Non-Tech | Derivatives: Darth Vader's Revenge


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From: axial3/21/2012 5:59:52 PM
2 Recommendations   of 2329
 
Goldman loses bid to end lawsuit over risky CDO

'Goldman Sachs Group Inc lost its bid to dismiss a lawsuit accusing it of defrauding investors by selling risky debt linked to subprime mortgages that it planned to bet against. The decision by U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero in New York keeps alive a hedge fund's claims over a $2 billion offering of collateralized debt obligations, amid intense scrutiny over Goldman's activities before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

[...]

It accused Goldman of creating the Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-1 and 2006-2 CDOs, which were backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, in late 2006 as part of a secret scheme to offload subprime risk.

The hedge fund said it lost nearly all of its $4 million investment, selling its holdings for 2.5 cents on the dollar in October 2007 after having paid 95 cents or 100 cents on the dollar the previous winter. Marrero dismissed one claim by Dedona that accused Goldman of market manipulation.

But the judge said even "large sophisticated" investors such as Dodona might not have understood Goldman's CDOs, and that the bank's boilerplate disclosures on their "speculative" nature might be inadequate. Goldman "created the synthetic CDOs here in dispute, a form of investment instrument that, Rube Goldberg-like, few but a select group of its own designers, engineers and lawyers could clearly explain, let alone understand, precisely how it functions or exactly what it does," the judge wrote.'

reuters.com 

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[When are sovereign governments - not hedge funds - going to sue?]

Jim

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From: axial3/22/2012 3:42:10 AM
   of 2329
 
Basel‘s Monstrous Regulatory Mistake

[Leverage -- see how Basel and banks did it: youtube.com  ]

---

'The Basel Committee made a monstrous regulatory mistake in Basel II, when they considered the credit ratings of the clients of the banks when setting the capital requirements for banks, even though the information provided by the credit ratings was already being considered by the market and the banks when setting their risk-premiums and interest rates.

Even if the credit ratings had been perfect it would have been wrong as something considered excessively, can be much worse than something not considered at all. But, of course, being the credit ratings the product of human fallible raters, so much the worse to leverage the importance of their failings.

That stupid and unforgivable mistake resulted in:

1. The setting of minimalistic capital requirements that served as growth hormones for the ‘too-big-to-fail’.

2. That banks overcrowded and drowned themselves in shallow waters, whether of triple-A rated securities backed with lousily awarded mortgages to the subprime sector, or of equally or slightly less well rated “rich” sovereigns, like Greece.

3. A serious shrinkage of all bank lending to small businesses and entrepreneurs as lending to these generated, in relative terms, much higher capital requirement, which made it difficult for them to deliver a competitive return on bank equity.

With Basel III, regulators, instead of correcting the mistake, are trying to correct for this mistake, which can only result in a serious case of overmedication and in the Basel Committee digging us deeper in the complex hole where they placed us. bit.ly 

voxeu.org 

Jim

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To: axial who wrote (2095)3/28/2012 10:24:57 AM
From: Worswick   of 2329
 
Axial fantastic posts .... keep it up.

A few things of note here , first GS derivative profits this quarter.

Lauren Tara LaCapra Wed Mar 28, 2012 7:37am EDT

(Reuters) - Goldman Sachs Group Inc's (GS.N) first-quarter earnings are expected to benefit from the increased use of derivatives by European clients seeking ways to hedge risk, according to an internal report seen by Reuters.

Revenue at Goldman's investment bank in Europe increased by 8 percent from the year-ago period to $476 million, the report said.

A big driver was derivatives that clients, corporations and financial institutions used to hedge bets in the stock and fixed-income markets.

Overall client-driven derivatives revenue was up 142 percent year-to-date in Goldman's Europe division, helping to offset declines in more traditional investment banking businesses, like mergers and acquisitions.

The figures suggest that steps taken by European regulators to stabilize capital markets have been effective and have set the stage for stronger-than-expected quarterly results for Wall Street investment banks.

The figures also suggest that U.S. banks are benefiting from stress among European competitors that have had to step back from the market and reduce risk-taking in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis.

