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From: TFF1/29/2009 5:34:16 PM
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U.S. government guarantees on banks total $419 billion

By Mark Pittman and Alison Fitzgerald


Jan. 29 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. government guarantees on securities totaling $419 billion for bank bailouts provide an early test of President Barack Obama’s pledge to be open with taxpayers about what they have at risk in the credit crisis.

Bloomberg News asked the Treasury Department Jan. 26 to disclose what securities it backed over the past two months in a second round of actions to prop up Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. Department spokeswoman Stephanie Cutter said Jan. 27 she would seek an answer. None had been provided by the close of business yesterday.

As Congress debates an $875 billion economic stimulus bill, the guarantees represent a less publicized commitment. The public’s stake has grown along with assurances tying the Treasury to the fate of corporate loans and securities backed by home mortgages, car loans and credit card debt.

“Guarantees are only meaningful if there’s a real chance that someone will have to pay out for them,” said Representative Alan Grayson, a Florida Democrat and a member of the House Financial Services committee that is reviewing the bailouts. “The conception that guarantees cost nothing is a misconception.”

Obama promised a new era of government openness as he took office last week, issuing a statement telling agencies “to adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure” in responding to requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers, head of the National Economic Council, said they would emphasize accountability and transparency in using the second half of a $700 billion bank bailout fund.

New Disclosures

Late yesterday, Geithner’s office put hundreds of pages about the fund on the department’s Web site. They did not include documents describing the guaranteed assets.

Members of Congress from both parties have complained about the Bush administration’s lack of disclosure about the spending of the first $350 billion from the fund.

“We have requested information in the past three months and have been rebuffed by the administration,” said Representative Scott Garrett, a New Jersey Republican and member of the House Financial Services Committee. “President Obama comes down the pike now, and maybe, in a week or a month, we’ll know.”

Last fall, the Federal Reserve declined to identify the recipients of about $2 trillion in emergency loans from U.S. taxpayers or the assets the central bank is accepting as collateral.

Fed Is Sued

Bloomberg News asked for details of the lending on May 21 and filed a federal lawsuit against the Fed Nov. 7 seeking to force disclosure. The loans were made under the terms of what became 11 programs in the midst of the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Arguments in the suit may be heard by a judge as soon as next month, according to the court docket.

Bloomberg filed a FOIA request yesterday for the list of what was covered by the Citigroup and Bank of America guarantees. Bloomberg asked for records on the fees paid by banks to the government, which securities were rejected for guarantees, as well as any contracts for data services and experts to assess the value of the securities.

Under the information law, passed by Congress in 1966, Treasury has 20 working days to respond to Bloomberg’s request. The measure allows nine exemptions, such as trade secrets or national security, for blocking disclosure.

During his confirmation, Geithner, the former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, didn’t directly answer a senator’s request for more information about Maiden Lane LLC, a special-purpose entity that holds assets from the takeover of Bear Stearns Cos. by JPMorgan Chase & Co.

‘Working With You’

“If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and with Chairman Bernanke on ways to respond to your suggestions and concerns,” Geithner said in a written response to the senator, Charles Grassley, an Iowa Republican.

Geithner said it was important to keep details about loans in the portfolio confidential “in order to allow the asset manager the flexibility to manage the assets in a way that maximizes the value of portfolio and mitigates risk of loss to the taxpayer.”

Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Arlington, Virginia-based Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, said “People are trying to get a handle on where the money went and how it’s being used. One would hope that we’ll get to see something. Personally, I want to know what my tax dollars are being used for.”

Consumer confidence fell in January to the lowest since records began in 1967, the Conference Board said Jan. 27. Home prices plunged 18.2 percent in November from a year earlier, the biggest drop since the data was started in 2001, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller index that covers 20 metropolitan areas.

$301 Billion Guarantee

Citigroup’s guarantee package, completed Jan. 16, totals $301 billion. It kicks in after the bank goes through its $9.5 billion in current loan loss reserves and the first $29 billion of losses. The government also gets $1 billion of the bank’s benefit from hedging contracts. The Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Fed then assume 90 percent of losses from those assets.

Citigroup’s guarantees include $191 billion of consumer loans, with $55.2 billion of them second mortgages, according to a Jan. 16 news release from the bank. Securities backed by commercial real estate total $12.4 billion and corporate loans add $13.4 billion.

Citigroup has received $45 billion in cash from selling preferred securities to the government under the Troubled Asset Relief Program.

$118 Billion

Bank of America’s agreement, announced the same day, is similar: $20 billion in cash aid, bringing the total to $45 billion, and $118 billion in asset guarantees. The government said the assets included securities backed by residential and commercial real estate loans and corporate debt and associated derivatives and hedges. Scott Silvestri, a spokesman for the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank, declined comment.

Merrill Lynch & Co., which was bought by Bank of America, was the underwriter for $49.4 billion in defaulted collateralized debt obligations, the most of any bank, since October 2007, according to data compiled by Standard & Poor’s and Bloomberg.

Merrill was the biggest CDO underwriter from 2005 to 2007, with more than $102 billion, said Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. research analyst Brad Hintz.

Since October 2007, Bank of America underwrote under its name $15.1 billion in failed CDOs, according to S&P and Bloomberg. Banks have so far understated losses on such securities, and “the tsunami is on the horizon,” Hintz said.

‘Going to Be Huge’

Past sales of CDOs valued them at pennies on the dollar. In July, New York-based Merrill sold $30.6 billion of the securities to an affiliate of the Dallas-based investment firm Lone Star Funds for $6.7 billion. Merrill provided financing for about 75 percent of the purchase price, and the sale valued the CDOs at 22 cents on the dollar.

