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From: Eric2/21/2014 12:39:57 PM
   of 3297
Boeing offers bonuses to spur 787 catchup in Charleston

To reduce the flow of unfinished 787 work arriving at the Everett final-assembly plant, Boeing dangles a bonus for its South Carolina workers and reorganizes its lagging plant there.

By Dominic Gates

Seattle Times aerospace reporter

Mike Siegel / The Seattle Times, 2009

A North Charleston employee works in the mid-fuselage section of a 787. The mid-fuselage is where the worst production bottlenecks are currenlty occurring.

Boeing is offering a one-time bonus of 8 percent of a year’s pay to workers at the 787 Dreamliner plant in North Charleston, S.C., if they can fix the production problems there within the next few months.

To reduce the deluge of work that has been flowing unfinished to Everett’s final-assembly plant, managers in Charleston also are reorganizing the myriad jobs involved in assembling the jet’s mid-fuselage, where the worst bottleneck is.

And Boeing says it has completed the first step in its campaign to control Charleston’s production problems: rapidly hiring 1,100 workers, many of them skilled contractors, in the past three months.

However, a big backlog has built up. Last week, the mid-fuselage build teams were just shy of 8,000 jobs behind schedule. At recent rates, that’s about 10 days of work.

“There are still a lot of wiring issues,” and efforts to fix that are “taking a lot of manpower and a lot of hours,” said a manager in Charleston.

The most recent fuselage sections delivered to Everett from Charleston are those for Dreamliner No. 178.

Boeing’s latest target, said the manager, is to minimize the work traveling incomplete to Everett by Dreamliner No. 195. That would be within a couple months.

“But to me it still feels chaotic,” cautioned the manager, who, like other employees cited in this story, spoke on condition of anonymity because Boeing doesn’t allow workers to speak without authorization. “I don’t think that will happen by line number 195.”

Meanwhile in Everett, work is still backing up as sections arrive missing not only major wiring bundles but even the brackets that hold the wiring.

According to three people in the factory, work on both 787 assembly lines in Everett slid by two to three days in the past week, despite mandatory overtime through the weekend for many mechanics.

“If parts are not there, you cannot do your job,” said one Everett mechanic. “The whole process has to stop until we go backwards and do what wasn’t done in Charleston.”

Boeing spokesman Marc Birtel insisted that “the 787 program remains on track to meet its delivery commitments” despite “a temporary increase” in the number of jobs behind schedule in Charleston.

He declined to respond to specifics, such as the number of jobs lagging in Charleston.

Birtel said the additional work traveling to Everett to be done in final assembly “is planned and well understood.”

“Traveled work is something we deal with in all production programs,” Birtel said, adding that the Charleston “mid-body team is working to a plan that will result in improved performance, and significantly less additional work (traveling to Everett), in the months ahead.”

Dangling an incentive

Boeing Charleston mechanics build the mid-fuselage and rear-fuselage sections of all 787s. They also do final assembly of some 787s, working toward a goal of assembling three jets per month. The site employs just over 8,000, including contractors.

The bottleneck is the plant where they build the mid-fuselage sections, which are 84 feet long for 787-8 models and 104 feet long for the 787-9 models.

In that plant, workers join the big pieces of the structure, thread wiring, air ducts and hydraulic lines through the barrel, and finish the cabin walls. Each piece of that work is broken down into thousands of smaller jobs.

Since fall, after Boeing stepped up the pace of overall production to 10 jets per month, the mechanics have been overwhelmed.

To keep production flowing, managers have sent the mid-fuselages to Everett with more than 1,000 unfinished jobs per fuselage, adding immense pressure on final-assembly workers here.

To fix that, Boeing is now dangling an incentive: If the workers can get the jobs behind schedule at the entire Boeing South Carolina site below 3,500 by April 30, engineers and managers will get a flat $2,500 and mechanics will get a bonus equal to 8 percent of last year’s pay.

Any jobs that travel to Everett aren’t counted in the bonus calculation. Once an airplane section leaves South Carolina, any incomplete jobs shift from Charleston’s to-do list to Everett’s.

The incentive bonus would be on top of Boeing’s regular annual bonus, which just this month paid the Charleston workforce an extra 18 days’ pay.

If the target is missed in April but achieved by June 30, the bonus paid will be 40 percent less.

If the target is not reached by the end of June, there will be no bonus.

The manager in Charleston said some progress is already apparent, with the mid-body plant now completing 1,000 jobs per day, versus 800 recently.

And last week, Boeing cleared a significant hurdle when the Federal Aviation Administration approved wiring installations on Dreamliner No. 158 in Charleston.

FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said the wiring inspections just completed on No. 158 were “standard practice” after a wiring design change.

However, the Charleston manager said the process received careful scrutiny because of repeated issues with wires getting nicked during installation, damaging the insulation shielding.

In response, Boeing has shifted doing the wiring work that goes in the crown of the mid-fuselage to a back shop, instead of on the plane.

This wiring is installed on overhead cradles that are then brought into the mid-fuselage, he said.