On a conference call last week to discuss quarterly results, Jefferies Group Inc (JEF.N) Chief Executive Richard Handler said "a number of larger foreign players who have had ambitions of being global are choosing to go back to their respective countries to basically satisfy their regulators and the rating agencies." That is a situation, he said, that "creates an opportunity" for U.S. competitors to gain market share.

Goldman's derivatives gains were driven by clients adjusting their balance sheets for counterparty credit risks, as well as European financial institutions seeking capital gains, said a source familiar with the results who spoke on condition of anonymity because the figures are not public.

Goldman spokesman Michael DuVally declined to comment on the figures.

Goldman does not break out its European results individually in quarterly reports. Instead, it reports revenue for Europe, Middle East and Asia, which delivered $2.87 billion of revenue and $1.09 billion in pre-tax earnings for the first quarter of 2011.

Analysts have been lifting their estimates for Goldman in recent weeks thanks largely to improved market conditions.

Analysts expect Goldman to earn $3.25 per share for the first quarter, on average, according to Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S, up from an estimate of $2.89 per share 30 days ago. The figure compares with adjusted earnings of $4.38 a year ago, excluding a one-time cost of redeeming preferred stock.

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From: Worswick3/28/2012 10:31:52 AM
   of 2329
 
Secondly, continued from my last post "of intersting things upon the horizon" .... please reference article number two in this section.


I have been looking for years to find a brief staement about "what will happen".


See: Mark Grant Explains The Latest European Con Tyler Durden on 03/28/2012 09


As The ECB Crosses The Inflationary Rubicon Has Mario Draghi Lost All Control? Tyler Durden on 03/28/2012 For the charts inv this article see:

zerohedge.com 


Having been heralded around the world for solving Europe's crisis, ECB head Mario Draghi confidently states (as does every other central banker in the world) that "should the inflation outlook worsen, we would immediately take preventive steps". However, a recent analysis by Tornell and Westermann at VOX suggests the ECB has hit its limit with regard to its anti-inflationary fighting measures.

The ECB appears to have lost control over standard measures of tightening: short-term interest rates (since short-term lending to banks has dropped to practically zero), increase in minimum reserve requirements (practically impossible withouit crushing the banks that they have propped up due to the sharp asymmetries - the recent cut from 2% to 1% minimum reserves saw a remarkable EUR104bn drop), and finally asset sales (the quantity of 'sensitive' or encumbered assets on the ECB's books has reached such a scale - due to LTRO, SMP, and ELA programs - leaving the 'sellable' non-sensitive assets at a level below excess deposits for the first time in ECB history).

Got that? (posters blog note, bold type mine)

As the authors note, while this does not immediately produce an inflation flare, the lack of maneuvering space will induce an inflationary bias to ECB monetary policy as Draghi will find it increasingly expensive at the margin to hit the anti-inflationary brakes. "This bias puts the Eurozone at risk of de-anchoring long-run inflationary expectations. The danger is not inflation today, but the de-anchoring of expectations about future inflation." As we have noted many times before, the ECB (and for that matter most central banks in the world) need Goldilocks.

Standard monetary 'instruments' to control inflationary concerns (or the ECB's ability to absorb an excessive increase in liquidity) have hit a limit:

Short-term interest rates will be ineffective since ECB lending to MFIs is now minimal: Increasing the minimum reserve requirement will crush banks capital - especially damaging for low-excess deposit countries where systemic bank runs would likely occur.

And finally asset sales is very limited since the unencumbered (or non-sensitive) ECB assets - that are practically saleable - have crossed below the excess deposits level for the first time - standing at just 26% of the balance sheet (simply out the ECB would not have enough non-sensitive assets to sell in order to cover a withdrawal of excess deposits by banks).

In summary, the intersections in Figures 1 and 3 make clear that the ECB has lost its ability to implement standard anti-inflationary policies.




Mark Grant Explains The Latest European Con Tyler Durden on 03/28/2012 09 From Mark Grant, author of Out of the Box and Onto Wall Street The Firewall- An Irrelevancy

“Tough luck, Lonnehan. But that's what you get for playing with your head up your ass!”