“By June, it’ll become clear that these guarantees are being drawn and they’re going to be huge,” said Christopher Whalen, managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics, a financial-services research company in Torrance, California. “Every day that goes by, Congress figures it out just a little more.”

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From: TFF1/29/2009 5:34:45 PM
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Russia's second-biggest bank seeking a bailout
Jenny Booth

The crisis facing banks was sharply underlined today when Russia's second-biggest bank admitted in Davos that it was seeking a bailout and Germany indicated that it was coming round to the idea of "bad banks" to hive off toxic debt.

Russian banks have been badly hit by the global economic crisis, which has hammered the country’s stock, bond and currency markets. A number of its smaller banks have already failed, and some of its biggest lenders may need capital injections.

Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, Andrei Kostin, the chief executive of VTB, Russia's second-largest bank, said that the lender may issue preference shares this year as part of a 200 billion rouble (£4 billion, $5.7 billion) state recapitalisation.

“There is no final decision yet on the size of the capitalisation,” Mr Kostin said. “We think that 200 billion roubles would be the right decision.

"The capitalisation is linked to an additional share issue which takes about half a year in Russia, so we think the decision should be taken now. There are different options, including the issue of preference shares.”

Mr Kostin said he hoped VTB could break-even for 2008 under international accounting, but that it was too early to forecast 2009 results. He said non-performing loans totalled about 3.8 per cent but VTB was using forecasts for bad loans for 10 per cent, for planning purposes.

“The worst scenario is up to 10 per cent,” he said.“The reason for the crisis in the Russian banking sector is quite different to in the West. In Russia, a major problem is the inability of companies to return debts.”

VTB has to pay about $7 billion in foreign debt this year and will seek to refinance some of it, he said.

“We will negotiate for refinancing but we think we will have enough liquidity for this year,” said Mr Kostin.

“Frankly speaking, this year it will be very difficult for Russian companies to find funding abroad, with the exception of major companies who have a state guarantee, or some of the oil companies.”

Several governments, including America and Britain, have been forced to step in to rescue their banks from collapse as credit markets dried up after banks began to reveal they made multibillion-dollar losses on mortgage-backed assets originating in the United States.

One of the ideas Barack Obama, the US President, is seriously considering is for the government to set up a "bad bank" where ailing institutions would be allowed to dump their bad loans and toxic assets.

The idea has gained some international interest. In Germany, Peer Steinbrueck, the finance minister, told a newspaper today that there would be no state “bad bank” set up to take banks’ toxic assets off their books, but individual banks might each consider such a remedy.

“In recognition of the effects of bad assets on a bank’s balance sheet, the question arises of whether each individual institute should not have the possibility to remove problem assets from its balance sheet and to start over again,” he said.

Yesterday George Soros, the international financier who is one of the few people still to be making money through the financial crisis, said that what was needed in America was even more radical - not so much a bad bank, as a good bank where only sound assets were invested, so that it could attract confidence.

Mr Soros said that President Obama's $825bn fiscal stimulus package and his proposals for a bad bank might ease the situation, but were only palliatives.

“They need a thorough reorganisation of the mortgage system and you have to replenish the equity of the banks,” said the Hungarian-born speculator-turned philanthropist.

“That now would require an injection of about a trillion and half dollars - much more than if they had done it previously under the TARP (the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program agreed by Congress last year). The well has been poisoned by the way the TARP money was used.

"It needs a good bank/bad bank solution, but I would do it differently than what is proposed," he went on.

“I would keep the capital of the banks together with the bad assets in the bad bank, and then create a new bank with the good assets of the bank and the recapitalise that, giving the shareholders the right to put in more money. Without this the banks will not lend, because they know there is a lot of deterioration coming.”

Earlier Mr Soros told a press lunch that the “financial structure we used to take for granted has collapsed” and everyone was in a“state of shock” as the financial storm spread internationally and into the real economy.

He said the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers investment bank last September was a “watershed event” and that the financial system was now on “artificial life support.”

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From: TFF1/29/2009 7:08:39 PM
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No 'Bad' Banks, Please: Oppenheimer's Whitney
By: Reuters | 29 Jan 2009 | 11:31 AM ET


The idea of creating a "bad bank" is unlikely to address the root problem of contracting system capital as simply removing "toxic" assets from bank balance sheets would not cause banks to increase lending, veteran banking analyst Meredith Whitney said.




U.S. President Barack Obama's administration is increasingly focused on the possible creation of a "bad bank" that would let U.S. financial institutions move toxic assets off their books and could potentially take trillions of dollars of assets off banks' balance sheets.

Lending standards have tightened dramatically, and there is an unavoidable restructuring of risk taking place, causing money to come out of the system and lending to contract, with or without a "bad bank" structure, Whitney said.

"Lower asset bases, higher credit losses and bloated expense structures will continue to pressure banks' earnings power and capital creation," she wrote in a note to clients.

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Apart from writedowns from structured securities and illiquid assets, commercial banks also face problems from rising defaults on balance sheet loans, Oppenheimer's Whitney said. "If a bank were to sell its "bad" assets into a "bad bank," it would still be left with lower earnings power from higher losses on "good loans" and the requirement to build reserves, lower earnings power from lower assets and a higher legacy expense structure, or both," she said.

A vast majority of toxic assets related to securities have already been written down and only few lenders would dominate the lion's share of the "bad bank," Whitney added.

"Those lenders, we argue, should monetize their "good" assets to cover their "bad" assets."