Boeing managers are also reorganizing the mid-fuselage work, aiming to create a clearly defined package of tasks that has to be done in Charleston, and another reduced set that will travel to Everett — called “intentional” traveled work.

The idea is that Everett will start to get the same traveled work each time — and less of it — rather than the mixed bag of late, said an engineer in Charleston.

The initial goal is to cut in half the man-hours needed to complete the mid-body traveled work in Everett, reducing it from 800 to 400, the Charleston manager said.

In another effort to streamline Charleston, planners are combing through the system to reduce the number of required quality inspections as work progresses.

Quality inspectors will still have final buy-off on all work, but the aim is to reduce the number of inspections along every step of the way, said the Charleston engineer.

Boeing spokesman Doug Alder said this is normal “optimization.”

“Boeing is always reviewing its quality system to optimize the number of inspection points,” Alder said. “We continue to employ rigorous processes, oversight and monitoring.”

Both the engineer and the production manager in Charleston said the problems there are directly traceable to the cutback of skilled contractors last year, just before the pace of 787 production stepped up to 10 planes per month.

“Upper management is starting to see that was a mistake,” said the engineer.

“It’s not for lack of effort by the mechanics,” said the manager. “People here work hard. But there are not enough of us.”

Earlier this month, at an aerospace suppliers conference in Lynnwood, Stan Deal, the Boeing vice president in charge of the supply chain, said work traveling incomplete to final assembly is “not uncommon.”

“We are seeing some bumps along the road in our supply chain,” Deal said. “We’ve got a team focused on that in Charleston…. You manage it. You deal with it. Then you move on.”

Dominic Gates: (206) 464-2963 or

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From: Eric2/25/2014 7:14:43 AM
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Boeing Said to Seek Buyers for $1.1 Billion of Early 787s

By Julie Johnsson Feb 24, 2014 11:15 PM PT

Boeing Co. (BA) is struggling to find buyers for 11 of its earliest 787 Dreamliners valued at $1.1 billion after two airlines dropped orders for the holdover models from the jet’s troubled birth, people briefed on the plans said.

The partially completed planes, which are heavier than new 787s and can’t fly as far, have been parked for about four years near a Seattle-area plant. Black plastic shrouds the windows, and 17,000-pound (7,700-kilogram) counterweights dangle from wings in place of engines to keep the jets balanced.

Boeing began building Dreamliners before getting U.S. certification in 2011, amassing a record inventory that included dozens of older versions requiring extensive repairs to meet federal standards. Chicago-based Boeing is starting upgrades on the early 787s, the last ones to be fixed, as it steps up sales efforts, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the talks are private.

The work shows the “diversion of personnel and resources needed to deal with unprofitable aircraft,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst at Fairfax, Virginia-based consultant Teal Group. “It is a commentary on plans gone badly wrong.”

Boeing’s marquee jet, the first airliner built mainly from composites instead of the traditional aluminum, ran more than three years late while the company worked out kinks with the carbon-fiber materials, onboard systems and a manufacturing process that relied more heavily on suppliers.

Photographer: Patrick T. Fallon/Bloomberg

Workers assemble a Boeing Co. 787 Dreamliner airplane at the Boeing Everett Factory in Everett, Washington

Terrible Teens

The early Dreamliners are known in the industry as the “terrible teens,” a nod to their place in the assembly-line order and the factory woes. The teens weigh more than other 787s due to custom-fitted reinforcements and needed the most work among the more 60 early Dreamliners that required post-assembly modifications.

“We are actively marketing those airplanes and have several available opportunities,” Doug Alder, a Boeing spokesman in Seattle, said by e-mail while declining to elaborate.

Boeing has approached PT Garuda Indonesia (GIAA) and Malaysia Airline System Bhd. (MAS) as well as Latin American and Middle Eastern carriers about the early 787s, said one of the people.

Garuda is considering buying twin-aisle planes and is choosing between Airbus’s A350 and the Dreamliner, a person familiar with the discussions had said earlier this month.

Airline Responses

Russia’s Transaero Airlines opted out of an order for four of the jets in December, three people said, while Indonesia’s PT Lion Mentari Airlines said in January it was switching to Boeing 737s instead of taking five Dreamliners. The sales push also includes two 787s for which RwandAir signed a letter of intent in 2012 and for which no firm agreement has been reached, one person said.

Transaero, Garuda and Malaysia Air didn’t respond to requests for comment. RwandAir Chief Executive Officer John Mirenge said the carrier’s purchase plans aren’t final and that it wouldn’t take any 787s until 2017. The Kigali, Rwanda-based airline has seven planes.

The 787s are the last of those that Boeing mothballed to fix supplier work done out of sequence and to resolve issues that surfaced during flight tests. The faults included an electric-panel fire and structural weakness where the plane’s wings melded with its body, the repairs that spurred the structural enhancements on the so-called teens.

Bargain Hunters

ANA Holdings Inc. (9202), the first commercial 787 operator, and other customers opted to ditch the teens for planes manufactured with the enhancements.

Barring a global aerospace slump, Boeing should be able to place the reworked 787s with bargain-hunting airlines seeking twin-aisle jets to fly shorter, densely traveled routes, said Douglas Kelly, senior vice president for asset valuation at Chantilly, Virginia-based aviation consultant Avitas.

