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To: axial who wrote (11430)11/22/2002 2:15:58 AM
From: axial   of 14101
 
(2) How Hard Can It Be?

The following summary is based on US law. Given that Canadian law is different, and securities regulation in Canada is of dubious benefit, there is no direct relationship to our interests.

However, the article does point out the difficulties inherent in balancing the interests of the manufacturer, the regulatory agencies, and investors.

"E. Final Thoughts on Predictions of FDA Approval

Considered together, the FDA prediction decisions prompt three final comments. First, courts generally should and likely will give companies considerable leeway in predicting agency approval. The decisions of government bureaucracies, like the FDA, are inherently difficult to predict.[110] While courts will give more latitude to companies predicting approval farther out in time, even companies making shorter-term predictions should be able to avoid liability, unless the company acts in a manner that raises the court’s suspicion. In Xoma, the company’s very direct campaign to support the price of its stock by publicly contesting the significance of bad news may have been its undoing.

Second, courts and the investment community need a deeper understanding of the entire FDA approval process. Biotechnology is based on science and, to the lay person, science suggests certainty. Yet certainty may be unattainable in biotechnology reality. A company may undertake tests designed to show the effectiveness of a drug over a large patient population, only to find that the tests do not show efficacy for that population as a whole, but may show a statistically significant positive effect on a subset of the patients in the clinical trial. Interpretation of the test results may be a matter of judgment and different reviewers may hold differing opinions, each of which is reasonable. All of this adds uncertainty in the scientific sense which, added to the unpredictability of bureaucratic decisions, compounds the difficulty of forecasting FDA actions. The section of this article discussing disclosure of test results suggests an approach that may help courts and companies wrestle with this problem.

Third, drug and medical device manufacturing businesses engage in a near-constant dialogue with the FDA. A communication from the FDA that criticizes the company may simply be a part of that dialogue. The fact that plaintiffs’ lawyers later seize upon that communication does not necessarily mean the life sciences company erred at the time in concluding that the letter, comment, or notice raised issues the company could address successfully without damage to the prospects for, or timing of, an FDA approval."


mttlr.org 

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To: axial who wrote (11431)11/22/2002 3:27:47 AM
From: TheBusDriver   of 14101
 
Nice find Jim. Ties in with olga's posts as well.

If the UK can approve Pennsaid, it is a constant source of frustration for me with the FDA process. It is not like the UK is a 3rd world country with a lax policy.

At least those who need Pennsaid know how they can get it now, at least until approval comes or DMX goes bust while they are waiting....

Wayne

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To: TheBusDriver who wrote (11432)11/22/2002 3:53:22 AM
From: axial   of 14101
 
Hi, Wayne -

"If the UK can approve Pennsaid, it is a constant source of frustration for me with the FDA process. It is not like the UK is a 3rd world country with a lax policy."

I hear you. I wish Health Canada would, too. And Germany, France, Sweden...the EU.

Then of course, there's the obvious contradiction that the UK approved Pennsaid - but allows hardly anyone to have it! >g<

The pharma world is a regulatory madhouse.

Jim

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To: axial who wrote (11431)11/22/2002 6:08:41 PM
From: padco   of 14101
 
Jim, those were the most relevant finds that have ever been posted on this thread IMHO.

My only wish is that I'd have read them 10 months ago when I began to over commit to this company, in the erroneous belief that approval would be imminent.

The two parts of your How Hard Can It Be posts each address central themes we've had to grapple with:
1)Will DMX get approval and when
2)How much blame can be put on REK and the Board for the company's lack of success to date.

From the GAO file we clearly see that predicting approvals is incredibly difficult. The applicant, in its dialogue with the FDA may have been led to believe that an issue has been resolved. The company may have conveyed optimism to its shareholders based on that dialogue. Then along comes new personnel, an obscure study on a key molecule, and the applicant finds itself back to square one. DMSO, only for example, may have become a problem again.

If approvals are so unpredictable, what is the small investor to do?
1)Buy a basketful of biotechs to spread the risks.