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From: TFF1/30/2009 6:30:04 PM
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Corporate bond sales near record in January
By Deborah Levine, MarketWatch
Last update: 5:40 p.m. EST Jan. 30, 2009



NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- Companies brought a near record amount of debt to bond markets in January, taking advantage of the thaw in investors' appetite for risk.
Investment-grade bond sales have topped $149 billion so far, making this the second busiest month ever, according to Informa Global Markets. This volume includes banks that have issued bonds guaranteed by the FDIC, but these are far from the bulk of sales.
Depending on how much Verizon Communications
sells Friday, monthly sales could represent the most on record, analysts at Informa said.
The volume of speculative-grade debt, also known as junk bonds, rose to about $5.5 billion, the most since last July.
Even so, demand for the debt has exceeded the supply, making rates more attractive for companies that have wanted to issue.
"It's a feeding frenzy: the market has rallied tremendously to start the year and some people feel like they're being left behind," said Tom Murphy, who heads up investment-grade corporate debt at RiverSource Investments. Issuer: Amount Sold:
ConocoPhillips COP $6 billion
Wal-Mart Stores WMT $1 billion
General Mills GIS $1.15 billion
Amgen AMGN $2 billion

On Thursday alone, companies offered $15 billion, but demand for that topped $50 billion, said Murphy, who also co-manages the firm's Diversified Bond Fund .
The gap between what companies have to pay on their debt and comparable Treasurys has shrunk to the lowest since September, according to an index compiled by Merrill Lynch.
Corporate debt rated A or higher yield 4.67 percentage points more than Treasurys, down from a high of 5.90 points in December.
Besides limited liquidity at the end of last year, many investors are concerned about the strength of companies' balance sheets given the downward spiral in the economy. But current spreads still compensate for that, Murphy said.
"The economy is not going to feel good for the first half of the year but valuations are appropriate," he said.
Investment-grade issuers this month included AT&T ,
Goldman Sachs , Duke Energy , Citigroup and FedEx , according to Informa.
The total includes debt guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and sold by financial institutions.
The slew of new high-yield sales comes even as two more U.S. issuers defaulted this past week, bringing the tally of global corporate defaults to 19 so far this year, according to Standard & Poor's.
Containerboard and packaging company Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. , defaulted and filed to reorganize under Chapter 11 of U.S. bankruptcy law on Monday. Foamex International
subsidiary Foamex LP, which makes polyurethane foam-based products, also defaulted.
Standard & Poor's forecasts U.S. corporate speculative-grade defaults to reach 13.9% in the next 12 months.

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From: TFF1/31/2009 6:20:36 AM
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Here Comes The BARF
Liz Moyer, 01.29.09, 04:30 PM EST

Why creating a Bad Asset Repository Fund for Wall Street's toxic assets could make banking even sicker.

First there was TARP. Get ready for BARF.

They haven't named it that yet, but calling a federal "bad bank" to soak up toxic assets the Bad Asset Repository Fund would be truth in advertising at least. Despite Washington's renewed enthusiasm for the idea, there is a strong case to be made against it.

The problem boils down to bank profitability, which is depleted, and the industry's ability and willingness to lend. Offloading the worst assets into an aggregator fund would still leave banks with loan books under pressure from rising defaults. Banks would still be forced to build reserves at a time when their earnings power is reduced, and that earnings power would only shrink more with a smaller asset base.

And there is no way a "bad bank" will induce banks to lend. "Lending standards have tightened dramatically and there is an unavoidable restructuring of risk taking place," says Meredith Whitney, the Oppenheimer & Co. analyst who was among the first to point out the looming bank crisis. "Such causes money to come out of the system and lending to contract, with or without this 'bad bank' structure."

But facing a mounting banking crisis, federal regulators and the new Obama administration have returned to the original idea of the Troubled Asset Relief Program as one way to solve the credit crisis. New Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said this week that a new plan is expected to be announced soon.

One idea is for the government to buy assets that banks have classified as "available for sale" and create a guarantee program for assets classified "held to maturity."

The latter category avoids the need to mark the assets to market, and in recent months banks have moved "massive" amounts of assets from the "available for sale" category to "held to maturity" for this reason, says Joshua Rosner at Graham Fisher.



That would create an incentive for banks to avoid the pain of marking down values of assets sold to a bad bank, Rosner notes. They could simply shift the assets to the category destined for the guarantee program, "delaying the day of reckoning."

Last fall, as Lehman Brothers failed and other banks scrambled for safety, thoughts turned to the revival of an idea from the last real estate lending crisis. The Resolution Trust Corp. came to life in 1989 after the failure of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., then the thrift industry's version of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC). In the thick of the savings and loan debacle, FSLIC was swamped by the collapse of 296 thrifts in a short span of time. It too failed.

So Congress put together the RTC, funded it with $50 billion, and tasked it with taking on the assets of failed thrifts and working them off. The RTC lasted until 1995 and required additional injections of capital, ultimately totaling more than $100 billion.

It did serve its purpose, however expensive. In its six-year lifespan, the RTC worked with 727 failed thrifts, totaling some $394 billion of assets.

Last fall, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson convinced Congress to approve the $700 billion rescue program for the banking system with a similar plan in mind. But that part of the TARP never got off the ground, mainly because the government couldn't figure out how to price the assets it was buying. Price them too low, and banks had no incentive to participate. Price them too high, and taxpayers wind up with socialized losses while banks benefit with private gains.

Paulson decided to use $250 billion of TARP funds to take direct equity stakes in banks instead.

Some don't think a new RTC-like structure is needed. The FDIC already functions as a buyer of troubled bank assets. During the savings and loan crisis, the FDIC handled the failure of 1,911 banks, totaling $703 billion of assets, and didn't succumb to failure like the FSLIC.

Concerns that the FDIC will run out of insurance funds to cover deposits are overblown, many say. For starters, the insurance fund isn't a separate account, as many imagine it to be. It is part of the Treasury Department's general fund, meaning it can be expanded to how ever big it needs to be.

