash and bank xfers are no longer as good.
What a mess to sort out, presumably similar to a complicated divorce.

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To: TobagoJack who wrote (90282)5/16/2012 7:09:24 AM
From: KyrosL1 Recommendation   of 100673
 
There us no distinction between Euros printed or minted with different countries' pictures. This is strictly cosmetic, done for national pride reasons. Individual countries do not print Euros. All Euros are printed by the ECB. And printed Euros are a small fraction of the digital Euros in existence around the world. Right now my wallet has Euro coins from Germany, Greece, France, etc.

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To: TobagoJack who wrote (90255)5/16/2012 7:39:18 AM
From: carranza2   of 100673
 
Message 28147974

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To: TobagoJack who wrote (90282)5/16/2012 7:48:30 AM
From: Entitlement   of 100673
 
The Greeks could,by design, allow only Greek citizens to exchange their Greeks Euro's for New Greek currency. Anyone not holding a valid Greek citizenship would forfeit,gg. That would stir things up a bit :))

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To: TobagoJack who wrote (90276)5/16/2012 8:29:48 AM
From: elmatador   of 100673
 
"The BRICS helped save us in 2008-2009." But there won't be a permanent salvation. Salvation came at the cost of a big shakedown in the BRIC economies. This shake down took two year to build and it's taking another two years to pul back.

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To: Entitlement who wrote (90285)5/16/2012 8:37:27 AM
From: dalroi   of 100673
 
mmmm then i would donate my euros to a greek friend and let him change them for me and then return minus a %

or make a greek llc etccc,,,,,,,

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To: dalroi who wrote (90287)5/16/2012 8:49:14 AM
From: Entitlement   of 100673
 
You could if it were allowed but I think the Greek government would taking an accounting of one's net worth before an exchange took place so to ease and offset the patriational underground economy,gg. The Greeks are not Stupid.

Lets face it. This is where Europe and very likely the US is headed; the effects of continued and intentional deficit spending.

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To: Entitlement who wrote (90285)5/16/2012 9:49:47 AM
From: elmatador1 Recommendation   of 100673
 
I'd decree bank holiday following Monday during the weekend. Euro no longer legal tender. On Tuesday, newly printed Drachmas available for exchange old Euros that are circulating.

Then gazillions of Euros will flow into Greece to exchange for Drachmas to buy now cheap assets. Northern Europeans will flock into Greece for dirty cheap holidays.

The rich and the companies that took Euros away will repatriate to buy state assets being privatized.

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To: dalroi who wrote (90287)5/16/2012 9:53:24 AM
From: elmatador   of 100673
 
the informal name for the economic measures taken in Argentina at the end of 2001 in order to stop a bank run, and which were fully in force for one year. The corralito almost completely froze bank accounts and forbade withdrawals from U.S. dollar-denominated accounts. The Spanish word corralito is the diminutive form of corral, which means "corral, animal pen, enclosure"; the diminutive is used in the sense of "small enclosure" and also "a child's playpen". This expressive name alludes to the restrictions imposed by the measure.

Background and initial measures

In 2001, Argentina was in the midst of a crisis: heavily indebted, with an economy in complete stagnation (an almost three-year-long recession), and the exchange rate was fixed at one U. S. dollar per Argentine peso by law, which made exports uncompetitive and effectively deprived the state of having an independent monetary policy. Many Argentines, but most especially companies, fearing an economic crash and possibly a devaluation, were transforming pesos to dollars and withdrawing them from the banks in large amounts, usually transferring them to foreign accounts ( capital flight). [1]

On 1 December 2001, in order to stop this draining from destroying the banking system, the government froze all bank accounts, initially for 90 days. Only a small amount of cash was allowed for withdrawal on a weekly basis (initially 250 Argentine pesos, then 300), and only from accounts denominated in pesos. No withdrawals were allowed from accounts denominated in U.S. dollars, unless the owner agreed to convert the funds into pesos. [2] Operations using credit cards, debit cards, cheques and other means of payment could be conducted normally, but the lack of cash availability caused numerous problems for the general public and for businesses.

[ edit] Immediate effects




A protest against the banks in 2002. The large sign reads "Thieving banks - give back our dollars". The green and light blue object in the middle of the crowd is a Payphone.


The corralito caused an immediate backfire on the government. Even more people started trying to withdraw their money from the banks, and many ended up in court fighting for their right to have their funds (and being granted that right on occasion).