-The Sting

There is noise and fluff and soap bubbles floating in the wind but don’t be distracted. Like so many things connected to the European Union it is just hype. In the first place do you think that any nation in Europe is actually going to put up money for the firewall no matter what size that they claim it will be? Let me give you the answer; it is “NO.” The firewall is just one more contingent liability that is not counted for any country’s financials, one more public statement of guarantee that everyone on the Continent hopes and prays will never be taken too seriously and certainly never used. Any rational person knows that some promise to pay in the future will not solve anything and it certainly won’t create some kind of magic ring fence around any nation. Think it through; what will it do to stop Spain or Italy from knocking at the door of the Continental Bank if they get in trouble and the answer is clearly nothing, not one thing. The firewall is just a distraction to lull all of you back to sleep and all of the headlines and discussion about it makes zero difference to any outcome and so is nothing more than a ruse. “Look this way please, do not look that way, pay no attention to the man behind the curtain, put up your money to buy our sovereign debt like a good boy and everything will be just fine.”

“Did you ever hear of a hustle called Two Brothers and a Stranger?”

-The Color of Money

The more that the 170 politicians in the 17 countries discuss the size of the firewall, whether Germany will guarantee more money or not, whether the old fund will be used in conjunction with the new fund; the more the scam is in play. It is a hustle organized by a very elegant set of grifters and since Eurostat clearly states that “promises to pay” are not counted on any nation’s financials then why would you think that “promises to pay” have any value in fencing out economic contagion? Spain or Italy will hit the skids based upon solvency issues and whether the interest rate on their debt is 7.00% or 5.50% makes very little difference in determining the outcome. The core issue for these countries is whether they can pay their debts and as their recession worsens and as the payments come due the squeeze is on. The LTRO money is beginning to run dry and unless they do another one and take the debt at the ECB up to $6 Trillion or the EU starts handing out money like candy upon the street corner the debts cannot be paid. The Ponzi bonds may well roll on and the Ponzi scheme may well get bigger but just because the Bernie Madoffs on the Continent tell you that your money is safe; Mark Grant will tell you that it is not.

One Degree of Separation between “Being Right” and “Winning”

We play the Great Game to win. We do not play the Great Game to be right. Get this clearly in your minds because it makes ALL the difference. Here is the embarkation point and the disembarkation point between money managers. Here is the line, the Great Divide, between coming out on top and falling by the wayside. Winning is the thing, it is the only thing and “getting it right” may lead you to be a winner but it is not what is really important; winning is what is important. Consequently when “The Con” is on there are only two realistic choices; do not play or trade around it. For longer term investors you must recognize that the sting is underway and invest your money in other places. For the hedge fund types you can bet against or trade with the momentum but while doing so never, ever forget that “The Con” is in motion.

“Someday, following the example of the United States of America, there will be a United States of Europe.”

-President George Washington

Now here is a great example of what I am trying to explain. This comment from the first President of the United States has turned out to be basically correct. However, if you had betted on it then it would have been some two hundred and change years before you won your bet. Generations would have come and gone and so, being right, is not always the way to play the Great Game. Further, “being right” is always defined by the timeline on which the proposition depends and so Father Time, your best friend and worst enemy, forever intervenes in the outcome of any investment. An LTRO, a Quantitative Easing, the printing of money, always drives up the prices of assets in the short term; this would be as in ALWAYS. Then when the well runs dry again the opium induced swindle is played again and sometimes again and again but then, inevitably, there comes a time, a moment, when for political or economic reasons the presses are shut down and there is no longer any new money. Here, at this specific point, the road switches back, the reversal begins, and the Pied Piper demands payment for the use of the printing presses.