2)Buy biotechs associated with large Pharma's with milestone payments and cash infusions. This does not guarantee approvals however, and you've got to look carefully at how much future revenue is compromised. This category seems to dominate what we find today and the market seems to give these biotechs more value than a company like DMX. Witness Research Capital recent recommendations.

3)Concentrate your resources on a high risk, maybe high reward biotech that seems to have approvals close at hand. DMX would fit this billing. Unlike the previous category, its a small company with no significant financial commitments from the big guys, and no earnings to carry it through the approval process. It's successful (Pennsaid) ph III and plant approval would suggest imminent approval. It has not sold a large chunk of its future to the big guys. Yet the risk of failure, or of unacceptable dilution, or of lost opportunities remains high. If I had to do it over again, I would not have committed as much as I have to DMX.

This leads to the other theme, which is especially popular on the SH thread; blaming REK and the BOD to the extent that some are suggesting civil offence, even criminal misdoings. Even though the article was discussing American law, which is usually more harsh than Canadian law, I'd think that the same arguments would be made in Canada. People, myself included, should take more care to understand the risks that are present in their investments.

Those were excellent finds Jim, thanks

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To: axial who wrote (11431)11/23/2002 3:51:25 AM
From: Montana Wildhack   of 14101
 
Jim,

During this period where I'm watching my hair grow
it's great to read this sort of stuff. Well thought
out comments and articles.

Its a wonky world we're making full of strange, painful,
and marvelous things. Goodbye cod hello mini-kyoto.
Just don't say moron.

Wolf

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To: Montana Wildhack who wrote (11435)11/23/2002 12:58:18 PM
From: TheBusDriver   of 14101
 
Wolf, you're not supposed to DRINK the Pennsaid!/eom

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To: TheBusDriver who wrote (11436)11/23/2002 5:39:57 PM
From: Montana Wildhack   of 14101
 
Wayne,

My bottle of Pennsaid is busier than a piece of pork
in a pork and bean factory. Its a clean sweep so far
and a small pack of future users.

It is quite simply a marvelous product as you more than
many knows.

To anyone,

I'm concerned about the risk of time and cash right now
but not approvals. I'm one of those people who thinks we'll
get that from HC some 30 days after the FDA is public.

I know Rebecca said we might hear from them first but I
don't believe that's likely and I'm just as good a judge
as she is.

Regardless of the current bleak landscape and the
irrevicable frustration at my experience to date, these
approvals are in my future. Dimethaid, the FDA, whoever
it all is, this investment has taken too long however and
that is not news.

The sole responsibility of the investment lies with the
investor. I have no time for people laying responsibility
with the object of the investment which in my mind simply
is confusing emotion with the object of the exercise. This
applies equally with horseracing. Don't bet then.

The clearest advice in my opinion is that every moment in
time is an opportunity. I mean that every decision should
be made looking forward and everything in the rearview
should be viewed as notes to ourselves.

I picked a company here who's public experience has been
rather less than stellar to be kind. Dioptic, UK, we know
the list. These are not encouraging signs.

I also picked a company who's product is stellar and that
took this top notch product through the NDA which was the
big bet in the first place and is extremely rare. They
bounced back to some labelling problems though.

I see no worse labelling than the COX2's as in the cards
and no possibility of not solving whatever problem the
FDA director apparently saw about labelling. I literally
see a near zero chance of rejection.

However, while this stock has been fun for a long time it
isn't fun right now.

It's doing no worse than the majority of stocks and better
than numerous blue chip companies. I would also add that
I see holes and risks of comparable size in many companies
across the board and equally I see opportunities. The
point being Dimethaid does not stand out in either it's
current price or it's screwups or it's potentials.

I sold a smaller fraction of DMX to get more of a stock I
think won't hit it's stride for another 2 years, and just
a bit of Walmart and Barrick (my first gold ever).

As a result DMX is no longer my largest holding by number
of shares though I continue to hold the vast majority of
what I bought.