Asia seems like exactly the right place,” said George Ferguson, senior analyst with Bloomberg Industries in Skillman, New Jersey, especially if Boeing targeted sales to potential customers of the re-engined A330 contemplated by Airbus Group NV. “You can see it as a competitor to the A330.”

Buyers would probably pay less than half the current $211.8 million list price of the 787-8 version, Kelly said. The 787 teens have a market value of $115 million each for a single-unit or small lot sale, according to Avitas estimates. Airlines will probably demand 10 percent to 15 percent discounts, bringing the price closer to $100 million, Kelly said.

‘Good Value’

The upgraded Dreamliners will boast the same warranties as new planes, 10 percent fuel savings over Airbus’s A330-200 and creature comforts such as greater cabin humidity and dimmable electronic window shades, Kelly said. Their range will be about 1,000 nautical miles (1,852 kilometers) shorter than later 787s.

For carriers that don’t need to fly 7,850 nautical miles nonstop, as Boeing promises the 787 can do, the teens “still represent a good value,” Kelly said in a phone interview. “It’s just a matter of what price are you going to be prepared to pay for that versus a standard-build 787.”

In addition to the 11 teens, three other Dreamliners used for test flights also await upgrades, according to Flightglobal’s Ascend Online database. Boeing has firm orders for two of the test aircraft and is seeking a buyer for the third, according to a Feb. 14 company filing.

Margin Pressure?

Boeing’s inventory ballooned to $42.9 billion in 2013 from $8.1 billion in 2006 as Boeing parked some jets, provided cash advances to suppliers and invested in tooling for the Dreamliner and a revamped 747-8 jumbo that was also delayed, according to company filings and data compiled by Bloomberg.

Once customers are found and deliveries begin, the high-cost teens may squeeze margins for Boeing’s airplane business and cause unit costs to briefly surge, said Jeff Morris, head of U.S. equities at Boston-based Standard Life Investments.

Investors have moved on to other concerns, like Boeing’s production cadence as it raises 787 output, Morris said. “The market tends to be forward-looking and this is a legacy issue,” he said.

Boeing faces writedowns if it can’t find customers for the unsold 787s, Teal Group’s Aboulafia said. Boeing recorded a $2.7 billion research and development expense after concluding it couldn’t sell the first three 787 flight-test Dreamliners in 2009 because they required “an inordinate amount of rework.”

“It’s good to remove any residual overhang, any doubt that there’s more like that,” Aboulafia said.

To contact the reporter on this story: Julie Johnsson in Chicago at

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Ed Dufner at

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From: Eric3/19/2014 10:41:23 AM
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Airbus lags in updating midsize widebody jets, say experts

European plane maker Airbus needs to unveil a serious upgrade to its A330 jet soon or Boeing will dominate the key market for midsize widebody airplanes in the coming decade, analysts said this week.

By Dominic Gates

Seattle Times aerospace reporter

MIKE SIEGEL / The Seattle Times

An Airbus A330-300 flown by Lufthansa.

Airbus officials say that over the past five years Airbus has sold more widebodies than Boeing.

European plane maker Airbus needs to unveil a serious upgrade to its A330 jet within the next six months or Boeing will dominate the all-important and profitable market for midsize widebody airplanes in the coming decade.

That was the stark message from leading aviation analysts this week at the annual U.S. conference of the International Society of Transport Aircraft Trading (ISTAT) in San Diego.

Airbus Senior Vice President Andy Shankland, however, isn’t buying it.

“We get very hot under the collar when we hear the words ‘dominate,’ ‘Boeing’ and ‘widebody’ in the same sentence,” said Shankland in an interview. “Over the past five years, Airbus has sold more widebodies than Boeing.”

But many analysts at the meeting see an urgent need for Airbus to act. Steve Mason, vice president of aircraft analysis at jet lessor CIT Aerospace, said Airbus probably needs to invest the money to put a new fuel-efficient engine on its A330, an upgrade referred to as the A330neo (“new engine option”).

If it doesn’t, he projects sales of the A330 — the highly successful, mid-size twin-aisle jet that seats 250 to 300 people — will inevitably fade within a few years and leave Airbus with no viable plane in that market segment against the 787-8.

The A330, designed in the early 1990s, “is at a crossroads,” said Mason.

For the A330neo to win orders it needs to be available no later than 2018, he said, to take advantage of the fact that Boeing has no open, near-term delivery slots for the 787.

“Airbus needs to make a decision in the next six months,” he said. “If they miss that, it could really damage the prospects of the A330.”

Longtime industry analyst Kevin Michaels, vice president with consulting firm ICF International, agreed.

“At the end of the day, they can’t cede that ground to Boeing,” he said.

Boeing vice president of marketing Randy Tinseth said that even a decision soon to launch an A330neo may be too late for his rival.

“Come late 2015, they’ve got nothing,” said Tinseth. “Even a re-engined airplane wouldn’t come until 2018 or ‘19.”

