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To: engineer who wrote (112114)6/2/2012 5:07:36 PM
From: badger3   of 117508
 
Could someone explain to this non-techie why Win 8/WoA is such a huge engineering effort/cost to Q compared to say...when Android makes a major version upgrade?? W8 looks alot like Mango to me (albeit scalable to tablet sized devices)..it isn't backward compatible to the previous (x86 based) Windows versions...and I'm thinking that MS..not the chip companies should be responsible for most of the development costs. Just wondering why this is sucking up such a significant amount of time/R&D budget for us...tia

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To: badger3 who wrote (112126)6/2/2012 6:27:40 PM
From: zax   of 117508
 
Could someone explain to this non-techie why Win 8/WoA is such a huge engineering effort/cost to Q compared to say...when Android makes a major version upgrade??

Windows in Charge: A Few Numbers

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To: zax who wrote (112127)6/2/2012 7:04:14 PM
From: badger3   of 117508
 
Not sure I get your point Zax..yes Windows has a huge installed base...not sure how that impacts WoA/WinRT (and dev costs for QCOM in particular). Maybe you can expand a bit...

Another thing that's bothering me...supposedly there are three chip "development partners" involved with WoA (Q, TXN and NVDA)..and I expect all will have devices using their chips at launch. But looking back thru the earnings call transcripts..only Q has mentioned (repeatedly) the high cost of developing WoA. NVDA and TXN mention the future benefits of WoA..but never mention the development costs associated with it. NVDA has 25% of Q's R&D budget..so you would expect them to be really feeling the sting.

I could be way off base here..but I get the distinct impression that Q is funding a disproportionate share of WoA development..but will not get the benefit of an exclusive launch to help compensate for the added expense.

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To: engineer who wrote (112114)6/2/2012 10:33:45 PM
From: Eric L2 Recommendations   of 117508
 
A Good VM for Windows 8 (there are several) ...

engineer,

<< At the very least they could provide a good VM ware alternate boot to allow one to run dual systems and try it out for a week or two. ... Been on the MIcrosoft Technet blogs and not found good solutions yet... >>

I haven't installed the Win 8 RC yet and I skipped the Win 8 Win 8 Developer Beta but upon release installed the Win 8 Consumer Preview using Oracle’s free VirtualBox virtual PC on both of my Win 7 desktops (one 32-bit and the other newer 64-bit. Both work just fine ...

More on this here ...

Message 28014279

I decided to use Oracle's VM rather than dual boot.

Ed Bott's "Windows 8 Head Start, Developers Edition" ...

Message 28099434

... with free upgrade to the same title for the Consumer Preview Edition amplified on Langa's walk through referenced in the 1st link I supplied above and supplied much more info to save time bumbling one's way around both releases. Best $7 investment I've made in recent years.

Cheers,

- Eric -

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To: badger3 who wrote (112126)6/2/2012 11:27:07 PM
From: Eric L3 Recommendations   of 117508
 
Qualcomm's R&D Efforts on Windows ...

B3,

<< Could someone explain to this non-techie why Win 8/WoA is such a huge engineering effort/cost to Q compared to say ... I'm thinking that MS..not the chip companies should be responsible for most of the development costs. >>

Microsoft IS responsible for most of the development costs of Win 8 and I don't mean to downplay the fact that smaller development costs and contributions are significant for smaller companies (like Qualcomm and including ARM Holdings, both of which are major holdings in my digital convergence basket).

The chip companies developing for Windows RT -- fka Windows on ARM or WoA -- (and Intel needs to be included now that they own formerly ARM oriented Infineon), are spending big development bucks on RT because they want a piece of the monstrous Windows action that only Intel (and AMD) enjoyed previously as part of the WinTel duopoly.

Amongst those competing players Qualcomm has earned some meaningful recognition by virtue of their partnership with Microsoft for WinMoble smartphones (WinMob was the 1st modern day real --i.e. 32-bit -- smartphone OS platform that they finally supported with their ARM 9 MSM72xx radios).

Qualcomm has extended that strategic partnership by being the first and (currently) only developer supporter strategic partner of Microsoft of the newer WinPhone platform. The ROI for that has yet to be seen, but likely will be when Win 8 Apollo for smartphones, tablets and other MIDs including hybrids hits the streets, gets debugged, and then rapidly gains traction. While I realize that there are some Nokiaphobes here, Microsoft, Nokia, (and Qualcomm) are now wedded at the hip and I believe both Nokia and Microsoft appreciate and will reward Qualcomm for their efforts.

I realize that I haven't really or totally answered you question but bottom line is that I'm convinced that both Qualcomm and ARM will be major beneficiaries of the Research and developments they have contributed and those benefits will pay off even further when Softie releases Windows 9 three years from now, and Windows 10 six years from now. I think those of us that hold Qualcomm long should really appreciate PJ's (Sanjay's) and Steve Mollenkopf's vision in this matter.