You do not need to go back two hundred years to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers to see what is currently happening. Try just four years ago, 2008, and the presses were rolling, the mortgages were bundled, the ratings agencies gave them a AAA based upon diversification, no documentation was needed for loans and the hustle was in full play. In Europe, in 2012, the presses are rolling, the quality of collateral is now the second lien on Mr. Popandopolous’s gyro Greek diner and the hustle is in play. In America the presses are rolling, Chairman Bernanke is engaging in “twists” and turns and now we find that our own Federal Reserve Bank, according to Bloomberg, has even bought a “small quantity” of European sovereign bonds. Our Fed is even nicer than the ECB; no demands for collateral at all so that not only does the rabbit pop out of the hat but the hat pops out of pure air. Alchemy is alive and well. The Philosopher’s Stone has been found and it is resident at the world’s central banks.

The Game Book

Now yields in the longer end of the curve are beginning to back up. This is your first indication of trouble to come. Then it will be even higher yields, the equity markets will begin to back up, assets will decline in price and your portfolios will be chock full of flung mud. Given the particularities of this crisis, with TIPS at negative yields and the yields on short term bonds just off of Kelvin’s Absolute Zero; the risks are magnified. It is out of bullets and into corporate bonds tied to Inflation, and fixed-to float bonds and anything and everything to adhere to Grant’s Rules 1-10; “Preservation of Capital.” I don’t care if you do not like structured bonds or if you keep intoning the mantra of liquidity because normal old fixed coupon bonds in the space of five years and out are going to have marks to market that will cause a gagging sensation and so the Great Game must be played from a different angle. When the time comes that the LTRO play is over and when the Fed shuts off the spigot then the Hell that will be paid will be lining up at everyone’s doors demanding cash and not accepting anymore IOU’s. Bow to Hamelin and thank the gods of the marketplace that your eye was good enough to see the Pied Piper making the turn and heading down the road.

''The music stopped, and I stood still,
And found myself outside the Hill,
Left alone against my will,
To go now limping as before”


-Robert Browning, The Pied Piper of Hamelin

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From: Worswick3/29/2012 11:46:54 AM
1 Recommendation   of 2329
 
I would say, as I have said this many times in the last fifteen years on this blog:

"This is what the end of our world looks like."

The absolutely, even resolute criminal looting of the world by captive governments by empowered elites has allowed (prospectively) an event that was wholly preventable to occur.


$707,568,901,000,000: How (And Why) Banks Increased Total Outstanding Derivatives By A Record $107 Trillion In 6 Months

Tyler Durden on 11/26/2012

zerohedge.com 


For the charts see the above url

While everyone was focused on the impending European collapse, the latest soon to be refuted rumors of a quick fix from the Welt am Sonntag notwithstanding, the Bank of International Settlements reported a number that quietly slipped through the cracks of the broader media. Which is paradoxical because it is the biggest ever reported in the financial world: the number in question is $707,568,901,000,000 and represents the latest total amount of all notional Over The Counter (read unregulated) outstanding derivatives reported by the world's financial institutions to the BIS for its semi-annual OTC derivatives report titled " OTC derivatives market activity in the first half of 2011."

Indicatively, global GDP is about $63 trillion if one can trust any numbers released by modern governments. Said otherwise, for the six month period ended June 30, 2011, the total number of outstanding derivatives surged past the previous all time high of $673 trillion from June 2008, and is now firmly in 7-handle territory: the synthetic credit bubble has now been blown to a new all time high. Another way of looking at the data is that one of the key contributors to global growth and prosperity in the past 10 years was an increase in total derivatives from just under $100 trillion to $708 trillion in exactly one decade. And soon we have to pay the mean reversion price.

What is probably just as disturbing is that in the first 6 months of 2011, the total outstanding notional of all derivatives rose from $601 trillion at December 31, 2010 to $708 trillion at June 30, 2011. A $107 trillion increase in notional in half a year. Needless to say this is the biggest increase in history. So why did the notional increase by such an incomprehensible amount? Simple: based on some widely accepted (and very much wrong) definitions of gross market value (not to be confused with gross notional), the value of outstanding derivatives actually declined in the first half of the year from $21.3 trillion to $19.5 trillion (a number still 33% greater than US GDP). Which means that in order to satisfy what likely threatened to become a self-feeding margin call as the (previously) $600 trillion derivatives market collapsed on itself, banks had to sell more, more, more derivatives in order to collect recurring and/or upfront premia and to pad their books with GAAP-endorsed delusions of future derivative based cash flows.