My own peculiarities include a more detailed disclosure
than some others and in this situation that is making
public the fact that I have thinned out from a stock I
strongly support (to the utter boredom of some who have
already skipped ahead in any event). I reassessed at the
end of the summer as I said I would for the entire
investment and stayed based on FDA closeness. I have now
hedged a small percentage that does not materially affect
the outcomes here. Dimethaid continues to be the largest
by cost of shares.

And while I'm on the topic of measurement I question what
is being measured at times. I see no way of not getting
tangled in the trees if I don't measure capital seperately
from transactions. The only real money is the actual cash
that you put in net. Preferably compounded at least at the
rate of inflation (the cost of money) or more usefully at
the expected rate of growth (opportunity cost of money).

When you judge performance you judge the value of current
holdings against the above number and any spreadsheet can
calculate that dollar variance as a compounded rate.

Is it relevant to measure the percentage drop in DMX from
cost? I don't know. Did you buy them with $2 or $120
Nortel's that you sold? Is the money that was used
interconnected to previous transactions? If it is
what are you measuring - number of successes?

Compared to 2 years ago I stink. Compared to 5 years ago
I look fine. Compared to 10 years ago I look good.

The quest continues. The ultimate outcome is not in doubt
- it is death. Carpe diem!

Wolf

PS - don't let perception be an issue. Please note that
I said that in my opinion FDA approval is a near certainty.

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To: padco who wrote (11434)11/23/2002 11:21:58 PM
From: axial   of 14101
 
Hi, Padco -

First, I'm happy the posts were appreciated. One hopes that we can bring reason to bear, on what we are doing.

It was a while back when I posted to Wayne about the difficulties inherent in deciding what pain was, how to measure it, and interpreting data from trials, never mind properly constructing the trials in the first place. In between, I revived some old posts on the possible construction of DMX's trials, and the belief of some posters that DMX erred in early trial design.

More recently, I posted the question, "Are we there, yet?".

This goes to your statement, "My only wish is that I'd have read them 10 months ago when I began to over commit to this company, in the erroneous belief that approval would be imminent."

Having made the same commitment, I found myself looking back over the history of my investment, and asking myself if I did something wrong. Most investors (winners AND losers) rationalize their success, or loss, after the fact. I'll try to avoid that.

It's now almost a year since I first bought DMX. Since then, I found myself increasing my commitment. Was I wrong to do so?

The evidence was that the factory inspection was complete, and had gone well. Trials appeared to be complete; these additional trials had been designed as a result of input from the FDA, and it was reasonable to suppose that this time, the company had got it right. In other words, after some difficulties, sufficient time had elapsed to correct the deficiencies in trials: the worst should have been behind us.

In that time, the share price declined slowly and steadily. I attributed the majority of the decline to Acqua sales, consisting of millions of shares, in the midst of the worst Bear Market in recent memory.

Looking at DMX's potential fortunes, with 2 products at the end of Phase 3 trials, the odds appeared to me to be better than for any other pharma in Canada - all other things being equal.

Throughout this time, I repeatedly posted on the dangers inherent in the approval process, and I believe that I understood them. I also was well aware of the anti-DMSO lobby (some members of which apparently decided that we needed enlightening >g<). The DMSO story was discussed ad nauseum here, and on SH.

Yet, as you saw in more recent posts, the number of patents related to transdermal use of DMSO has climbed over 1500 in the 90's, and the FDA had raised no particular objection to the use of DMSO in early stages of the NDA. It seemed clear that there was a market of which many pharmas were aware, and that many were prepared to pursue.

In addition, UK approval argued that DMSO itself was not a sufficiently negative factor to halt the product's acceptance.

The one clear risk that emerged - again, in retrospect - was the marriage of a high-risk financial strategy (ie., Acqua sales) with the inherent riskiness of the approval process. This is a strategy that could have worked, if approvals had come sooner - but it didn't. Looking back, it was a mistake. But again, if you read the congratulatory posts of investors at the inception of the Acqua deal - it's clear that neither investors nor the company saw how bad it would get.