Analysts at Keefe Bruyette & Woods estimated in recent days that for a new or improved TARP to really be effective, the government would have to take on roughly 25% of the banking industry's assets, or $3.5 trillion.

An alternative to selling their loans at distressed prices to a bad bank structure is selling "crown jewel" assets, Whitney from Oppenheimer notes. Citigroup (nyse: C - news - people ), which has taken $45 billion from the TARP in two installments and needed the government to back $300 billion of its assets, agreed to sell 51% its Smith Barney brokerage to a joint venture with Morgan Stanley (nyse: MS - news - people ) for $2.7 billion.

"Private capital will readily invest in businesses that make money and grow," says Whitney. "The banks do not fit this description."

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From: TFF1/31/2009 6:25:13 AM
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US set for ‘big bang’ financial clean-up

ByKrishna Guha in Washington

Published: January 30 2009 23:31 | Last updated: January 31 2009 00:19

The Obama administration is gearing up for a “big bang” announcement next week that will combine a bank clean-up with measures to reduce home foreclosures and probably steps to kick-start credit markets.

The plan will involve an overhaul of the troubled asset relief programme – the $700bn bail-out fund – including strict curbs on compensation at banks receiving public aid. The Tarp overhaul is intended to restore public confidence in what is a deeply unpopular programme and ensure that taxpayer money is not used to fund excessive pay, bonuses and dividends to shareholders.

“There will definitely be a cap of some sort on bonuses,” said a Wall Street executive who has taken part in talks with the authorities. “The political climate is such that there is a need to punish Wall Street.”

The announcement will follow Friday’s news that the US economy contracted at an annualised rate of 3.8 per cent in last year’s final quarter – less than analysts were expecting, but still the worst quarter since 1982. The fall was cushioned by ballooning inventories, which suggest the economy could shrink faster than expected in the first quarter.

The “big bang” approach reflects the belief of Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary, and Lawrence Summers, National Economic Council director, that the Bush administration was wrong to dribble out policy initiatives. Mr Geithner intends to present a “comprehensive” plan that policymakers hope will command market confidence.

Details of the financial overhaul are being finalised and have yet to be approved by President Barack Obama, but it may include both the purchase of toxic assets by a “bad bank” and insurance-style guarantees for problem assets remaining on bank balance sheets.

Anti-foreclosure efforts are likely to focus on subsidising programmes that reduce unsustainable monthly mortgage payments, though there may also be support for schemes that subsidise the partial writedown of loans that exceed the value of the home. Treasury may also unveil new efforts to revitalise dysfunctional securitisation markets.

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From: TFF1/31/2009 10:45:07 AM
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*The credit crunch according to Soros

By Chrystia Freeland

Published: January 30 2009 11:38 | Last updated: January 30 2009 11:38

On Friday, August 17 2007, 21 of Wall Street’s most influential investors met for lunch at George Soros’s Southampton estate on the eastern end of Long Island. The first tremors of what would become the global credit crunch had rippled out a week or so earlier, when the French bank BNP Paribas froze withdrawals from three of its funds, and in response, central bankers made a huge injection of liquidity into the money markets in an effort to keep the world’s banks lending to one another.

Although it was a sultry summer Friday, as the group dined on striped bass, fruit salad and cookies, the tone was serious and rather formal. Soros’s guests included Julian Robertson, founder of the Tiger Management hedge fund; Donald Marron, the former chief executive of PaineWebber and now boss of Lightyear Capital; James Chanos, president of Kynikos Associates, a hedge fund that specialised in shorting stocks; and Byron Wien, chief investment strategist at Pequot Capital and the convener of the annual gathering – known to its participants as the Benchmark Lunch.



The discussion focused on a single question: was a recession looming? We all know the answer today, but the consensus that overcast afternoon was different. In a memo written after the lunch, Wien, a longtime friend of Soros’s, wrote: “The conclusion was that we were probably in an economic slowdown and a correction in the market, but we were not about to begin a recession or a bear market.” Only two men dissented. One of those was Soros, who finished the meal convinced that the global financial crisis he had been predicting – prematurely – for years had finally begun.

His conclusion had immediate consequences. Six years earlier, following the departure of Stan Druckenmiller from Quantum Funds, Soros’s hedge fund, Soros converted the operation into a “less aggressively managed vehicle” and renamed it an “endowment fund”, which farmed most of its money out to external managers. Now Soros realised he had to get back into the game. “I did not want to see my accumulated wealth be severely impaired,” he said, during a two-hour conversation this winter in the conference room of his midtown Manhattan offices. “So I came back and set up a macro-account within which I counterbalanced what I thought was the exposure of the firm.”

Soros complained that his years of less active involvement at Quantum meant he didn’t have the kind of “detailed knowledge of particular companies I used to have, so I’m not in a position to pick stocks”. Moreover, “even many of the macro instruments that have been recently invented were unfamiliar to me”. Even so, Quantum achieved a 32 per cent return in 2007, making the then 77-year-old the second-highest paid hedge fund manager in the world, according to Institutional Investor’s Alpha magazine. He ended 2008, a year that saw global destruction of wealth on the most colossal scale since the second world war, with two out of three hedge funds losing money, up almost 10 per cent.

Soros’s main goal was to preserve his fortune. But, as has been the case throughout his career, his timing and financial acumen enhanced his credibility as a thinker, and never more so than in 2008. In May and June, after more than two decades of writing, he hit bestseller lists in the US and in the UK with his ninth book, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets. In October, he received an invitation to testify before Congress about the financial crisis. In November, Barack Obama, whom he had long backed for the presidency, defeated John McCain.