Because derivatives in addition to a core source of trading desk P&L courtesy of wide bid/ask spreads (there is a reason banks want to keep them OTC and thus off standardization and margin-destroying exchanges) are also terrific annuities for the status quo.

Just ask Buffett why he sold a multi-billion index put on the US stock market. The answer is simple - if he ever has to make good on it, it is too late.

Which brings us to the the chart ( see url above) showing total outstanding notional derivatives by 6 month period below. The shaded area is what that the BIS, the bank regulators, and the OCC urgently hope that the general public promptly forgets about and brushes under the carpet.

Try not to laugh. Or cry. Or gloss over, because when it comes to visualizing $708 trillion most really are incapable of doing so.

Expect to see gross market value declines persisting even as the now parabolic increase in total notional persists. At this rate we would not be surprised to see one quadrillion in OTC derivatives by the middle of next year.

There is much more than can be said on this topic, and has to be said, because an increase of that magnitude is simply impossible to perceive without alarm bells going off everywhere, especially when one considers the pervasive deleveraging occurring at every sector but the government. All else equal, this move may well explain the massive surge in bank profitability in the first half of the year. It also means that with banks suffering massive losses, and rumors of bank runs and collateral calls, not to mention the aftermath of the MF Global insolvency, the world financial syndicate will have no choice but to increase gross notional even more, even as the market value continues to get ever lower, thus sparking the risk of the mother of all margin calls: a veritable credit fission reaction.

But no matter what: the important thing to remember is that "they are all hedged" - or so they say, a claim we made a completely mockery of a few weeks back. So ex-sarcasm, the now parabolic increase in derivatives means that when the bilateral netting chain is once again broken, and it will be (because AIG was not a one off event), there will simply be trillions more in derivatives that no longer generate a booked cash flow stream for the remaining counterparty, until at the very end, the whole inverted credit0money pyramid collapses in on itself.

And for those wondering what the distinction is between notional and

Notional amounts outstanding: Nominal or notional amounts outstanding are defined as the gross nominal or notional value of all deals concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date. For contracts with variable nominal or notional principal amounts, the basis for reporting is the nominal or notional principal amounts at the time of reporting.



Nominal or notional amounts outstanding provide a measure of market size and a reference from which contractual payments are determined in derivatives markets. However, such amounts are generally not those truly at risk. The amounts at risk in derivatives contracts are a function of the price level and/or volatility of the financial reference index used in the determination of contract payments, the duration and liquidity of contracts, and the creditworthiness of counterparties. They are also a function of whether an exchange of notional principal takes place between counterparties. Gross market values provide a more accurate measure of the scale of financial risk transfer taking place in derivatives markets.

Well, no. It is logical that the BIS will advise everyone to ignore the bigger number and focus on the small one: just like everyone was told to ignore gross exposure and focus on net... until Jefferies had to dump all of its gross PIIGS exposure or stare bankruptcy in the face; so no - the correct thing to say is "gross market values provide a more accurate measure of the scale of financial risk transfer" if one assumes there is no counterparty risk.



...because once the whole bilateral netting chain is broken, net becomes gross. And gross market value becomes total notional outstanding. And, to quote Hudson, it's game over.

As for the largely irrelevant gross market value, which is only relevant in as much as it will be the catalyst which will precipitate margin calls on the underlying notionals, all $700+ trillion of them:

Gross positive and negative market values: Gross market values are defined as the sums of the absolute values of all open contracts with either positive or negative replacement values evaluated at market prices prevailing on the reporting date. Thus, the gross positive market value of a dealer’s outstanding contracts is the sum of the replacement values of all contracts that are in a current gain position to the reporter at current market prices (and therefore, if they were settled immediately, would represent claims on counterparties).