The one clear risk that did emerge in that time, that I have never been able to explain, is the lunatic predictions that have emanated from DMX. While Provalis was perhaps a forgiveable mistake, the company's continued broadcasting of pie-in-the-sky sales projections made it clear that someone didn't get it: especially when we were posting data and information on these pages that contradicted the company's position.

Both DMX and its investors got blindsided by the stumbling blocks in the UK and EU - but at least investors started to understand the problem: apparently, long before the company did.

We saw a repetition of dysfunctional corporate communication several times, in the last year, accompanied by a deafening chorus of "Incompetence!" - and even recently, the company has either refused to mend its ways, or is incapable of doing so.

That worried me. It still worries me. It speaks to the possibility of problems that are serious. Why? Because it's inexplicable. It's so easy to fix. It's the corporate equivalent of taking a pebble out of your shoe, so you can walk without a limp.

It's not shooting yourself in the foot.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Well, I don't want to get into The Litany. The question, in my mind, is: if I were faced with this investment decision again, would I make the same choices?

On balance, I think: yes; but like you, but not nearly as heavily. It's still a company with two Phase 3's behind it (I hope!). FDA was an active participant in the WF10 P3 design, and the Pennsaid trial design. Yes, there are risks associated with novel treatments, and yes, it seems to be taking a long time.

As posted, time and agin, the approval process for Pennsaid is still within norms for a company like DMX, with a novel therapeutic.

The only thing that should cause excessive disappointment is the overoptimistic forecasts of the CEO. They are not to be trusted: a better guide is our own research. The bashers are confirmation of that: a chorus of bleating from people who lost money because They Believed Her.

But do these failed forecasts make the eventual odds any worse? No. By our own research, no.

It becomes difficult to separate the annoyances from the fundamental weaknesses, at times. Stupid forecasts are an annoyance.

Making bad decisions based on stupid forecasts is a fundamental weakness: optimism is a necessary evil in CEOs - but the decision to hire a Sales Force was a regrettable and expensive error.

We have seen, in other investments, the failure of CEOs to understand and mitigate the risks in what they manage. We expect them to have a sophisticated, and better-informed picture of the realities than we can hope to have.

When we see they perhaps do not understand those risks, we begin to worry. When we see that they have an uninformed view of their markets, we begin to worry. When we see that they are prepared to "bet the company" on success, we begin to worry. When we see they are not prepared to coldly cut their losses, and staunch the bleeding, we worry.

Like many, I am aware of the CEO's notable successes. But like you, I am becoming uneasy: I am beginning to question whether she has the stuff to make the hard decisions, and right the boat.

What many want to see, right now, is someone to take charge: recognize the dangers, recognize the realities, and get this company into Survival Mode. At a time of some hazard, people want to see clear vision, good thinking, and smart moves.

The time for Warm Fluffies is past. The Dream hasn't pulled in to the station, yet. It is still possible that the arrival of Approvals may transcend the need for such a person at DMX: good fortune may save the day.

A number of things that (yes, we understand) could have worked did not work: a number of dreams will have to go on "Hold", until Approval can bring them to reality. It's time for the CEO to start acting like a CEO.

The primary risk is not the FDA.

I wondered, long ago, whether the CEO could do the "Cinderella Thing", and turn this company around, when Approvals came. I thought she could. Now, it looks like she has to put DMX on Life Support, until Approval comes.

C'mon, RK: you can do it. If you can't, then someone else will have to.

Regards,

Jim

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To: axial who wrote (11438)11/25/2002 12:58:14 AM
From: padco   of 14101
 
You've nailed it Jim, has RK got what it takes to put DMX into survival mode. Does she have deadlines in place if approvals don't come as expected?

To change subject for a minute, has anyone noticed what the new facts sheet has to say about WF10. It says the, "Multi centre Phase III clinical trials data for late-stage AIDS patients is currently being verified."