Cheers,

- Eric -

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To: badger3 who wrote (112126)6/3/2012 1:55:51 AM
From: waitwatchwander1 Recommendation   of 117508
 
In addition to Apollo supposedly being quite different than Mango/Tango, Win8 on Snapdragon will bring intelligent muti-core mgt. In Qualcomm's case that involves much more sophisticcate clock mgt then with the other Arm chipset suppliers. One can only hope the extra fost of this development gets reflected in a better more versatile product but there is bo guarantee on that front.

I suspect another delay in the arrival of Win 8 has to do with changes in how mobile will get mpnetized. Banner Ads are much less effective in that environment and more intelligent mechanisms of getting paid for bring eyeballs needsnto be developed. On this front, I'd note Nokia Design City app which uses Augmented Reality and GPS to bring Yelp like data to camera views. Mobile is a much more dynamic environment than a desktop and a mobile OS needs to enable functionality along more dimensions. On this front, Qualcomm is encapsilating gesture fontrol within Anapdragon.

Win 8 is taking longer and costing more in R&D because the product is more than just another OS update. All these new parts have to be bult into the OS as well as witin the tool base that will empower developers and provide greater monetization capabilities. Hopefully, they know when to stop in this more progressive effort so that they don't get beaten to the punch by others.

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From: Jim Mullens6/3/2012 11:45:05 AM
5 Recommendations   of 117508
 
Tomi’s tormenting trek for truth………………………………………………..

(just stumbled across this- a couple months old but nonetheless “interesting”)

Tomi is / was a leading Eurocentric NOK enthusiast and everything mobile wireless “expert” who apparently never saw the NOK “cliff” and is now attempting to determine what hit him (how he got blindsided by NOKs “abrupt” fall from grace) while seemingly rationalizing NOKs failures as a whole industry phenomenon.

He offered his “Cliff” theory (below) and requested / received quite a few comments (can that be right, 52 MS Word pages???) while responding to a number ….but not this one>>>

“……Nokia, Siemens and Ericsson, were simply gifted a market advantage by the ITU/GSM cartel - it would never last. I'm shocked Nokia's run lasted as long as it did.

Phones now are computers. Not telecom "terminals". So Nokia, Siemens, Ericsson, Fujitsu, etc simply can no longer compete.

It is Silicon Valley's turn to rule. “

Posted by: Baron95 | March 31, 2012 at 03:01 AM

My idears >>>>>>>>>>>

I’ve got some idears, in addition to what Baron95 mentioned as a key culprit. I don’t believe any of the commenter’s brought Qualcomm into the equation.

----

+ Parlayed it’s ITU/GSM cartel advantage to the hilt.

……. Shutting out the Asian handset mfgs using Euror governmental protection aided by patents / high royalty fees which essentially restricted competition to a few Euro / US based companies with royalty free cross licenses.

+ Not being a true innovator, delayed industry advancement to new CDMA based technologies as long as possible so as to maintain its dominant position (volumes, revenues, high margins) unfairly gained from its “gifted GSM market advantage”.

+ With dominant industry volumes gained from the above, ruled over its supply chain “partners”, tightening their margins while receiving first and highest deliveries in capacity constraint environment, etc.

+ Used its vast monetary sources-

……+ to influence developing world governments against using newer CDMA based technologies as well as,

……+ to spread FUD (fear, uncertainty, distrust) throughout media circles regarding new technologies / truly innovative companies

……+ engaged in viscous, costly, and often frivolous litigation by itself and along with conspiring with others to restrict competition and industry advancement.

+ Not being a truly innovative company, as the industry finally moved to CDMA based technologies (and beyond), NOK was unable to compete technology wise with the new entrants

……..+ The Asian companies were finally able to break NOKs strangle hold, using CDMA based technologies primarily via Qualcomm’s integrated (application processor & baseband) chipsets.

……..+ Qualcomm’s unique royalty based business model recycled royalty revenue in a perpetual manner to fund overall industry R&D, enabling many companies to now enter the marketplace and compete on a much more level playing field.

………..+ Using state of the art Qualcomm chipsets, Qualcomm’s handset partners were able to build upon Qualcomm’s industry enabling R&D, employing their own R&D budgets more efficiently to bring new devices to market in a shorter timeframe by shortening their development cycles.

+ Nokia stubbornly refused to employ Qualcomm chipsets (until recent alignment with MSFT) and thus was unable to effectively compete in the large CDMA based North American marketplace and newer global 3G (CDMA based) and Android based markets led by Qualcomm innovations.

+ Nokia stubbornly refused to recognize the advantages of the integrated processor / baseband model for mainstream volume production devices and stuck with Texas Instruments’ inferior and more costly modular model, even eventually moving away from its longtime major chipset supplier .

+ As the world moved to more appealing, feature rich innovative devices by Apple and Android operating systems, Nokia stubbornly kept recycling its legacy Symbian OS.

+ Echoing Barron95 again, I'm shocked Nokia's run lasted as long as it did.

Anyone else care to chime in?