The gross negative market value is the sum of the values of all contracts that have a negative value on the reporting date (ie those that are in a current loss position and therefore, if they were settled immediately, would represent liabilities of the dealer to its counterparties).

The term “gross” indicates that contracts with positive and negative replacement values with the same counterparty are not netted. Nor are the sums of positive and negative contract values within a market risk category such as foreign exchange contracts, interest rate contracts, equities and commodities set off against one another.

As stated above, gross market values supply information about the potential scale of market risk in derivatives transactions. Furthermore, gross market value at current market prices provides a measure of economic significance that is readily comparable across markets and products.

And here again, what they ignore to add is that the measure of economic significance is only relevant in as much as the world's banks don't begin a Lehman-MF Global tango of mutual margin call annihilation. In that case, no. They are not measures of anything except for what some banks plug into some models to spit out a favorable EPS treatment at the end of the quarter.

Expect to see gross market value declines persisting even as the now parabolic increase in total notional persists. At this rate we would not be surprised to see one quadrillion in OTC derivatives by the middle of next year.

And, once again for those confused, the fact that notional had to increase so epically as market value tumbled most likely means that the global derivative pyramid scheme (no pun intended) is almost over.

Source: OTC derivatives market activity in the first half of 2011 and Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2011

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From: Sam4/1/2012 8:47:51 PM
   of 2329
 
Four Numbers Add Up to an American Debt Disaster
By Caroline Baum Mar 28, 2012 7:00 PM ET
bloomberg.com 

Consider the following numbers: 2.2, 62.8, 454, 5.9. Drawing a blank? Not to worry. They don’t mean much on their own.

Now consider them in context:


1) 2.2 percent is the average interest rate on the U.S. Treasury’s marketable and non-marketable debt (February data). 2) 62.8 months is the average maturity of the Treasury’s marketable debt (fourth quarter 2011).

3) $454 billion is the interest expense on publicly held debt in fiscal 2011, which ended Sept. 30.

4) $5.9 trillion is the amount of debt coming due in the next five years.

For the moment, Nos. 1 and 2 are helping No. 3 and creating a big problem for No. 4. Unless Treasury does something about No. 2, Nos. 1 and 3 will become liabilities while No. 4 has the potential to provoke a crisis.

In plain English, the Treasury’s reliance on short-term financing serves a dual purpose, neither of which is beneficial in the long run. First, it helps conceal the depth of the nation’s structural imbalances: the difference between what it spends and what it collects in taxes. Second, it puts the U.S. in the precarious position of having to roll over 71 percent of its privately held marketable debt in the next five years -- probably at higher interest rates.

First Among Equals And that’s a problem. The U.S. is more dependent on short- term funding than many of Europe’s highly indebted countries, including Greece, Spain and Portugal, according to Lawrence Goodman, president of the Center for Financial Stability, a non- partisan New York think tank focusing on financial markets.

The U.S. may have had a lot more debt in relation to the size of its economy following World War II, but the structure was much more favorable, with 41 percent maturing in less than five years, 31 percent in five-to-10 years and 21 percent in 10 years or more, according to CFS data. Today, only 10 percent of the public debt matures outside of a decade.

Based on the current structure, a one percentage-point increase in the average interest rate will add $88 billion to the Treasury’s interest payments this year alone, Goodman says. If market interest rates were to return to more normal levels, well, you do the math.

Some economists have cited the Treasury’s ability to borrow all it wants at 2 percent as an argument for more fiscal stimulus. Why not, as long as it’s cheap?

Goodman says the size of the deficit (8.2 percent of gross domestic product) or the debt (67.7 percent of GDP) is only part of the problem. The bigger threat is rollover risk: “the same thing that got countries from Portugal to Argentina to Greece into trouble,” he says. “It’s the repayment of principal that often provides the catalyst for a market event or a crisis.”

The U.S. is unlikely to go from all-you-want-at-2-percent to basket-case overnight. That said, policy makers would be wise to view recent market volatility as a taste of things to come.

Talking to Goodman, I was reminded of the Treasury’s standard sales pitch before quarterly refunding operations during periods of rising yields. Some undersecretary for domestic finance would be dispatched to tell us that Treasury expected to have no trouble selling its debt.