“In the twilight of his life, he’s achieved the recognition he has always wanted,” Wien said. “Everything is going for him. He’s healthy, his candidate won, his business is on a solid footing.”

. . .

Many comparisons have been drawn between 2008 and earlier periods of turmoil, but the historical moment with most personal resonance for Soros is not one of the conventional choices. The parallel he sees is with 1944, when, as a 13-year-old Jewish boy in Nazi-occupied Budapest, he eluded the Holocaust.

Soros credits his beloved father, Tivadar, with teaching him how to respond to “far from equilibrium situations”. Captured by the Russians in the first world war, Tivadar was imprisoned in Siberia. He engineered his own escape and return home through a Russia convulsed by the Bolshevik revolution. That sojourn stripped him of his youthful ambition and left him wanting “nothing more from life than to enjoy it”. Yet on March 19 1944, the day the Germans occupied Hungary, the 50-year-old sprang into action, rescuing his immediate family and many others by arranging false identities for them.

Before the invasion, George was still enough of a child, his father thought, to need a bit of parental coddling. Yet the teenager who spent the war living apart from his parents under a false name found the danger exhilarating. “It was high adventure,” Soros wrote, “like living through Raiders of the Lost Ark.” And as the latest financial crisis gathered momentum, he admitted to the same thrill. “I think the same thing applies again. I feel the same kind of stimulation as I felt then,” he told me.

Part of the stimulation is intellectual. Soros’s experiences in 1944 laid the groundwork for the conceptual framework he would spend the rest of his life elaborating and which, he believes, has found its validation in the events of 2008. His core idea is “reflexivity”, which he defines as a “two-way feedback loop, between the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs. People base their decisions not on the actual situation that confronts them, but on their perception or interpretation of the situation. Their decisions make an impact on the situation and changes in the situation are liable to change their perceptions.”

It is, at its root, a case for frequent re-examination of one’s assumptions about the world and for a readiness to spot and exploit moments of cataclysmic change – those times when our perceptions of events and events themselves are likely to interact most fiercely. It is also at odds with the rational expectations economic school, which has been the prevailing orthodoxy in recent decades. That approach assumed that economic players – from people buying homes to bankers buying subprime mortgages for their portfolios – were rational actors making, in aggregate, the best choices for themselves and that free markets were effective mechanisms for balancing supply and demand, setting prices correctly and tending towards equilibrium.

The rational expectations theory has taken a beating over the past 18 months: its intellectual nadir was probably October 23 2008, when Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, admitted to Congress that there was “a flaw in the model”. Soros argues that the “market fundamentalism” of Greenspan and his ilk, especially their assumption that “financial markets are self-correcting”, was an important cause of the current crisis. It befuddled policy-makers and was the intellectual basis for the “various synthetic instruments and valuation models” which contributed mightily to the crash.

By contrast, Soros sees the current crisis as a real-life illustration of reflexivity. Markets did not reflect an objective “truth”. Rather, the beliefs of market participants – that house prices would always rise, that an arcane financial instrument based on a subprime mortgage really could merit a triple-A rating – created a new reality. Ultimately, that “super-bubble” was unsustainable, hence the credit crunch of 2007 and the recession and financial crisis of 2008 and beyond.

As an investor and as a thinker, Soros has always thrived in times of upheaval. But he has also remained something of an outsider. He recalls how he “discovered loneliness” when he arrived to study at the London School of Economics in 1947. Later on, as he worked his way up from being a journeyman arbitrage trader in London and then New York, to running one of the world’s most successful hedge funds, Soros remained, in the words of one private equity acquaintance, a bit of “an oddball”, both on Wall Street and in the academic world. He is frequently described as “charming”, yet few see the fit, tanned, twice-divorced billionaire as an emotional confidant. “If I had an idea about India-Pakistan, I would talk to him about it,” Wien said. “If I were having a problem in my marriage, I don’t think I would go and talk to George about it.”

Strobe Talbott, now the president of the Brookings Institute and a former deputy secretary of state, said: “He likes to think of himself as an outsider who can come in from time to time, including to the Oval Office, where I took him on a couple of occasions. But simply hobnobbing with the powerful isn’t important.”

That lack of clubbiness, and the associated trait of iconoclasm, may explain why, for all his worldly success, Soros has had a rather mixed public reputation. His speculative plays, which have often targeted currencies, have earned him the wrath of political leaders around the world. The ambitious, global reach of his richly funded Open Society foundation has prompted some critics to accuse him of suffering from a Messiah complex. He was so effectively demonised by the US right earlier this decade that he kept fairly quiet about his support of Obama, lest the association hurt his candidate. Probably most painfully, his forays into economics and philosophy often have met with considerable scepticism, especially from academia.

The one time and place where he instantly became a highly regarded insider was in the former Soviet Union and its satellites, at the moment the Berlin Wall came down. More completely and more swiftly than any other foreigner, Soros grasped and embraced the systemic transformation that was unfolding, and was rewarded with influence and respect. The question for Soros today is whether, as the west undergoes its own once-in-a-century systemic shock, this arch-outsider will finally find himself in the mainstream in the society which has been his main home for more than half a century.

. . .

Soros’s most famous – or infamous – speculative play as an investor was his bet against sterling in 1992, a wager which won him more than $1bn and earned him the epithet from the British press of “the man who broke the Bank of England”. That bet also turns out to be a perfect illustration of the specific talent which his past and present fund managers agree has been central to his investing success.