>>>>>>>>>>>> Tomi’s Article

Bt Tomi Ahonen


communities-dominate.blogs.com 

March 30, 2012

The 'Cliff Theory' ie How Handset Makers Die, why in Mobile Phones do Companies Collapse so Rapidly (Siemens, Motorola, Palm, Nokia, Blackberry and Windows Mobile) I think its time to coin a new term for the smatphones and in fact all mobile phone 'handsets' industry about the biggest danger in this industry? The Cliff. The sudden comprehensive collapse of the business. Why does this happen in mobile and at rates - I mean the speed in terms of timing of the collapse - never seen in any other industry.

CASES

Lets take a few case studies. What am I talking about. First, lets go to all phones, and ten years back. For the end of 2001, Siemens had 7% market share in mobile phone handsets. They had held a reasonably steady top 5 position for many years. Its a bit like LG has been recently. And what happend? They suddenly fell off a cliff. By 2003 their market share was half, and two years later, half again, and they quit the business (the Siemens handset business was sold to BenQ of China).

Then Motorola. Moto had held a steady 2nd place market share in handsets for 8 years since Nokia took their number 1 position, and Motorola's market share had been very steady, modest fluctuation only, between 15% and 20% over that 8 year period. Then in 2007 they fell off a cliff. So for the year 2006 Motorola's market share of all phones sold was 20% (similar to Samsung today). Then in just 18 months, it had fallen in half, and in another 18 months, by half again. By 2009 Motorola's global handset market share was down to 4%. They went bankrupt, were split up as a company and the handset business was sold to Google.

What about smartphones? Palm had held a strong second place market share behind Nokia, rather steady, at modest fluctuation only, at about 8% to 11% over many years, and had 9% market share globally of smartphones for 2006. (This would be like say HTC has been recently in smartphones). Then Palm fell off a cliff. In one year their market share fell in half to 4% and just a year later, they had lost another half by 2008 and then limped along bleeding customers and making huge losses, until they were sold to Hewlett-Packard.

And lets take Windows Mobile. Microsoft's smartphone OS has been around for a decade and it had steady growth until 2007 when it reached 12% market share of smartphones and held that till 2008. Microsoft's OS had briefly taken over the second place ranking behind Nokia's Symbian, after Palm's second place and before Blackberry replaced it as second biggest OS. Then from 2008, Windows Mobile fell off a cliff. In 18 months their market share fell by half to 6% and in another 18 months, fell by another half. Obviously Microsoft itself killed Windows Mobile which in 2011 managed only a 1% market share, so Microsoft now tries to replace it with Windows Phone which had amassed a magnificently unimpressive 1% market share for itself globally for the first full year it was sold, when we remove the other Microsoft Windows Mobile smartphones, in 2011. The combined Microsoft smartphone operating systems market shares, together, for last year, was under 2%

PATTERN

I like to find patterns and I think we have one here. The historical performance of a given mobile phone handset or operating system seems to have exceptionally poor predictive power to this phenomenon I now have christened 'The Cliff'. Powerful, global Top 5 size powers in handsets, often for very long in tech, more than a decade often, have held steady shares (Siemens, Motorola, Palm) - or even they might see steady growth for year after year, as in the case of Microsoft Windows Mobile - and can easily be even the second biggest player of this industry at the tme (Motorola, Palm, Windows Mobile) - but if they hit 'The Cliff' they can die in unprecedented speed. Let me show you this graph to give a graphical view of what it looks like. This is a kind of amalgam of the cases we've had, to illustrate the theory, but it is not the mathematical average haha..

communities-dominate.blogs.com 







(The above image may be freely distributed)


Understand this doesn't happen in other industries, certainly not this fast. In cars, home electronics, even personal computers, the growth is steady and long-term, and the decay and decline for some past glorious brands, is also relatively long-term. The bestselling car makers worldwide 50 years ago included Ford, GM, Volkswagen, Toyota, etc. Yes, manufacturers die, like American Motors, but globally, even less-desirable brands manage to hang around for a very long time. How many of the 10 bestselling cars of the 1970s has vanished. I don't mean that a car brand has quit some single car market like say French carmakers Peugeot and Renault left the US market (many US readers might be surprised to find out that Renault and Peugeot (with Citroen) are both still giant car manufacturers globally. I am not talking about mergers here (Daimler and Chrysler, Chrysler and Fiat), those are 'normal' in business. I mean market collapse like the four cases in handsets that I listed.

Even the bestselling PC makers a decade ago had very familiar names - HP, Dell, IBM, Compaq, Toshiba, Apple. None of them collapsed. IBM was sold to Lenovo but IBM did not collapse and sold as a corpse, Lenovo bought IBM's PC business while it was still a powerhouse, and it continues under the Lenovo brand as one of the biggest PC makers of today. Compaq is no longer a brand, but HP bought Compaq also while it was one of the top 5 PC makers.