In contrast, he said, last fall’s launch of the 777X twin-engine widebody — late as that decision was in coming — leaves Boeing with excellent offerings from the smallest to the largest twin-aisle jets.

“We are in a really good place,” said Tinseth.

In a paper released at the conference, CIT’s Mason argued that if Airbus doesn’t change course on the A330, in just a few years it could effectively be reduced to building only A350s in this airplane size category, produced at a rate of no more than 14 jets per month.

Boeing, meanwhile, could be rolling out as many as 24 jets in the same category, including both 787s and 777Xs.

Such an outcome would “put Airbus considerably behind Boeing,” Mason concluded.

Both Delta CEO Richard Anderson and AirAsia CEO Tony Fernandes have called on Airbus to launch the A330neo.

Yet Airbus’s Toulouse-based Shankland tried to tamp down A330neo speculation in his conference presentation.

“There is a lot of discussion of A330 re-engining,” Shankland said, “except in Toulouse.”

In an interview Tuesday, Shankland said the jet maker is analyzing all possible alternatives to upgrade the airplane, but “one should not discount” the option of keeping the A330 as it is today.

That position received the support of Aengus Kelly, chief executive of AerCap — soon to be the world’s second biggest lessor when its acquisition of leasing company ILFC closes.

Kelly said the A330 is so successful now that “If you own the market, why would you bother doing anything else with it?”

For sure, putting a new engine on the A330, which would require also beefing up the wing to hold the heavier new-generation engines, is more complicated than was the successful re-engining of the A320 single-aisle jet family.

That’s because many airlines operate the A330 on relatively short-range flights for a big airplane of less than 3,000 miles. The fuel saving on such routes may not justify the higher price of an A330neo, as they would for operators who fly the plane long distance.

Yet the talk among analysts in San Diego suggests real industry concern that the years ahead could see a widebody-jet market swing toward Boeing.

One senior executive with a leasing company, who asked not to be named because he buys planes from both big plane manufacturers, said an Airbus sales team recently made him a pitch to buy more A330s and succeeded only in raising concerns.

The Airbus pitch was that the A330 could compete against the much lighter and more fuel-efficient 787 by winning on price, compensating for higher fuel costs in operation.

But no airplane lessor wants a manufacturer to offer big discounts, the leasing executive said. That will substantially lower the value of the airplane as it ages.

“That raised the hairs on the back of my neck,” he said. “If they keep the production rate high and lower the price, it becomes a bad investment.”

Steven Udvar-Hazy, now chief executive of Air Lease Corp. and the most respected name in the industry, said he believes Airbus must choose between launching an A330 neo and revamping the plan for the smallest version of Airbus’s new A350 model, the A350-800.

Most industry analysts believe the current A350-800 design is not efficient and likely won’t ever be built without a big upgrade.

Udvar-Hazy said he doesn’t believe it’s rational for Airbus to build both those planes.

“It’s going to be one or the other,” he said. “Certain large airlines are receptive to a re-engined A330 solution that are not receptive to the A350-800.”

“In the end the airline customers will sway Airbus,” he added. “The re-engined A330 is getting more attention. We’ll see what happens between now and the summer.”

Dominic Gates: (206) 464-2963 or

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From: Eric3/25/2014 12:47:21 AM
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Analysis of ‘pings’ helped reach conclusions on 777’s fate

Detailed analysis of the time delay and frequency of hourly “pings” to and from a stationary satellite positioned over the central Indian Ocean helped narrow the search for the missing Malaysian Airlines 777.

By Dominic Gates

Seattle Times aerospace reporter

Richard Wainwright / The Associated Press

Crewmen on board an RAAF AP-3C Orion aircraft check radar screens Monday while searching for missing Malaysia Airways Flight 370

Detailed analysis of hourly “pings” to and from a stationary satellite positioned over the central Indian Ocean has allowed authorities to conclude definitively that Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 must have gone down in the southern part of the ocean.

Days after the plane disappeared, analysts at satellite provider Inmarsat used the precise time delay during transmission of those pings to calculate how far the plane was from the satellite, defining two vast circular arcs sweeping across south-central Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Now, an analysis of the shifting frequency of the signals — in the way the sound of a police siren changes as it comes toward you, then speeds away — and comparisons with signals from other planes in the region at the time has allowed the analysts to discount the northern arc and to zero in on a more defined final known position in the southern Indian Ocean, west of Australia.

“They’ve at least been able to narrow down to a fairly localized region” of that southern arc, said Tim Farrar, president of TMF Associates, a Menlo Park, Calif.-based satellite consulting company.

Malaysian Prime Minister Najiv Razak in a news conference Monday said this new analysis confirms beyond reasonable doubt that the plane soon afterward must have run out of fuel and crashed into those waters, and that all 239 people aboard must be dead.

“This is a remote location, far from any possible landing sites,” Najiv said.

Farrar said further analysis of the satellite signals could help narrow the search area further.

It could also help determine whether the plane was traveling for the last part of its journey in a straight line at a constant speed, with no apparent pilot intervention.

If so, that would raise the possibility that the plane was on autopilot before plunging into the ocean, with the pilots — and perhaps the passengers — incapacitated, possibly already dead.