The main reason for ending up in court was that, after the corralito, and after Economy Minister Cavallo resigned, the new government led by Eduardo Duhalde and his Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna converted those funds nominated in US Dollars, into Argentine Pesos at a 1 Peso = 1 US Dollar exchange rate, while the exchange rate was liberalized (immediately going to 4 Pesos = 1 US Dollar).

The same was done with debtors, so many private enterprises and also the Province of Buenos Aires were favoured by this measure as they managed to decrease their debts. Nine years later, several people have not yet been able to recover their savings because of the pace of Justice in Argentina. However, debtors were able to purchase properties and other items by paying their debts at the 1 to 1 exchange rate.

At the time, the average Argentine did not employ the banking system for daily uses; many did not have a personal bank account, and dealt only with cash. Debit cards were not popular and many businesses did not have the equipment to accept them. Thus the cash restrictions only exacerbated the recession and angered the public. President Fernando de la Rúa was forced to resign on 20 December 2001 after violent riots, but the restrictions of the corralito were not lifted at the time. [3]

[ edit] Corralón Argentina's situation worsened for several months. The corralito was hardened during the interim rule of President Eduardo Duhalde, and turned into a corralón ("big corral"). The corralón differed from the corralito in that most deposits were forcibly exchanged for a series of bonds denominated in pesos. The dollar-denominated accounts were automatically exchanged for pesos and peso bonds at a predetermined rate. The real necessity of such decision was questioned by several observers at the time, and some suggested this move benefited some large companies which were insolvent (or nearly so) whose owners had sent their dollars abroad before the corralito; these owners were thus able to repay their companies' now devalued debts by converting much fewer dollars than it would have taken previously. [4]

The peso was first devalued (from 1.0 to 1.4 pesos/dollar) [5] and then floated, thereby quickly depreciating to a maximum rate of nearly 4 pesos per dollar. [6] Argentina's economy then gradually began a recovery from its abysmal state, spurred by exports that benefited from the heightened exchange rate, and by the declaration of default on most of its debt, which left the government with more money available to expand the economy. [7]

[ edit] The banks and their role in the crisis




Depositors protesting frozen accounts for fear they might lose value, or worse. February 2002.


It is generally agreed that the banks had a share of the blame for the situation that led to the corralito. [8] In mid-2001, it was probably clear to bank owners and high-ranking officials that Argentina's banking system was going to crash, and some in fact may have spurred this outcome by letting their highest deposit holders know this news. These, mostly large companies, quickly moved their deposits abroad. Meanwhile, they continued to recommend their middle-class customers to enter deposits.

It is also believed that in the end the corralito ended up being good business for some international banks since they negotiated with the Argentine government to receive compensation bonds for the "missing" money, which in a large proportion had never really left their banks, only moved from one branch to another. [9]

Most banks stayed in the country during the crisis, withstanding a severe damage to their reputation as well as (in certain cases) physical attacks. Others fled as soon as problems arose (for example, Scotiabank's Argentine branch, Scotiabank Quilmes).

[ edit] The end of the corralito The corralito officially ended on 2 December 2002, when Minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna announced the liberation of deposits for about 23.7 billion pesos (though not of 17.3 billion pesos in formerly dollar-denominated long-term accounts). [10] The measure was coupled with exchange market controls, by which no person or business was allowed to buy more than 100,000 dollars; this was done to prevent the possible effects of the sudden availability of pesos.

[ edit] References
^ "The Man Who Came In from the Crash" - Harvard Independent. ^ "The crisis in Argentina" - socialistworld.net ^ "Oxford Analytica Brief: Argentina's Economic and Political Situation" -United Jewish Communities ^ Krishock, Dan. "74 and counting". Buenos Aires Herald. http://www.buenosairesherald.com/columnist/note.jsp?idContent=7921. Retrieved 2006-07-06. [ dead link] ^ "Cautious reaction to peso devaluation" - BBC News. ^ "El peso argentino toca fondo" - BBC Mundo. (Spanish) ^ "Becoming a serious country" - Economist. ^ "The Argentine Crisis: A Chronology of Events After The Sovereign Default" - Standard & Poor's ^ "Argentina: Program for a Popular Economic Recovery" - Monthly Review. ^ "Argentina: llegó el fin del 'corralito'" - BBC Mundo. (Spanish)

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From: elmatador5/16/2012 10:01:44 AM
1 Recommendation   of 100673
 
Era of a diminished superpower

By Martin Wolf

What will be the role of the US in the 21st century? This is a question I rashly agreed to address last week at the Carnegie Council in New York. In analysing it, I considered a closely related issue that also exercises Americans: is the future role of the US in its own hands? The answer is: yes, but only up to a point. The US can control what it does. But it cannot control what others do.