And this is not somehow symptomatic of the telecoms industry either. Look at the other hardware side of telecoms. The five biggest telecoms networking infrastructure makers at the start of the past decade were Ericsson, Nokia, Lucent, Siemens and Alcatel, in that order. Yes, there has been some mergers in the industry, so today Alcatel owns Lucent and Nokia and Siemens have joined venture on their infrastructure. But if you take the market shares of the combined entities, then the three players were ranked Ericsson biggest even alone in 2000, NokiaSiemens second biggest and Alcatel-Lucent third. How is that today? Ericsson is biggest of these three, NSN is second and Alcatel-Lucent still third biggest. Except that NSN is in reality third, and Alcatel-Lucent is 4th in the world, because Chinese Huawei has climbed to 2nd place. But this is 'typical' competition in the world. The global rankings do not fluctuate wildly even on decade-length time horizons.

Same is true of television sets, Some new brands emerge but the old brands fight on and if some depart the scene, they do so over lengthy periods of time. A decade ago the world sold tons of Sony TV sets and Sony is still in there today. Samsung was not as big, but they were around a decade ago, and so forth. But in mobile, if your handset maker hits 'The Cliff' the fall is rapid and essentially seems nobody survives the Cliff. The damage is 'terminal' and the company will be bankrupt in what, like 3 years.

Note, size is no protection here. Motorola had one fifth of the world market to itself in 2006 (making huge profits too). Thats about what Samsung does today in total handsets, and is actually more than what Apple currently has for the iPhone in smartphones. And hugely popular 'must have' devices are no guarantee you won't fall off 'The Cliff' - witness the Motorola Razr. That didn't keep Moto from going over the MotoCliff. Again, warning about the uber-desirable iPhone here too. I am not about to suggest Apple is about to fall - far from it, I strongly believe the next iPhone is going to be a huge hit as well - but please beware, nobody, not me, nobody predicted at the Razr peak, that MotoMoto would become the DodoDodo of the handset industry before that decade was done.

WHY IS THERE THE CLIFF

Obviously one case does not prove any kind of pattern. We needed several such collapses to even be able to observe a pattern. But now with proven cases of Siemens, Motorola, Palm and Windows Mobile; combined with the current collapse of Nokia's smartphone business and possibly Blackberry as well, we have evidence of a peculiar pattern in a consumer electronics industry sector. Why is this possible to happen in mobile phones and why haven't we seen anything like it in other industries.

I think there are three factors that help create The Cliff. First, there is the replacement cycle. The average replacement cycle for mobile phones in year 2000 was 21 months. By year 2006 it was down to 18 months. Today it is 16 months (all handsets). For smartphones it is even faster, at 11.5 months. A car is replaced something like every 3 or 4 years on average. A TV set once every 7 years. A personal computer every 3 and a half years. But mobile phones are replaced every year and a half, smartphones replaced every year (on average).

So if you have a bad model car, and your sales suffers because of it, you will not lose all your loyal customers in a year or two, because many of your customers have last year's model and are happy with it, and will not even come to your car dealership until two years from now to consider the replacement model, by which time you have had plenty of time to fix the problems with your current car model.

In mobile phones we do not have that luxury. The pace is so fast. And note that the rate of the collapse due to The Cliff is actually accelerating. This also suggests the replacement cycle and The Cliff are related.

A second point is the dealerships. Some technology is kind of 'protected' from rapid market fluctiations, because it is sold by the manufacturer's own stores (like Sony flagship stores for example) or through branded dealerships (like in new car sales) or by registered partners (like many personal computers, sold through 'VARs' Value Add Resellers, who are authorized with given PC brands). In mobile phones, there used to be no branded shops (Apple changed that of course) and Nokia briefly tried its own Nokia branded flagship stores - most of them have been discontinued. So if you have branded dealers, that helps dampen the fluctuation, even if you have a bad model year of your products, the damaging effect is not as severe. Mobile phones are sold whether in operator/carrier stores, or independent handset retailers, with essentially all handset brands and many of their models on display side-by-side in the store. Note, that of current handset makers, only Apple is a little bit immunized but not completely so, as it also operates its own Apple stores.

The third point is the carrier relationship. The operator/carrier has exceptional influence in the mobile phone handset business. If the carrier/operator decides to push a given phone, it can help it succeed, yes, but that is not dramatic gains. But if the the carrier/operator community decides to punish a given brand, it rapidly dies. We heard just now from Finland (of all places) that a survey of major handset stores in the biggest cities of Finland by the commerical TV broadcaster MTV3 - found that in most handset stores (both operator stores and independent stores) - even if the consumer asked for the Nokia Lumia by name - most sales representatives would not show the Nokia Lumia to the customer, and showed Samsung Android handsets instead. This even as the stores had Lumia in stock and the biggest in-store displays were featuring Lumia.

In television sales, the television broadcasters (BBC, CBS, RTL etc) do not have any influence on what brand of television you buy. The internet brands like Google, Yahoo, Ebay, YouTube, Facebook have no real influence on what brand PC or tablet you buy to access the internet. But in mobile, the carrier/operator has a profound effect on which handset brand is welcome to that market, and which is not.