Is this not new information for us. I can't remember what the previous fact page reported. It certainly is interesting, as it could mean any number of scenarios with totally opposite implications. On the other hand, it could be just a normal process which any prudent trial contractor would carry out.

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To: TheBusDriver who started this subject11/25/2002 6:24:32 AM
From: Zed4   of 14101
 
Dimethaid's tough medicine

EXCLUSIVE: Product delays, an unpopular CEO and falling stock price have all plagued the drug maker, writes LEONARD ZEHR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By LEONARD ZEHR
00:00 EST Monday, November 25, 2002

MARKHAM, ONT. -- John Totten struck a raw nerve with Rebecca Keeler when he called for her resignation and an independent audit of her performance as president and chief executive officer of Dimethaid Research Inc. during a raucous annual meeting last year.

"She told me to sell my shares if I wasn't happy with the progress of the company and then she turned off my microphone," he recalls. "That's the first good piece of advice she's ever given me, because I got out at $5 plus."

Dimethaid shares closed at $1.99 on the Toronto Stock Exchange on Friday.

Ms. Keeler didn't put up with any griping at this year's annual meeting. The mercurial executive didn't allow a single question from some 300 shareholders in attendance last month.

Instead, she answered 21 prepared questions that she said had been submitted to the drug developer.

The running battle between Ms. Keeler and many shareholders like Mr. Totten traces its roots to the company's flagship Pennsaid lotion to treat arthritic pain, which has been mired in regulatory review by Health Canada since 1996 and by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration since 1997.

"I've never heard of anything taking that long," said one biotech industry consultant, who asked to remain anonymous.

Dimethaid is a classic biotech saga about an underdog company that's trailing in the ninth inning and waiting for a home run.

It's also a story about undisclosed late-stage testing of Pennsaid, unexplained trading by insiders, the departure of two auditing firms and a European marketing strategy that is running a year behind schedule.

Moreover, Ms. Keeler's management record has many shareholders complaining about inaccurate, incomplete and possibly misleading statements in a bid for corporate survival until regulators decide the fate of Pennsaid.

"This is a good company with good technology that is being destroyed by the CEO," Mr. Totten charges.

A case in point was Ms. Keeler's attempts to control the agenda at the annual meeting last month, which backfired badly, several sources suggest.

Addressing generic competition, one of the prepared questions included incorrect dates for the expiry of the patent on Pennsaid: 2006-07 in the United States and 2008 in Canada.

Rather than correct the question at the meeting, Ms. Keeler repeated the error and discussed how the patent could be extended.

The complete Q&A, including the question containing the error, was then posted on the company's Web site, prompting a flurry of e-mail protests from shareholders.

Eventually, the company corrected the snafu and pointed out that the "patents to our transdermal delivery technology expire in 2004 in the U.S. and 2005 in Canada."

Ms. Keeler, who is the only full-time officer of Dimethaid, contends that the company's position was "to not alter the questions at all but to deal with them exactly as written."

A spokesman for the Ontario Securities Commission said the agency has received a "couple of complaints" about Dimethaid recently.

"Like any other complaint we receive, we will take a look at the information provided before deciding whether to take appropriate action," he added.

Ms. Keeler, a former insolvency lawyer, moved into the executive suite at Dimethaid's predecessor, defunct Clark Pharmaceutical Laboratories Ltd., in 1990, largely because she figured Pennsaid's patent could be exploited.

But in 1992, the company terminated talks with Johnson & Johnson's Ortho-McNeil Inc. and decided to develop Pennsaid by itself, a gutsy move Ms. Keeler calls a "defining moment."

The relationship was revived in 1999, but this time to distribute Pennsaid in the United States.

The signing gave Dimethaid instant credibility, but critics charge that the company was never clear on the details.

The inside cover of Dimethaid's 1999 annual report, for example, twice refers to a "standstill agreement" with the consumer and health products giant that precludes Dimethaid from negotiating with anybody else. But Ms. Keeler's letter to shareholders in the same report twice refers to J&J as Dimethaid's "first corporate alliance."