Najiv said the conclusion the jet is lost in the location identified was arrived at “using a type of analysis never before used in an investigation of this sort.”

Tracking via satellite pings

Airliners use a satellite connection while out of radio range over the ocean for voice communication with the pilots and also to carry text messages to the airline operations base via the jet’s data-communications link, the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System, or ACARS.

ACARS sent its last transmission a half-hour after takeoff. The last radio contact with the plane was 38 minutes into the flight; the jet dropped off radar minutes later.

Even if ACARS was either turned off by someone or ceased functioning because of some system failure, the satellite connection remained.

Just as a cellphone communicates with cell towers so that the network can reach it with an incoming call, the Inmarsat satellite sends an hourly message to the terminal on board the airplane to check that it is still connected.

In response, the terminal sends back a ping to say, yes, it’s still there.

The final ping from Flight 370 was sent at 8:11 a.m. local time, 7½ hours after the jet took off from Kuala Lumpur.

The pings identified the airplane as Flight 370 but contained no direct location data.

Nevertheless, Farrar, who said he spoke with both Inmarsat and the designers of the satellite equipment on the airplane, explained how it’s possible to use the raw ping data to deduce location information.

The time the response ping takes to travel from the plane to the satellite hovering 23,000 miles above the Indian Ocean varies according to the distance the signal must traverse.

The satellite recorded at what point in the predetermined transmission time slot the ping from Flight 370 arrived, and so established how far away the jet was.

It was this data that persuaded the Malaysian authorities, a week after the plane disappeared, to reorient the search toward two arcs in a large radius around the satellite.

One arc swept north over land into Central Asia, the other south into the remote southern ocean.

Not totally stationary

Subsequent analysis used the fact that the Inmarsat satellite is not perfectly stationary in its orbit.

Although it is fixed on the 64-degree east line of longitude, the satellite moved slightly from north to south of the equator during the jet’s flight, which means it was moving away from jets in the Northern hemisphere and moving toward jets in the Southern hemisphere.

The Doppler effect — the same phenomenon that changes the pitch of a siren as an ambulance moves toward, past and then away from a listener — enabled analysts to determine whether the plane is moving toward or away from the satellite as it pinged.

The frequency of the Flight 370 signal told analysts it was in the southern arc, not the northern.

By comparing the signals from other planes in the sky at the time that were pinging the same satellite and whose position was known, they were able to further narrow the jet’s possible location, Farrar said.

The search remains daunting. The area where it will now be concentrated, toward the southern tip of the original search arc, is still many tens of thousands of square miles.

Dominic Gates: (206) 464-2963 or

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From: Eric4/1/2014 9:44:15 AM
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Page modified March 31, 2014 at 10:53 PM

Boeing blames pilots for Asiana 777 crash; airline faults software, too

Boeing on Monday firmly blamed the pilots for last year’s crash of an Asiana Airlines 777 in San Francisco, telling the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that the crash “would have been avoided had the flight crew followed procedures.

By Dominic Gates

Seattle Times aerospace reporter

National Transportation Safety Board / Getty Images

A National Transportation Safety Board investigator examines debris at the Asiana Airlines crash site last July.

Boeing on Monday firmly blamed the pilots for last year’s crash of an Asiana Airlines 777 in San Francisco, telling the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that the crash “would have been avoided had the flight crew followed procedures.”“This accident occurred due to the flight crew’s failure to monitor and control airspeed, thrust level and glide path,” Boeing said in a document submitted for the agency’s investigation of last July’s crash in which three passengers died.

Asiana partly agreed with Boeing in its own submission to the NTSB, but it also found fault with the design of the jet’s automated flight controls.

The South Korean carrier wrote that “the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s failure to monitor and maintain a minimum safe airspeed during a final approach.”

However, its report cites factors it says contributed to the crash, including the logic built into the plane’s autothrottle software.

Boeing and Asiana agree that as the pilots came in to land, they expected the autothrottle to automatically supply engine thrust to maintain a minimum airspeed. In fact, in the flight mode they had engaged, the onus was on them to maintain the speed.

Asiana also faulted the cockpit alerting systems as providing “inadequate warning” that the speed had dropped dangerously low.

The discrepancy between the airline and the jet-maker pivots around Boeing’s flight-control design philosophy, cited in its submission as requiring “the pilot always has the final authority over any automation system.”

In an earlier NTSB hearing in December, Boeing staunchly defended this automation-control design.

The issue will now come under intense NTSB scrutiny as the agency does its final report on the July 6 crash.

Because the airport’s instrument-landing system was out of service that day due to construction, pilots had no digital glide path in the sky to follow. They had to manually land planes.

But Asiana Flight 214 from Seoul, with 307 people aboard, came in too low and, traveling at 120 mph, clipped the seawall short of the runway. The main landing gear and the tail of the big jet sheared off.

Six people were thrown from the back of the jet when the tail detached. Three of them died. These were passengers in a rear row of seats; none was wearing a seat belt.

The other three, who were seriously injured, were flight attendants strapped into their seats at the rear of the plane for the landing.