And as the carrier community is tiny - the 10 largest carrier groups control the subscriptions of 2.7 Billion people - and thus strongly influence 46% of the global handsets - that could theoretically be down to yes, 10 CEO's (or a little bit more in reality, their handset bosses and their management teams). So like just now today, those 10 CEOs could decide (or might have decided) that Blackberry survives or Blackberry dies. But yes, imagine if an operating system manufacturer (just hypothetically, lets say Microsoft manages to piss off the carrier community) or say a handset manufacturer (again, hypothetically a giant like Nokia suddenly annoys the carriers) were to become the object of - perhaps boycott is too strong a word here at this level - but lets say 'undesirability' - their fate would be doomed. Witness the birth and death of the Kin youth phones by Microsoft. They went from launch to death in 6 weeks. WEEKS. But obviously the Kin phones cannot be used as example of falling off a Cliff, as they never climbed up to the hill in the first place haha.. I am just saying it here as evidence of the incredible power of the carriers in deciding who wins and who loses in the handset business.

WHAT IS NOT THE CAUSE

Some will jump in here and say Tomi, the obvious disruptor was Apple's iPhone. And I agree, the iPhone has been the most important handset model ever, and we now measure time in the era before the iPhone and the era after the iPhone (as I correctly predicted before the iPhone was first sold in 2007). But this pattern existed before the iPhone (Siemens, Motorola), it coincided with the iPhone (Palm, Windows Mobile), and it happened after the iPhone stopped grabbing tons of market share (Nokia, Blackberry).

Yes, for those who didn't pay attention back in 2007 and 2008 and 2009. The biggest growth in the iPhone market share, from zero to 17% - happened from the summer of 2007 to the summer of 2009. Since then Apple's iPhone market share has been essentially flat picking up only a few market share points to 19% for 2011. In the big iPhone growth years, Nokia mostly held flat and Blackberry actually grew market share in smartphones. So it is absolutely factually untrue to claim that Apple stole customers from Blackberry. And to a lesser degree same is true of the iPhone and early Nokia smartphones in 2007 and 2008. (Few remember that after the original iPhone 2G was launched in 2007, Nokia's contemporary smartphone, the N95 handily outsold all iPhones globally.)

After the iPhone big growth period ended and the iPhone was flat, only then Blackberry suddenly collapsed and so did Nokia. So the losses to RIM and Nokia did not go to gains to Apple's iPhone. Their losses were to the gain of the Android family, so while you can argue that the iPhone killed Palm and Windows Mobile, the evidence does not support the theory that the iPhone killed Nokia or Blackberry, on the contrary, those were relatively immune to the iPhone, it was Android which killed Nokia smartphones and Blackberries. I recognize that the widely-held myth keeps repeating the BS that the iPhone killed Nokia or Blackberry. We deal with the facts here, not myths.

So, to anyone who wants to comment on this thread - this pattern can be observed BEFORE the iPhone existed, so it cannot be (solely) caused by the iPhone. Yes, the iPhone may have boosted the damage haha, but then I would argue, its simply 'any' new and highly desirable phone can help boost the effect. The Razr for example caused Nokia's 2006 market share to fall. So just be warned, anyone who posts comments here and says 'the iPhone caused the Cliff' - those comments will be deleted immediately, because this effect has existed before the iPhone. Yes, I myself have said the iPhone is the most important phone of all time and it changed everything, but it did not cause The Cliff haha..

LONG LEAD TIMES

And one very important point I forgot to mention in early version of this article. The third person in the comments, Dipankar Mitra mentioned the connection with two time frames - one is the time we start to hate a given new phone, and the other is the fixing time. I forgot this dimension, thank you Dipankar! Yes, the typical development cycle for a completely new mobile phone is about 18 months from a clean table to in the stores. In the case of a newcomer company it can be longer - with Apple it was reportedly 30 months, because Steve Jobs looked at the intended 'iPod Phone' of late 2006 - and gossip says it looked like a Nokia candybar phone with regular buttons and a medium size screen - and Jobs said no, that is not good enough, and forced a total redesign, which then gave us the radical look of the iPhone with the massive screen and one button. And today's Nokia Lumia 'shortened' development time is totally an illusion, as the outwardly look and feel was taken from an existing Nokia product, the N9, and the guts of the phone came from Compal, not Nokia's own process. Even then it took 9 months to take existing parts and reorient them into 'Lumia' - but the first Nokia-designed and Nokia-manufactured original new Lumia phones that are not a blatant rebadging, will start with the Lumia 900 which launched 15 months after Elop announced his Microsoft strategy..

With that, yes, very very important point. If you have disappointing smartphone, to redesign a totally new one would take your company about 18 months, but by that time 3 out of every 4 customers you had, will have bought a new smartphone and if they really rejected your current phone, this is essentially a problem you cannot recover from. Thank you Dipankar!