Soros’s best-known investment was not, in actual fact, his own idea. According to both Soros and Druckenmiller, who was managing Quantum at the time, it was Druckenmiller who came up with the plan to short the pound. But when Druckenmiller went through his rationale with Soros, in one of their twice- or thrice-daily conversations, Soros told his protégé to be bolder: “I said, ‘Go for the jugular!’.” Druckenmiller duly raised their stake – Quantum and several related funds wagered nearly $10bn, according to interviews Soros gave afterwards – and Soros earned both a fortune and an international reputation.

Druckenmiller, who spent 12 years at Quantum, says that conversation exemplifies Soros’s singular financial gift: “He’s extremely good at using the balance sheet – probably the best ever. He is able to use leverage when he likes it, but he is also able to walk away. He has no emotional attachment to a position. I think that is an unusual characteristic in our industry.”

Chanos agrees: “One thing that I’ve both wrestled with and admired, that [Soros] conquered many years ago, is the ability to go from long to short, the ability to turn on a dime when confronted with the evidence. Emotionally, that is really hard.”

Soros denies any great degree of emotional self-control. “That’s not true, that’s not true,” he told me, shaking his head and smiling. “I am very emotional. I am as moody as the market, so I’m basically a manic depressive personality.” (His market-linked moodiness extends to psychosomatic ailments, especially backaches, which he treats as valuable investment tips.)

Instead, Soros attributes his effectiveness as an investor to his philosophical views about the contingent nature of human knowledge: “I think that my conceptual framework, which basically emphasises the importance of misconceptions, makes me extremely critical of my own decisions … I know that I am bound to be wrong, and therefore am more likely to correct my own mistakes.”

Soros’s radar for revolution is the second key to his investing style. He looks for “game-changing moments, not incremental ones”, according to Sebastian Mallaby, the Washington Post columnist and author who is writing a history of hedge funds. As examples, Mallaby cites Quantum’s shorting of the pound and Soros’s 1985 “Plaza Accord” bet that the dollar would fall against the yen – his two most famous currency trades – as well as a lesser-known 1973 bet that, as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli war, defence stocks would soar. “It’s not that reflexivity tells you what to do, but it tells you to be on the look-out for turn-around situations,” Mallaby said. “It’s an attitude of mind.”

Some Soros-watchers intimate that his vast network of international contacts might be an important source of his market prescience. But it was in the one part of the world where Soros really did have an inside track – the former Soviet bloc – that he made his most disastrous deal. In Russia, as in much of the former Soviet Union, he was intensely engaged with the country’s political and economic transformation. In June 1997, as the Kremlin struggled to pay overdue wages, Soros extended a bridge loan to the Russian government, acting as a one-man International Monetary Fund.

He came to believe in Russia’s commitment to reforms, and to see himself as an insider – two convictions that were his financial undoing. He invested $980m with a consortium of oligarchs who acquired a 25 per cent stake in Svyazinvest, the national telecoms company, deciding to participate because “I thought that this is the transition from robber capitalism to legitimate capitalism”. But instead, the Svyazinvest privatisation turned out to be the moment when the oligarchs redirected their energies from fleecing the state to fleecing one another. Soros, as an outsider, was an obvious casualty. “Never have I been screwed so much since Russia. For them, they get a satisfaction out of doing it.

“It was the biggest mistake of my investment career. I was deceived by my own hope.” In his most recent book he dismisses Russia with a single sentence, further diminished by parenthesis: “(I don’t discuss Russia, because I don’t want to invest there.)”

. . .

On a chilly Monday night in December, Soros took the hour-long drive from Manhattan to the Bruce Museum in Greenwich, Connecticut. He was due to speak at a benefit for the Scholar Rescue Fund, a programme he has partly financed and which, since 2002, has provided safe havens for 266 persecuted academics from 40 countries. After his talk (on the global financial crisis, of course), Soros filed out of the auditorium chatting with Stanley Bergman, a founding partner of the law firm that had sponsored the evening.

“You like the game?” Soros asked his host with a smile.

“Yes,” the white-haired Bergman replied.

Then, in a flash of the competitive spirit that makes Soros an avid skier and player of tennis and chess, Soros asked: “And how old are you?”

“75.”

“I’m 78,” Soros replied. “But what’s the use of good health if it doesn’t buy you money?” The vigorous septuagenarians flashed each other a complicit smile.

According to Wien, Soros likes the game, too: “George loves to be able to show from time to time that he can do it.” But while he loves to play, he is disdainful of a life lived purely to accumulate more chips. His epiphany came in 1981, when he had to scramble to raise money to pay for an investment in bonds. “I thought I would have a heart attack,” he told me. “And then I realised that to die just for the sake of getting rich, I would be a loser.”

For Soros, the solution was philanthropy. “To do something really that would make a significant difference to the world, that would be worth dying for,” he said. “The Foundation enabled me to get out of myself and to somehow be concerned with other people than myself.” Soros’s fortune has given his causes enormous firepower: according to Aryeh Neier, the human rights activist who has been running the Open Society Foundation since 1993, its budget was $550m in 2008 and will increase to $600m this year. By his own calculation, Soros has donated a total of more than $5bn to his causes, primarily directing his giving through his foundation.

“No philanthropist in the second half of the 20th century has done better in deploying resources strategically to change the world,” Larry Summers, the newly appointed head of Barack Obama’s National Economic Council, told me in a conversation early last autumn. Talbott compares Soros’s impact to that of a sovereign nation. In the 1990s, says Talbott, “when I got word that George Soros wanted to talk, I would drop everything and treat him pretty much like a visiting head of state. He was literally putting more money into some of the former colonies of the former Soviet empire than the US government, so that merited treating him as someone with a very high impact.”