The historic dominance of the US is the fruit of its exceptional assets. It is a continental power bounded by oceans to the east and west, and unthreatening neighbours to the north and south. It has huge, albeit dwindling, natural resources. It has had the world’s largest economy and the highest output per head since the late 19th century. The market-driven US economy has also been the world’s most innovative since at least the same era.



    The US is home to the world’s most influential financial markets, albeit ones that triggered the Great Depression and Great Recession of recent years. It has been the issuer of the world’s main reserve currency since the first world war. It has offered one of the largest import markets, surpassed only by external imports of the EU.

    The US possesses the world’s most technologically advanced and potent military. Since the second world war, it has also had more of the world’s leading universities and research institutions than any other country. It has the world’s most potent popular culture. Its political values still grip the world’s imagination, even if it has frequently fallen short in practice. Its democratic system has proved sufficiently legitimate and flexible to cope with the many challenges history has thrown up.

    Possessed of all these assets, the US managed to form strong alliances and to win its 20th-century wars, both hot and cold, against Germany, Japan and Russia. It shaped the open world economy, which was born after the second world war then became global after the collapse of the Soviet empire. It has offered the world’s most influential model of modernity. Whether we like it or not, we all live in the world it has made.

    How much of this array of assets will the US retain in this century?

    The obvious threat is to its position as the world’s largest economy. At market exchange rates, its economy is still roughly twice the size of China’s. Yet, according to the International Monetary Fund, it is only 30 per cent larger, at purchasing power parity. Since China’s gross domestic product per head, at PPP, is still only 20 per cent of US levels, this leaves huge room for it to catch up. China’s growth is likely to slow in coming decades but it should still converge further on US productivity levels. The likelihood is that China will have a bigger economy than the US by the early 2020s. Unlike, say, Japan, China has the numbers on its side. If its GDP per head were to reach half of US levels, its economy would be as big as those of the US and EU together.

    China’s gross exports of merchandise products already exceed those of the US. Its imports will soon do the same. Being a relatively resource-poor country, China is likely to remain a bigger trader, relative to GDP, than the US. A more controversial question is how soon the renminbi will rival the dollar as a reserve currency. The rise of China’s trade suggests the answer is: soon. Against this, I would argue that China’s party-state, not being subject to the rule of law and fearing loss of control, will be neither able nor willing to provide the open capital markets that outsiders want if they are to hold their safest assets in renminbi. At least, this shift is likely to take decades, not years.

    In principle, the US could also maintain its frontier position in science and commercial innovation. But, as my colleague Edward Luce shows in his thought-provoking new book, the combination of xenophobia with hostility to science, self-inflicted fiscal constraints and weird spending priorities risks robbing the US of its access to the world’s talent and its commitment to world-leading research and innovation.* Nothing captures the point better than this grim quote: “In 1990, [California] spent twice as much on its universities as its prisons. Now it spends almost twice as much on prisons.” That the US has the highest rate of incarceration in the world is not only a social statistic; it is also an economic one. The same is true of the costliness and inefficiency of the US healthcare system, which is the principal reason why long-term fiscal prospects look so grim.

    What is needed is serious reform. But this has become impossible, because of the exploding role of money in politics and the rising intransigence of the Republican party. In a system built on divided government, regarding compromise as weakness risks repeated chaos.

    The US economy is also no longer bringing the widely shared benefits it once did. In the last full business cycle, between 2002 and 2007, the top 1 per cent captured almost two-thirds of the rise in incomes, while the top 0.1 per cent captured more than a third. Such a zero sum economy breeds disaffection and despair. The crisis has made the anger far worse.

    All of this will also affect America’s ability to play its historic role in the world. The looming fiscal squeeze will undermine military spending. More important, the financial crisis and other large mistakes have robbed the US political, economic and social models of the prestige they enjoyed. Europe is in no better shape. But that merely means the west as a whole is less credible and so far less able to serve as leader.

    Whatever happens inside the US, its influence will be smaller in the 21st century than it was in the 20th. This is largely because others have learnt so much from it. Even so, the US could retain huge, possibly unrivalled, influence, since its main rivals face even bigger challenges. Yet if the US is to be what it can be, it has to rediscover the pragmatism that long marked its policy making, notably in its responses to the many challenges of the 20th century. No democracy can thrive if its citizens view their own government as their greatest enemy. If Americans choose to make their government fail, the US is sure to do so, too.

    *Time to Start Thinking, Atlantic Monthly Press 2012.


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