NEEDS MORE STUDY

I am not here to publish a massive peer-reviewed scientific survey haha. I am here to argue, for the first time in the public domain, that there is this phenomenon 'The Cliff' and it is peculiar to the handsets industry. It has already claimed several victims and it may well collect several more. The main point is that the rate of decline, if any handset maker goes over The Cliff, is catastrophic - essentially today, it means you lose half your customer base in less than 18 months, and another half again - or even faster. With Nokia when they went over The Cliff in 2011, they lost half of their market share in 9 months!.

And then if any handset maker goes over 'The Cliff' - the total company is in utter chaos and panic. The normally sensible management moves will not work and can be severely counterproductive, such as mass layoffs. If your sales fall by half in a year or 18 months, no matter how profitable you had been, you will be plunged into loss-making (witness Siemens, Motorola, Palm, Nokia and RIM). And if you combine that with massive layoffs, you then can't market, can't sell, and can't develop newer models fast enough to help save you (witness Siemens, Motorola, Palm, Nokia and RIM).

So I just wanted to post this blog out there, to spread the story, and to ask for comments and to have fellow thought-leaders in mobile consider 'The Cliff theory' and see if they see the pattern too. Are there other handset related brands that saw the same. I only looked at the global numbers, are there regional patterns too. And I haven't seen this speed of decline in other industries, can you think of some? Is this phenomenon unique to mobile? And can we perhaps find a way for any company to be saved if it falls off 'The Cliff' - is there perhaps a strategy that worked for some player that saved it.

Please those of my regular readers who have mobile related blogs, feel free to spread this story and give it your spin and opinion. If you do, please do refer to this as The Cliff theory by me, and please include a link to this blog if you do. You don't have to agree with me haha.. Let me know what you think on your blog, and I'll post updates on this and include surveys of other thought-leaders on what they said about The Cliff.

I'd really like to hear if this makes sense, but it may be very valuable for us in the industry to consider now for example with Nokia and RIM so much in trouble, and as we consider the 'invincibility' of an Apple or Samsung for example (or Android). Do you see 'The Cliff' and do you agree it is an effect that stalks the players in this handset industry only?

POSTSCRIPT - about 7 hours after I posted this, and after 22 comments in the comments thread, I have been convinced to refine the name. I think the follow-up blog will be called 'Walking Blind By The Cliff' theory which describes even more accurately how brittle any lead in this industry can be. So imagine being blind, and walking on a hill with a deadly cliff. And not being able to detect when stepping into The Cliff. But anyone has stepped into it, the fall is irreversable. I will return with more blogs about this, and include thoughts from the discussion thread. Oh, and Bruce Sterling at Wired and its Beyond the Beyond has covered this story already (thanks Bruce!).



UPDATE APRIL 11

Note Nokia's Q1 results show the single biggest one-quarter crash of smartphone market share yet reported. Read my view of the Nokia Profit Warning and why things are even worse.


Please allow me one plug - For those who feel they cannot have enough facts and numbers about the handset industry, I wrote a statistical handbook about the handset industry in 2010. The ebook is called the TomiAhonen Phone Book 2010 and runs 171 pages and has 98 charts and tables including just about anything you could ask for, including sales numbers, installed bases, market shares, features, form factors, etc. The ebook costs only 9.99 Euros so if you need the numbers, that is the place to go. And now a special offer - I will be doing the totally updated edition for release in the summer of 2012. If you buy the 2010 edition between now and when the 2012 edition is released, I will give you both for the price of one. So if you order the TomiAhonen Phone Book 2010 now, you will get the 2010 edition now, and for no extra cost, the 2012 edition this summer when it is released. Is that a good value? To see more, please see TomiAhonen Phone Book 2010.

Posted by Tomi T Ahonen at 02:17 PM in Blackberry, Carriers / Operators, Dumbphones, Ecosystem, Forecasts, Market Share, Nokia, Smartphone, Statistics, Strategy, Television | Permalink

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From: Bill Wolf6/4/2012 8:31:34 AM
   of 117508
 

Chip shaker - TSMC, Samsung to flex foundry muscle

Sun, Jun 3 2012
By Jonathan Standing

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Morris Chang, the father of Taiwan's chip sector, once shrugged off Samsung Electronics' entry into the foundry business - making private-label semiconductors under contract for others. Now, he calls the South Korean group the industry's "700-pound gorilla" with formidable financial firepower.

Samsung's (005930.KS: Quote, Profile, Research) rise highlights the rapid changes in one of Asia's top industries - where speed, creativity and deep pockets count in a race to make chips smaller, but smarter, to keep up with a consumer shift from computers to mobile gadgets such as Apple Inc's (AAPL.O: Quote, Profile, Research) iPhone and iPad.

While U.S. firm Intel (INTC.O: Quote, Profile, Research) remains the dominant player, with as much as a two-year lead in process technology, the chip industry is going through its biggest shakeout in a decade, and the less well-known contract makers, or foundries, are set to emerge strongest.