Soros’s philanthropic lieutenants report an approach remarkably similar to the investing style observed by his fund managers: he knows how to make big, original bets, and he isn’t afraid to cut his losses when a project isn’t working out. Anders Aslund, an economist who has studied Russia and Ukraine and who has worked with Soros on various projects, believes his philanthropic style “is very much formed by the money markets, which are always changing. He assumes any idea he has now will be wrong in a few years. He is always asking himself, when he has a wonderful project going, ‘When should I stop this project?’.”

Soros’s war chest, and his determination to deploy it beyond the usual blue-chip charities of hospitals, universities, museums or even poverty in Africa, had long made him an occasionally controversial figure outside the US. He was among the western culprits accused by the Kremlin of inciting Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution; his foundation’s offices have been raided in Russia and he was forced to close them down in authoritarian Uzbekistan.

America, it turns out, can also be sensitive to plutocrats using their wealth to address socially contentious subjects. In recent years, his foundation became more active in the US, taking on issues including drug policy. His engagement became more intense during the George W. Bush presidency, when Soros decided that the open society he had worked to foster in repressive regimes abroad was imperilled in his adopted home.

Some admired his chutzpah. The famously independent-minded Paul Volcker, who was appointed to lead the Fed by Jimmy Carter and reappointed by Ronald Reagan, said: “The drug thing is a perfect example that he doesn’t adopt a conventional view. I think drug policy needs a new look and he’s been one of the people who say that.”

Soros’s money has been crucial in enabling him to voice maverick views: “That’s what led me to oppose Bush very publicly, because I was in a position that I could afford to do it,” he said. But he also believes his fortune and the automatic credibility it gives him in America has drawn the fire of conservative pundits such as Fox’s Bill O’Reilly and extremist pamphleteer Lyndon LaRouche. “Given the excessive esteem in which people who make money are held in America, I had to be demonised,” he said.

Their attacks worked. So much so that last year, as the Obama bandwagon gained speed and American financiers, along with much of the rest of the country, clamoured to jump on, his earliest heavyweight Wall Street backer kept a low profile. “Obama seeks to be a unifier,” Soros said. “And I have been a divisive figure because I’ve been demonised by the right. I thought my vocal support for him would not necessarily benefit him.”

. . .

At around 1.00am on November 5 2008, Soros sat on a peach-coloured sofa in his elegant Fifth Avenue apartment, with Queen Noor of Jordan to his left and Steve Clemons, of the New America think-tank, perched on the edge of a chair to his right. Around them milled a crowd of eclectic and jubilant guests, many still teary-eyed from Obama’s Grant Park victory speech, which had been broadcast on four flat-screen television sets in the apartment. Like most Soros soirées, the gathering included more artists and statesmen than Masters of the Universe: Michèle Pierre-Louis, the prime minister of Haiti and former head of her country’s Soros foundation; former World Bank chief James Wolfensohn; Volcker; and twentysomething Kwasi Asare, a hip-hop music promoter, were among the visitors.

Soros drank an espresso and, a few minutes later, a final champagne toast with the last of his guests. Alexander, his 23-year-old son, perched on the arm of his chair and ruffled his father’s hair in farewell. Everyone else took that as a signal to depart, too. Soros was in a mellow, triumphant mood that night – and with good reason. He had spotted Obama early on. His ubiquitous political consigliere, Michael Vachon, still has among his papers a rumpled itinerary from a trip he and Soros took to Chicago in February 2004. In the upper right-hand corner of the page, Vachon had scrawled, “Barack guy”. The Senate candidate had been keen to meet Soros and called the pair repeatedly during their visit. But it was a packed schedule and Soros could only offer a 7.30am breakfast slot at the Four Seasons.

Soros left that meal “very impressed”, a view that was confirmed when he read Obama’s autobiography and deemed him “a real person of substance”. A few months later, on June 7, Soros hosted a packed fundraiser for Obama’s Senate campaign at his upper east side home. Soros and his family contributed roughly $80,000, then the legal maximum.

Obama was impressing a lot of people at that time. But once it became clear that Hillary Clinton would be in the presidential race, nearly all of the established New York Democrats, particularly the older Wall Street crowd, lined up behind their local Senator and her machine, driven by a combination of loyalty and calculation. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, now the head of the IMF and then a possible French presidential candidate, said Soros told him in 2006 he was supporting “this young guy, Barack Obama. He was the first one to tell me this and he was right.” On January 16 2007, the day Obama formed a presidential exploratory committee, Soros contributed to his campaign and officially offered his backing. Before doing so, Soros called Hillary Clinton to let her know. “I look forward to your support in the general election,” she told him.

His decision to back Obama was consistent with his life-long affinity for moments of radical change. “I felt that America had gone so far off base that there was a need for discontinuity,” he said. As in the markets, Soros’s political bet on systemic transformation – his support for Obama, but also his early opposition to the war in Iraq and the “war on terror” – has come good.

For Soros, one happy consequence of now being in tune with the zeitgeist is that he is being taken seriously as a thinker on American public policy issues, particularly to do with the financial crisis. When he, along with the other four highest-earning hedge fund managers, testified before Congress in November, he was treated with respect and even deference – not the prevailing attitude towards billionaire financiers at the moment. Before Soros had even taken his coat off, he was greeted in the corridors by Democratic New York Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney. “Give him a nice office,” she told a staffer who was looking for a place where Soros could wait before his testimony. “He creates a lot of jobs in my district and supports a lot of good people.” After the hearing, a lawmaker and a staffer both approached Soros and asked him to autograph their copies of his book.

. . .

Being listened to on Capitol Hill, and by global policymakers more generally, is important to Soros. But what matters to him most of all – more than money, more than the political and social accomplishments of his foundation – is leaving an enduring intellectual legacy. He describes reflexivity as “my main interest”. Even as Soros met with increasing financial and public success through his fund and his foundation, he was deeply frustrated by his failure to be accepted as a serious thinker. He titled one chapter in his latest book “Autobiography of a Failed Philosopher”, and once delivered a lecture at the University of Vienna called “A Failed Philosopher Tries Again”. As a young man, he wanted to become an academic, but “my grades were not good enough”.