Meanwhile, the rest of the plane slid along the ground, bounced, spun 330 degrees and hit the ground again.

The passenger cabin remained largely intact, enabling the remaining passengers and crew to survive.

As the plane came to a stop, the right engine caught fire. Everyone was evacuated on slides before the fire spread to the passenger cabin and burned through the fuselage.

The twin accounts by Boeing and Asiana largely agree on the events leading up to that deadly conclusion.

While approaching the airport, at about 1,600 feet, the pilot apparently accidentally selected an automated mode called Flight Level Change, which directed the autopilot to climb to a higher level.

To correct this error and cancel the climb, the crew disconnected the autopilot and manually pulled the throttles back to idle.

Boeing’s design philosophy interpreted this action as a manual override of the autothrottle by the crew.

In other situations, for example cruising at 35,000 feet, the autothrottle will automatically come alive and increase thrust if the airspeed falls too low.

But at that moment on Flight 214, with the assumption that the pilot had taken control of thrust, the Boeing control logic transitioned the autothrottle to hold mode, meaning it was ready to adjust the thrust again only if commanded to do so by the pilot’s actions.

At this point, the autothrottle had ceded control to the pilots, but the crew had lost touch with what was happening.

With the engines at idle and the autothrottle on hold, the crew didn’t monitor the jet’s speed.

Doug Rice, a veteran commercial-airline pilot and a board member of the California Pilots Association, said foreign flight crews often lack manual flying experience.

He believes the Asiana pilots were unable to cope that day with the fact that the instrument-landing equipment was out.

“It wasn’t like it was dangerous,” Rice said. “It was a beautiful day. And they didn’t fly the airplane.

“They didn’t miss their touchdown target by a little bit,” he added. “They missed by a third of a mile.”

In the December NTSB hearing, John Cashman, the test pilot who flew the 777 maiden flight in 1994, defended Boeing’s flight-control logic.

“It goes back to that original philosophy: not changing modes in an autopilot that the pilot doesn’t command,” Cashman said.

He said the pilot has to have the authority, should he see oncoming traffic or some other reason to change course, to fully control the airplane.

Asiana mentions in its submission that this precise situation arose during a test flight of a 787 Dreamliner, which has the same flight-control logic.

In that instance, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) test pilot questioned the fact that the autothrottle didn’t wake up automatically when the speed dropped.

But an FAA manager at the December hearing testified that after discussions with Boeing “the FAA pilot determined that the fact that the autothrottle did not wake up was not a safety issue.”

Asiana recommends in its submission to the NTSB that Boeing insert more explicit warnings in its flight-crew training manuals about this specific circumstance and also that it should develop stronger alerting features to mitigate any automation “surprise.”

Rice said such steps, rather than changing the logic of Boeing’s flight-control philosophy, is the right response.

“I don’t believe the philosophy needs changed,” said Rice. “We need to make sure the pilots understand the philosophy and they must demonstrate that knowledge during their training.”

The San Francisco crash was the first fatal accident of a 777. The NTSB investigation continues and will eventually produce recommendations.

There appears to be no link to what happened with the missing Malaysian 777 lost in March.

Dominic Gates: (206) 464-2963 or

My comments:

As a pilot and a FAA certified flight instructor for me it's sad to see that both pilots failed to do the simplest primary function... maintaining the correct airspeed at all times, especially during the most critical phase of flight, landing.


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From: Eric4/2/2014 9:42:18 AM
   of 3297
One final voyage for Boeing-built NASA shuttle carrier

The specially modified 747, used to ferry dozens of space shuttles over the decades, is being dismantled for a move to Space Center Houston, where it will be reassembled and go on display..

Smiley N. Pool / Houston Chronicle

Boeing employees work to dismantle the NASA Shuttle Carrier Aircraft at Ellington Field near Houston. The modified 747 is being moved late this month to Space Center Houston, where it will anchor an exhibit.


Houston Chronicle

Steven Ramey is standing inside a Boeing 747 fuel tank, and he’s having the time of his life.

Pointing to where the aircraft’s 50,000-pound wing attaches to the fuselage, Ramey notes where bolts are being removed.

“This is the first time we’ve pulled off a wing,” the Boeing employee says. “It’s great. We get to come in here, like a bunch of kids, tear it apart and then put it back together.”

The wing belongs to NASA 905, a jumbo jet that ferried space shuttles from landing sites in California and New Mexico back to Florida.

Now stationed at Ellington Field near Houston, the aircraft, which is 232 feet long and 63 feet tall, is being disassembled for an 8-mile move in late April to Space Center Houston.

In its current state, the plane is yet another reminder that the shuttle program is now part of history.

An “Aircraft on Ground” team from Boeing is carefully removing parts and the bolts that attach them, and storing them for reassembly. Although the plane will break into nine big pieces for the trip, there are thousands of smaller pieces. Cranes and drills and airplane parts are strewn everywhere.

“One of our biggest logistics problems is keeping track of the parts,” said Ramey, a lead foreman on Boeing’s aviation-services team. “It’s kind of like we are moving a puzzle from one location to another.”