Once-dominant Japanese firms have been battered by rising costs and the investment clout of Samsung and Chang's Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) (2330.TW: Quote, Profile, Research) (TSM.N: Quote, Profile, Research).

The Japanese have the technology, but the likes of Elpida Memory (ELPDF.PK: Quote, Profile, Research), a maker of DRAM memory chips for computers, and Renesas Electronics Corp (6723.T: Quote, Profile, Research), the world's leading maker of microcontroller chips for automobiles, just don't have the money to plough into the constant plant and technology upgrades.

"As technology moves forward, companies simply can't afford to individually build advanced fabs. The foundry model of aggregation is very good for addressing the cost issue," said Len Jelinek, director and chief analyst of semiconductor manufacturing at research company IHS iSuppli.

While the word conjures up images of red-hot steel and pounding metal, a chip industry "foundry" is a company that makes chips for others in large, modern and ultra-clean plants, or fabs, that cost billions of dollars to build.

IHS predicts revenue from the foundry business will jump to $42 billion by 2015 from around $30 billion this year, pushing up its share of the total chip industry to 10.8 percent from 9.1 percent. Foundries will account for almost a quarter of total chip capacity by 2015, up from a fifth currently.

The world's top foundries are Taiwanese: TSMC and United Microelectronics (UMC) (2303.TW: Quote, Profile, Research) (UMC.N: Quote, Profile, Research).

TSMC, founded by Chang in 1987, had revenue last year of $14.5 billion and a 49 percent market share, about four times the size of UMC, according to industry researcher Gartner. Then come GlobalFoundries, the former manufacturing arm of Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) (AMD.N: Quote, Profile, Research), which is backed by the Abu Dhabi sovereign fund and had revenue last year of $3.58 billion, China's SMIC (0981.HK: Quote, Profile, Research) and Israel's Towerjazz (TSEM.TA: Quote, Profile, Research).

The foundries' workload is dictated by rapid technological change as consumer hunger for mobile devices means chips must be smaller and lighter yet do more and use less power. This means a bigger focus on logic or system chips, which make such devices work.

"For the first time in semiconductor history, the most leading-edge technology is not being driven by computers, but now mobile processors need it, too," said Samuel Tuan Wang, chief analyst for semiconductor manufacturing at Gartner.

SHRINKING CHIPS

The key for foundries is to perfect that technology, and shrink the space between the transistors on a chip that make it work, so more of them can be fitted on. Currently, the thinnest TSMC and other top makers are able to produce at is the 28 nanometre (nm) level - meaning the gap between the transistors is several thousand times thinner than a human hair, and tens of millions of transistors can fit on the head of a pin.

Intel's latest Ivy Bridge chips are produced at the 22nm level. Both TSMC and Samsung are working on 20nm technology, but this has so far proved unstable. A 28nm fab costs around $5 billion.

Samsung, which has a near-50 percent share of the memory chip market, is converting lines to non-memory chips to boost production of mobile processors used in Apple products and its own mobile devices such as the Galaxy smartphone and Note tablet-phone. In non-memory, it competes with Intel, Qualcomm (QCOM.O: Quote, Profile, Research), Broadcomm (BRCM.O: Quote, Profile, Research) and specialist chip designers such as ARM (ARM.L: Quote, Profile, Research).

Samsung's foundry business, ranked 9th globally with a 1.6 percent market share, is set to grow as it pushes into these logic chips. The firm is one of very few with the money and capacity to seriously challenge TSMC in advanced technologies. It already has foundry clients such as Qualcomm, and increased capacity could see it win more clients such as Texas Instruments (TXN.O: Quote, Profile, Research) and Nvidia (NVDA.O: Quote, Profile, Research) away from TSMC - which is itself struggling to keep up with demand for chips in 28nm.

In January-March, non-memory chips accounted for nearly 40 percent of Samsung's total semiconductor revenue, and the group's investment in non-memory chips is expected to overtake memory chips for the first time this year.

"In future, Samsung will take a bite out of the orders that foundries get," said Clark Tseng, senior manager of market analysis at chip industry association SEMI, who sees TSMC and Samsung dominating the top-tier foundry business, with UMC and GlobalFoundries forming a second-tier and the rest trailing.

TECHNOLOGY HANDOVER?

But Samsung does have an Achilles heel: it competes in some product areas such as mobile phones with potential foundry clients, raising the question of whether firms would feel comfortable handing over their technology to a rival.

Its recent dispute with Apple over mobile patents while at the same time being a supplier of chips to Apple shows the sensitivity and complexity of such arrangements.

And the smaller foundries aren't giving up just yet.

UMC has broken ground on an $8 billion expansion of a plant in Taiwan, and U.S.-based GlobalFoundries, with its Middle East backing, has been linked with a bid for Elpida. SMIC, too, has big backers - the Chinese government - keen to develop high-value-added industries in a country better known for low-margin assembly work.