Today, there is still no marketing pact in place, J&J is the "preferred distributor" and references to J&J have long since disappeared from Dimethaid's press releases.

Nevertheless, Ms. Keeler likes to tell anyone who'll listen that regulatory approval for Pennsaid, which is targeting a $13-billion (U.S.) annual market to treat the pain of osteoarthritis, is right around the corner.

The only problem is, she's been saying it for years.

"The delays have been very disconcerting, but I'm very confident in what we've done," she said. "This can't go on forever. I'm absolutely convinced that we're going to get Pennsaid approved."

Notwithstanding her optimism, she privately sold 1.1 million of her Dimethaid shares in November, 2001, at $3.35 each to hold 210,706 shares at last report.

She declines comment on the sale but maintains that it does not reflect a lack of confidence in the company and its products.

Surprisingly, for a company with a market capitalization of nearly $100-million, no biotech analyst covers it.

"Bay Street has lost interest," one analyst said, adding that blockbuster drugs such as Celebrex are "too big to be affected by a topical lotion, so there isn't a large commercial opportunity."

Dimethaid describes Pennsaid as "proprietary technology." It consists mainly of dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO), a chemical solvent that carries a generic anti-inflammatory compound called diclofenac, along with a binding agent, through the skin.

While the company's patent covers the function of the formula, according to Ms. Keeler, DMSO has had an alternative medicine cult grow up around it.

One source said the only approved FDA use of DMSO is for interstitial cystitis, a urinary bladder inflammation.

Working in Pennsaid's favour, though, is that existing anti-inflammatory treatments, ranging from Aspirin or ibuprofen to hot-selling Cox-2 inhibitors such as Celebrex or Vioxx, can heighten the risks of bleeding ulcers and other gastrointestinal problems.

"We have demonstrated that Pennsaid can provide pain relief equivalent to oral [anti-inflammatory drugs], without the side effects," Ms. Keeler said, adding that only minute amounts of Pennsaid enter the blood system.

Convincing skeptics in the medical community will take some doing.

"It's a bit of a stretch to think that something you put on the skin is going to penetrate through the subcutaneous tissue, and down into the joint capsule and into the deeper joint tissue, and have a therapeutic effect," said Wayne Marshall, an orthopedic surgeon who is also president and CEO of ChondroGene Inc., a Toronto-based genomics company developing treatments for arthritis.

People who have taken Pennsaid disagree.

Michael Freedland, a Toronto computer software salesman who is also a Dimethaid shareholder, went to England two years ago after Pennsaid was approved by the British Medicines Control Agency and purchased eight bottles of the topical lotion for about $62 (Canadian) each.

"I've used it, my family has used it and I swear by it," he said.

So why has Pennsaid approval stalled in North America?

Working against Pennsaid, sources say, is a long-standing North American preference for pills, which tends to relegate topical treatments to the margins with nominal sales.

Moreover, the FDA wasn't satisfied of Dimethaid's ability to consistently manufacture Pennsaid using two outsourcing firms, a position that forced the company to buy its own plant in Quebec to manufacture Pennsaid. The FDA cleared the plant earlier this year.

Ms. Keeler saves her harshest criticism for Health Canada.

"It is a complete embarrassment that a product invented, developed and manufactured in Canada, after receiving approval from several European countries, has yet to be approved in Canada," she said last February when the agency temporarily suspended its review of Pennsaid for a second time.

A spokesman for Health Canada declined comment on the review but said the agency "will not approve a drug unless it is satisfied that it is safe, efficacious and of high quality, and every drug is assessed individually on its own merits."

According to documents supplied by Dimethaid, 4,213 patients received Pennsaid in a safety study between 1995 and 1999. The company has also conducted five double-blind, placebo-controlled pivotal studies with 1,115 patients, of whom 446 were treated with Pennsaid. All were Phase III trials, the last step before seeking regulatory approval.

Data for the final test were submitted to Health Canada in October, 2000, three months after the agency initially suspended its review of Pennsaid and asked for a new trial.