I had an equally standard response: At what price?

That seems particularly relevant today. The Federal Reserve purchased 61 percent of the net Treasury issuance last year, according to the bank’s quarterly flow-of-funds report. That’s masking the decline in demand from everyone else, including banks, mutual funds, corporations and individuals, Goodman says.

Of course, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke might look at the same numbers and see them as a sign of success. His stated goal in buying bonds is to lower Treasury yields and push investors into riskier assets.

Free to Borrow Then there’s the distortion in the relative value of stocks versus bonds to worry about. Using the 10-year cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio and the inverse of the 10-year Treasury yield, Goodman says the relationship hasn’t been this out of whack since 1962.

The Treasury isn’t unaware of the rollover risk. At the same time, it’s trying to accommodate the increased demand for “high-quality liquid assets,” such as Treasury bills, as required under new international capital-and-liquidity standards, says Lou Crandall, the chief economist at Wrightson ICAP in Jersey City, New Jersey.

In fact, when Treasury bills carry a negative yield -- when investors are paying the government to hold their money for three, six or 12 months -- borrowing “more is better,” Crandall says.

Still, the dangers are very real and were highlighted by Bernanke himself last week in the second of four lectures to students at George Washington University. Explaining why the decline in house prices had a greater impact than the drop in equity prices less than a decade earlier, Bernanke talked about “vulnerabilities” in the financial system. Too much debt was one; a reliance on short-term funding was another.

I doubt he had the Treasury in mind when he was explaining how the subprime debacle morphed into a global financial crisis, but the U.S. government would be wise to heed his advice. Currently its demand on the credit markets for annual interest and principal payments is equivalent to 25 percent of GDP, Goodman says, 10 percentage points higher than the norm. That’s real money. And with the federal budget deficit projected to top $1 trillion for the fourth year running, the funding pressure is bound to increase.

So the next time you hear someone say the Treasury can borrow all it wants at 2 percent, tell him, that’s true -- until it can’t.

( Caroline Baum, author of “Just What I Said,” is a Bloomberg View columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.)

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From: axial4/3/2012 2:41:06 AM
3 Recommendations   of 2329
 
Why do bankers get to decide who pays for the mess Europe is in?

'By now you'll have guessed the punchline: that July agreement was terrible for the Greeks, and brilliant for the bankers. It was widely panned at the time, for slicing only 21% off the value of Greece's loans, when Angela Merkel and many others agreed that financiers ought to be taking a much bigger hit. As the German government's economic adviser, Wolfgang Franz, later remarked in an interview: "If you look at the 21% and our demand for a 50% participation of private creditors, the financial sector has been very successful." Another way of putting it would be to say that the bankers overpowered even the strongest state in Europe.

None of this was inevitable. Iceland had made it clear that simply defaulting on one's loans didn't immediately lead to economic apocalypse. Across Greece, there were massive, repeated protests about the enormous spending cuts that citizens would suffer by paying off Goldman Sachs and the rest. And there was a growing movement in Greece and Portugal and France, among other countries, questioning the legitimacy of some of these loans.

None of these voters, none of these opinions got even a fraction of the consideration, let alone the face time, that was extended to Dallara and Ackermann. At Corporate Europe Observatory in Brussels, Yiorgos Vassalos has been tracking the negotiations over Greece: by his reckoning only the IIF got to have such personal, close-up access. These were summits settling how much misery would be imposed on the Greek people – and no trade unions or civil society groups got a say in them. "The only key players in those meetings were European governments and the bankers," says Vassalos.

Mindful of appearances, the EU has been less eager to admit to the influence of the bankers' lobby. When European officials were first asked by Corporate Europe Observatory about the extent of IIF access, they responded that it was limited to the Greek government. Only when it was pointed out that the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg were reporting that Dallara met Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy at midnight at an October summit to finalise a bigger reduction of the value of Greek debt did the officials back down: the IIF, they agreed, had been negotiating with a range of governments, on a whole host of issues to do with Greece's future.