Now in his 80s and showing no signs of stepping down from an industry he created, TSMC's Chang is up for the challenge.

"I'm not afraid," he told a recent youth gathering in Taipei. "If I were, I wouldn't be doing this."

(Additional reporting by Argin Chang and Clare Jim in TAIPEI; Kim Miyoung in SEOUL, Mari Saito in TOKYO and Noel Randewich in SAN FRANCISCO; Editing by Ian Geoghegan)


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From: Bill Wolf6/4/2012 8:33:09 AM
   of 117508
 
Samsung Unifies Its New Smartphone

By EVAN RAMSTAD in Seoul and ANTON TROIANOVSKI in New York

It's not the Captivate, it's not the Fascinate, nor is it the Epic 4G Touch. Samsung Electronics Co. wants you to know that its new flagship smartphone for the U.S. market is called the Galaxy S III.

On Monday, the world's leading smartphone maker is revealing U.S. launch plans for the Galaxy S III. The rollout is Samsung's latest effort to challenge Apple Inc. at the high end of the smartphone market and reflects the Korean electronics giant's growing clout with wireless carriers and consumers.

In interviews previewing the announcement, Samsung executives emphasized that the Galaxy S III will be the company's first top-of-the-line phone to use the same name at all four national wireless carriers in the U.S.

The two earlier generations of the Galaxy S—which has been Samsung's flagship phone since it embraced Google Inc.'s Android operating software in 2010—appeared under various names with U.S. carriers. There was the Samsung Fascinate at Verizon Wireless, the Samsung Captivate at AT&T Inc., and the Samsung Galaxy S II Epic 4G Touch at Sprint Nextel Corp.

Previously, large carriers' ability to get Samsung to let them each put their own name on what was essentially the same phone underscored the significant control they wielded over the marketing of cellphones.

Carriers have also pushed other phone manufacturers to give them exclusive access to certain phones with special names—such as Motorola Mobility's Droid Razr phones for Verizon Wireless and HTC Corp.'s Evo phones for Sprint . It's all part of their effort to stand apart from competing carriers and drum up interest in their own brand.

However, since Apple launched its iPhone in 2007 and got AT&T to let it drive much of the sales and marketing of the wildly successful smartphone, the strong grip of carriers over device makers has started to loosen.

Now Samsung is trying to follow the Apple playbook, and getting the carriers to come along. In the first quarter of 2012, thanks to strong sales of the Galaxy franchise, Samsung overtook Apple for the world's smartphone leadership position with a 29.1% share of the global market, compared with Apple's 24.2% share, according to research firm IDC.

Justin Denison, chief strategy officer at Samsung's U.S. telecom unit, said the single-name strategy wasn't an easy sell with carriers. The company will still customize software on the Galaxy S III for each of them, he added.

Samsung says that by getting carriers' agreement to use a consistent brand, it has been able to shift its U.S. advertising strategy to focus on a single product—and try to set itself apart from a slew of new Android phones from other manufacturers that boast similar features.

"When we're using our best device to tell our story, it allows people to understand very clearly who we are and has a cascading effect on other products," Todd Pendleton, Samsung's U.S. telecom marketing chief, said in an interview.

The phone's price will start at $199 with a two-year contract. It will be available at national carriers Verizon Wireless, AT&T, Sprint and T-Mobile USA, as well as smaller phone company U.S. Cellular Corp., as early as this month.

Samsung says it promised carriers it would back the phone with its largest product-launch campaign, though executives declined to say how much it would spend. The Galaxy S III, the company says, features a souped-up processor and face-recognition technology.

T-Mobile spokeswoman Cara Walker said the company was working on an ad campaign and exploring other joint marketing activities with Samsung to highlight the Galaxy S devices. T-Mobile had "no objection" to sharing the Galaxy S III name with other carriers, Ms. Walker said.

Write to Evan Ramstad at evan.ramstad@wsj.com and Anton Troianovski at anton.troianovski@wsj.com

A version of this article appeared June 4, 2012, on page B5 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Samsung Unifies Its New Smartphone.

Copyright 2012 Dow Jones & Company,

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From: Bill Wolf6/4/2012 9:47:22 AM
   of 117508
 
What the 28-Nanometer Shortage Means for the Chip Industry
MorningstarBy Brian Colello, CPA | Morningstar


Several leading chipmakers, including Qualcomm(QCOM) and Nvidia(NVDA), have announced that they will have trouble fully satisfying demand in the coming months because of capacity constraints for cutting-edge 28-nanometer chip wafers. Taiwan Semiconductor(TSM), or TSMC, the world's largest foundry and technological leader in 28 nm chip production, simply doesn't have enough production capacity on hand to fulfill all its orders. The shortage is likely to cause a scramble in the chip supply chain--foundries will race to expand capacity and buy new equipment, while chipmakers will look at alternatives, such as using 40 nm chips or switching to competing foundries, in order to fulfill demand.

How We Got Here


finance.yahoo.com 

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