Sources say the rapid reply indicates the company was in the process of completing a new Phase III trial, which copied the protocol used in Cox-2 trials.

Ms. Keeler acknowledges that the company did not publicly announce that a new Phase III trial had started because "we've been criticized by Health Canada in the past about releasing information about our studies."

One Dimethaid shareholder, who asked not to be identified, said had he known another Phase III trial was being planned, he would have sold his stock.

"A new trial stretches the timelines for approval out by at least two years," he added.

Dimethaid also didn't tell shareholders that it was conducting another clinical trial in March, 2001, with 588 patients suffering from osteoarthritis.

In December of that year, it filed a lawsuit in Ontario Superior Court of Justice to identify three posters on an investment bulletin board that had leaked portions of the protocols for that $2-million (Canadian) trial.

Ms. Keeler calls the 18-month trial a "marketing study" that was designed to compare Pennsaid with oral anti-inflammatory drugs for the first time. The study has not been filed with regulators but will be used to negotiate label claims for Pennsaid after approval, she added.

"Disclosing these trials can create difficulties with competitors and we're already aware of competitor activity against our product in Canada," she said. Moreover, there is always a "risk that regulators will ask for more data. There's never enough."

While Health Canada issued an advisory in 1998 that it wants to see efficacy data comparing topical treatments such as Pennsaid against oral anti-inflammatory drugs, Ms. Keeler said the advisory is "not a mandatory requirement."

Nevertheless, Pennsaid's value as a drug franchise was thrown into question in June, 2002, when Dimethaid terminated an 18-month-old sales and marketing agreement with its British partner Provalis Healthcare Ltd. for failing to meet certain sales targets.

Pennsaid chalked up sales of a paltry $50,000 or so under Provalis, Ms. Keeler acknowledges, adding that Dimethaid is now conducting marketing studies with another potential partner to find the most effective way to sell Pennsaid. She hopes to have a deal in place before the end of the year.

Lisa Baderoon, a Provalis spokeswoman, attributed poor sales to Dimethaid's failure to deliver "additional efficacy data that would have helped us pitch sales better to physicians."

Provalis also began marketing a competing oral anti-inflammatory drug from Pfizer Inc. and those sales "took off," she added.

Earlier this year, Dimethaid signed marketing deals to sell Pennsaid in Italy, Malta, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but a sales launch has been delayed largely because of problems translating labels and product information for each country.

In the Caribbean, Dimethaid announced in mid-2001 that Pennsaid's distribution deal covered 12 countries. But it did not disclose that until Pennsaid is first approved in Canada, it could only be sold in Barbados, Antigua and St. Vincent as an over-the-counter product.

Dimethaid's other drug product, WF-10, also is mired in delay.

WF-10 was developed as part of a 10-year collaboration between Dimethaid and Swiss-based Oxo Chemie AG as a possible treatment to restore normal functioning of the immune system in HIV/AIDS patients.

Oxo completed the third of three trials with WF-10 in 240 late-stage AIDS patients nearly 18 months ago but results have not been released.

At Dimethaid's annual meeting in October, 2001, Ms. Keeler promised shareholders that the test results would be delivered in November, 2001.

Ms. Keeler explains that Oxo was running out of money last year and the contract research organization conducting the Phase III trial refused to collect and analyze the data.

Nevertheless, cash-strapped Dimethaid went ahead in May, 2002, and purchased the 80 per cent of Oxo that it didn't already own for $37-million (U.S.).

"We've been promised that we'll have the data by the end of December," she now says.

WF-10 has been approved in Thailand for cancer patients receiving radiation therapy, and some doctors in Canada are giving it to cancer patients under an emergency drug release program approved by Health Canada.

Dimethaid's purchase of an initial 20-per-cent stake in Oxo for $20-million in 1997 prompted a nasty dispute with the company's auditors Ernst & Young about the accounting treatment for the investment.

Copyright © 2002 The Globe and Mail

globeinvestor.com 

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