So the bankers whose excesses helped land Europe in this mess then get to sit round the big EU table, like any other government, and decide who should pay for it. And the answer, unsurprisingly, is: not them. The bigger question is: why finance has been granted such power? In a forthcoming paper entitled Deep Stall, the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change gives one compelling reason: because so many countries across Europe are, through both their public and private sectors, so dependent on financiers in other countries for credit. That includes Britain, which relies on 10 eurozone countries for loans worth over 70% of its annual national income – a higher proportion even than Italy. The tale of the IIF and how it got such a powerful say on the fate of ordinary Greeks is really a chapter in a much bigger story of how governments across the western world got swallowed up by their finance industries.'

guardian.co.uk 

Jim

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To: axial who wrote (2100)4/3/2012 9:20:57 AM
From: Sam2 Recommendations   of 2329
 
SEC poised to charge Goldman over another mortgage bond deal.

The SEC is likely to soon bring charges against Goldman Sachs ( GS) over a mortgage-bond deal called the Fremont Home Loan Trust. The suspicion is that Goldman may have known the loans were even worse than advertised. One example: Goldman claimed 0.01% of the mortgages were underwater, but an audit found 23.5% were at the time the deal was pitched.

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From: Worswick4/6/2012 8:55:50 AM
   of 2329
 
One way or another they are going to eat the golden goose.....

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-05/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-s-heft-is-said-to-distort-credit-indexes.html

From Bloomberg:

The trader is London-based Bruno Iksil, according to five counterparts at hedge funds and rival banks who requested anonymity because they’re not authorized to discuss the transactions. He specializes in credit-derivative indexes, an off-exchange market that during the past decade has overtaken corporate bonds to become the biggest forum for investors betting on the likelihood of company defaults.

Investors complain that Iksil’s trades may be distorting prices, affecting bondholders who use the instruments to hedge hundreds of billions of dollars of fixed-income holdings. Analysts and economists also use the indexes to help gauge interest rates that companies must pay for new credit.

Though Iksil reveals little to other traders about his own positions, they say they’ve taken the opposite side of transactions and that his orders are the biggest they’ve encountered. Two hedge-fund traders said they have seen unusually large price swings when they were told by dealers that Iksil was in the market.

So how long until Bruno Iksil, and his massive one way bet, becomes the next Glenn Hadden, or the next Howie Hubler, or the next B oaz Weinsten? And how long until US taxpayer have to bail him out, either with direct rescue money, or with commingled deposits used to plug trading losses? Because MFGlobal was just an appetizer as to how JPM operates with "segregated" money.

Repeating the punchline again, because it bears repeating.

In some cases, Iksil is believed to have “broken” the index -- Wall Street lingo for the market dysfunction that occurs when a price gap opens up between the index and its underlying constituents, the people said. The persistence of price dislocations has frustrated some hedge funds that were betting on the gap to close over time, the people said.

And that, for those confused, is how JPMorgan operates: they lie about everything, fully aware they have perpetual immunity because they are more powerful than the Fed (just recall Jamie Dimon's symbolic spitting in the face of Ben Bernanke), they are a tri-party repo dealer thus in the center of the entire shadow banking system, and have the biggest single-bank derivative exposure in the world, at $70 trillion as of December 31.

JPMorgan is modern finance.

And because of they they can and will get away with everything, lying on prime time TV most certainly included.

Yet while JPMorgan may manipulate the gold, silver, or any other market, for its or the Fed's agenda, there is a silver lining: it allows everyone to buy physical assets at artificially deflated paper spot prices. And for that, JPM should be thanked. Because until the grand reset takes place, JPMorgan will never be held accountable for any of its actions in the current status quo regime. Period.


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To: axial who wrote (2100)4/6/2012 9:17:08 AM
From: Worswick   of 2329
 
Brilliant post, as ever Jim .... so glad you are hanging in there with Sam and the others.

This "story" and the narrative of derivatives and thier appearance in our time is still one of the big moments in two decades.

Best to you all,

Clark

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