Later this year, Ramey and his team will put the plane back together, a 44-day process that will reverse the work they’re doing. Then the museum will place a space shuttle mock-up — Independence — atop it.

In 2015, both the aircraft and shuttle will open as an interactive, six-story display.

The museum needs about $12 million to move the aircraft and set it up for display, said Jack Moore, a spokesman for the facility. They’ve raised $9 million, including an in-kind donation by Boeing for the work of employees like Ramey.

The crew, most of whom are from Washington state, were eager to tackle this kind of assignment. It’s a happier job than, say, the more typical work of rescuing an aircraft that’s gone off the end of a runway.

“I’ve been in the industry for 20 years and I don’t think anyone in this group had done this before,” said Tom Conant, a team captain for the aviation-services unit.

Even after breaking down the mammoth aircraft, the move by the 1,000-foot trailer convoy will be an arduous, two-night affair.

While the move will be at night to minimize traffic disruptions, it should nonetheless be a public spectacle and there will be viewing locations along the way.

Although it may seem audacious to plant a shuttle atop an aircraft, this combination actually weighed less than a fully booked 747 with passengers and their luggage.

Built in 1970, NASA 905 was one of the first 100 aircraft in Boeing’s 747 line, of which there have now been 1,500 made.

NASA acquired the plane from American Airlines in 1974 and began testing it with space shuttle Enterprise — which never flew into space — in 1977.

In addition to carrying the active orbiters across the country, the aircraft once carried Enterprise to Europe for display in England and at the Paris Air Show.

It was also the aircraft that carried Enterprise and the operational shuttles Discovery and Endeavour to their retirement homes in New York, Dulles Airport near Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, respectively.

NASA 905 made its last flight in December 2012. Now the grounded aircraft has but one trip before a final retirement.

Seattle Times staff contributed to this report.

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From: JakeStraw5/2/2014 8:53:55 AM
   of 3297
New Boeing jets hold key to more than half of future sales

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To: JakeStraw who wrote (3262)7/17/2014 10:43:00 AM
From: Eric
   of 3297
Boeing Buoyed at Show With $46 Billion in Day-Three Sales

By Julie Johnsson and Kari Lundgren

Jul 16, 2014 4:09 PM PT

Source: Boeing
777-300 with Qatar Airways livery.

Boeing Co. (BA) escaped Airbus Group NV (AIR)’s shadow on the third day of the Farnborough Air Show as an agreement to sell new 777X jets to Qatar Airways Ltd. drove a $46 billion haul of orders and options.

After dominating Boeing on the first two days of the event, Airbus reported one deal yesterday valued at $1.2 billion at list prices, according to data compiled by Bloomberg Industries. Boeing’s accord with Qatar Airways, which isn’t a completed order, is for 50 of the -9X version along with 50 options.

The agreement nudged Boeing ahead of Airbus in announced sales at the biggest aviation expo, with about $63 billion to the European planemaker’s $61 billion, the Bloomberg Industries tally showed. Even as the industry events at the show wind down today, the manufacturers will be working to ensure that the pledges to buy planes eventually are booked as firm orders.

“This is potentially useful as a guide, but with backlogs the size of the ones at both Boeing and Airbus, it has little near-term impact,” George Hamlin, a former Airbus executive who now runs Hamlin Transportation Consulting, said this week in an interview about the day-by-day sales jockeying.

Qatar Airways doubled its planned purchases of the upgraded 777 in yesterday’s transaction, after firming up a deal for the same number announced at the Dubai air show in November.

Photographer: Duncan Chard/Bloomberg
A model of Boeing's 777X aircraft, manufactured by Boeing Co.

List Prices

The latest agreement has a list value of $37.7 billion, Chicago-based Boeing said. That would make it the biggest deal yet at this year’s show. Boeing’s backlog was 5,197 planes through June, compared with 5,546 for Toulouse, France-based Airbus, according to data compiled by Bloomberg Industries.

Airbus took an early advantage this week after introducing an updated version of its A330 wide-body with more fuel-efficient engines. Lessors have dominated the deals, with Qatar Airways and AirAsia Group Bhd among the few airline customers.

“The preponderance of lessor orders at the show is largely a function of timing, we believe,” Gary Liebowitz, a New York-based analyst with Wells Fargo Securities, said in a note to clients this week. Lessors over time will command about quarter of the planemakers’ backlogs and own 45 percent to 50 percent of the global aircraft fleet.

Boeing also pulled in an order from China’s Hainan Airlines Co. (600221) for 50 737MAX-8 single-aisle airliners valued at $5.1 billion at list prices, as well as two current-version 737-700s from Air Algerie SpA. MG Aviation, a leasing company, agreed to buy two 787-9, the mid-sized version of the Dreamliner model.

The 777X will be introduced by the end of the decade to follow the current 777, a long-range wide-body jet that boasts the world’s largest commercial engine. Only one buyer formally expressed interest in Airbus’s competing A350 this week: Air Mauritius Ltd. took options on four planes.

To contact the reporters on this story: Julie Johnsson in Farnborough, England, at; Kari Lundgren in Farnborough, England, at

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Ed Dufner at; Benedikt Kammel at Stephen West

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To: JakeStraw who wrote (3262)12/11/2014 8:46:15 AM
From: Eric
   of 3297
Originally published December 10, 2014 at 9:56 AM | Page modified December 10, 2014 at 7:22 PM

With no new orders for huge A380, Airbus raises prospect of ditching jet

Airbus Group raised the prospect of discontinuing its A380 superjumbo as soon as 2018, the first admission that it may have misjudged the market for the double-decker after failing to find a single airline buyer this year.

By Andrea Rothman

Bloomberg News

An Airbus A380 aircraft, operated by Korean Airlines, is displayed at the 2011 Paris Air Show.

Airbus Group raised the prospect of discontinuing its A380 superjumbo as soon as 2018, the first admission that it may have misjudged the market for the double-decker after failing to find a single airline buyer this year.

While Airbus will break even on the plane in 2015, 2016 and 2017, that outlook doesn’t hold for 2018, forcing the company to either offer new engines to make the A380 more attractive or discontinue the program, Chief Financial Officer Harald Wilhelm told investors at a meeting in London on Wednesday.

His comments come as 2014 shapes up to be the first since the double-decker entered service without a new airliner customer. Its only buyer was a leasing company that has yet to line up a single carrier to take any of the 20 planes it ordered. The backlog remains as thin as it is fragile, highlighted by the cancellation of six jets ordered by Japan’s Skymark Airlines, with two close to handover.

In its seventh year in operation, the aircraft that cost $25 billion to develop threatens to become a costly misstep. While popular with travelers, most carriers prefer smaller twin-jet models that are more fuel efficient and can access more airports. Emirates is the only stand-out sponsor, having ordered 140 units, while other airlines have either backed off or are struggling to fill the two decks of the jumbo.

“It’s an excellent plane, but it only works for the right destinations,” said Air France-KLM Group Chief Executive Officer Alexandre de Juniac, who aims to cancel the last two of a dozen A380s on order and swap them for smaller models.

Chris Buckley, Airbus’ executive vice president, Europe, Asia and Pacific, said the company has been “at fault” in the way it marketed the aircraft, letting carriers customize the interiors rather than pushing the high-density credentials of the double-decker.

The four-engine widebody airliner is a rarity, after Airbus killed its A340. Boeing said Tuesday that it will cut back production of its 747 jumbo to 16 a year from 18 in 2015.

Emirates President Tim Clark is pushing Airbus to upgrade the A380’s engines to improve fuel efficiency, a move Airbus is resisting because the cost of doing so doesn’t match demand for the plane. Keeping the plane unchanged may mean running down the backlog and eventually shutting down production, now at just under 30 a year, analysts said.

“Airbus will be obliged to make a decision one way or the other in 2015,” said Yan Derocles, an analyst at Oddo Securities in Paris, who estimates an engine upgrade may cost Airbus 2 billion euros ($2.47 billion) because of work required on the wing.

An engine upgrade would take about four years, according to Derocles. The A380 now comes with a choice of engines either by Rolls-Royce Holdings or a joint venture between General Electric and United Technologies’ Pratt & Whitney.

The A380’s lackluster demand contrasts with a boom in orders for other models. Airbus’ best-seller remains its A320 family of single-aisle jets, which it made even more popular by offering new engines. The same concept added momentum to the A330 widebody jet.

The all-new A350, a twin-engine long-range widebody plane made of advanced lightweight materials, has almost 800 orders before its first handover.

Airbus has won orders for 318 of the jumbos. That’s a fraction of the 1,200 it thought airlines needed in that size category when it started marketing in 2000. Emirates accounts for 40 percent of the order book, while airlines including Virgin Atlantic Airways, Hong Kong Aviation and Air Austral are increasingly unlikely to ever take their planes.

Japan and China, originally seen by Airbus as key markets for the A380, have been disappointments, with only one Chinese airline taking five units. Boeing’s 747-8, the only rival, has fared even worse, winning 51 orders from four airlines.

“It’s a pity,” Clark, the Emirates president, said of the A380. “It’s a very big cash generator for us. I just open the doors and the people come.”

Emirates has been successful with its fleet of A380s because the airline uses its Dubai hub as a central point to connect major routes around the globe with just one stop. The A380 is also popular on capacity-restricted airports such as London Heathrow, while many smaller airfields lack the infrastructure to accommodate the plane.

Richard Aboulafia, vice president at the Teal Group and longtime critic of the plane, said the new large twin-engine planes coming to the market will be the death of the A380.

“I don’t think it lasts more than a few years into the next decade,” he said of the A380. “The quicker they let go, the quicker they can devote themselves to marketing efforts on other products.”

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From: FUBHO12/12/2014 12:36:03 AM
   of 3297
Fury at Airbus after it hints the super-jumbo may be mothballed

Suggestion sent shockwaves through the aviation industry

Airbus plunged deeper into crisis yesterday as customers reacted with fury to its suggestion that it may stop producing the fabled A380 super-jumbo in 2018 because of poor sales.

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