He writes that his first book, The Alchemy of Finance, was “dismissed by many critics as the self-indulgence of a successful speculator”. That reaction still prevails in some circles. Paul Krugman, the Nobel prize-winning economist, devotes half a chapter to Soros in his latest book, characterising him as “perhaps the most famous speculator of all times”. He also raises an eyebrow at Soros’s intellectual “ambitions”, tartly observing that he “would like the world to take his philosophical pronouncements as seriously as it takes his financial acumen”.

Another barrier to academic respectability is Soros’s self-confessed “phobia” of formal mathematics: “I understand mathematical concepts but I’m afraid of mathematical symbols, because you can easily get lost in them.” That fear proved no impediment to success in the quantitative world of finance, but it has hurt Soros’s street cred in economics departments. “Among academics, he suffers from the additional liability of not expressing it in the language of mathematics that has become fashionable,” Joe Stiglitz, another Nobel prize-winning economist, said. But Stiglitz believes his friend’s writing has become more current, partly thanks to the financial crisis: “By those economists interested in ideas, I think his work is taken seriously as an idea that informs their thinking.”

In the view of Larry Summers: “Reflexivity as an idea is right and important and closely related to various streams of existing thought in the social sciences. But no one has deployed a philosophical concept as effectively as George has, first to make money and then to change the world.”

Paul Volcker delivered a similar verdict: “I think he has a valid insight which is not always expressed as clearly by him as I might like.” Overall, he said, Soros is “an imaginative and provocative thinker … he’s got some brilliant ideas about how markets function or dysfunction.”

This is as close to mainstream intellectual acceptance as Soros has come in his two decades of writing and more than five decades since he gave up on academia. It feels like a breakthrough. When I asked him if he would still describe himself as a failed philosopher, he said no: “I think that I am actually succeeding as a philosopher.” For him, that is “obviously” the most important human accomplishment.

“I think it has to do with the human condition,” he said. “The fact that we are mortal and we would like to be immortal. The closest thing you can come to that is by creating something that lives beyond you. Wealth could be one of those things, but evidence shows that it doesn’t survive too many generations. However, if you can have an artistic or philosophical or scientific creation that withstands the test of time, then you have come as close to it as possible.”

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From: TFF2/1/2009 10:28:10 AM
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Meredith Whitney to banks: Deal with it

The influential analyst says taking toxic mortgages off banks' books only begins to address their fundamental problems.
By Katie Benner
January 30, 2009: 2:58 PM ET


NEW YORK (Fortune) -- Banks are looking for a second chance to dump some toxic waste from their balance sheets on the hope that the Obama administration will set up a "bad bank" to buy massive amounts of their troubled assets.

The end goal is to get banks lending again, but Oppenheimer bank analyst Meredith Whitney doesn't think that separating the bad from the ugly will get money flowing. Instead, she says banks should bite the bullet and start selling their good assets.

In an interview with Fortune Friday, Whitney argued that a "bad bank" does not attack the fundamental problems eating away at these firms.

"The bad bank is a covert way to recapitalize banks by paying more for the assets than the market would, she said. "Then the banks might be able to write up the value of the securities. This would give them, on paper, more tangible equity. In theory they would look stronger."

But Whitney believes the banks will remain weak, even if their books look healthier, because they have to deal with a lot more than just bad assets: As consumer and business spending slows, banks will still incur losses on their "good" loans; they would be forced to set aside more cash, which would cut into earnings; and there's also the simple fact that a recession means less demand for their business.

Banks created and held onto billions of dollars in esoteric credit products that were made up of everything from subprime residential mortgages to credit card payments. These securities have sunk in value as default rates on the underlying assets rise.

As the credit crunch gathered steam, banks hoarded cash, including the money they received from the Treasury's $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program. This program was originally conceived to buy their toxic assets, but was used instead to inject money directly into the banks.

The original TARP plan was rejected in part because of worries about asset pricing. If Uncle Sam paid too little, the banks would crater anyway - pay too much and taxpayers would eat the losses. The "bad bank" proposal faces the same essential pricing problem.

Whitney says it would be better to force big institutions like Citibank (C, Fortune 500) and Bank of America (BAC, Fortune 500) to sell the marquee pieces of the business that they can, fill the hole, and shrink.

"That's what people like you and me, what taxpayers have to do when we are in financial distress. We have to sell whatever it is we can, which is almost always our best assets, and deal with it. We can't just sell what we want to, which would of course be our bad stuff."

It's a punitive measure that banks are trying to avoid, and they argue that there are no buyers out there for even the good, stable pieces of their businesses. But Whitney disagrees.

"There is always a buyer at the right price, be it private equity or a rival business or another bank," she says. "If the government provides a facility through which people can get long-term funding, then buyers will come to the market for the 'crown jewels' assets of these banks."

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From: TFF2/1/2009 1:56:16 PM
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A big bang plan to clean up US banking system

By Krishna Guha in Washington

Published: January 30 2009 23:31 | Last updated: January 30 2009 23:31

The big bang announcement by US Treasury planned for next week is likely to have three key economic elements: moves to clean up the banking system, moves to restore the flow of credit in securitised financial markets, and moves to reduce home foreclosures.

The exact shape of the banking sector clean-up plan has still not been finalised. But it is likely to involve elements of both a “bad-bank” solution and insurance-style guarantees on pools of problem assets that remain on bank balance sheets.

Assuming this approach is approved, the bad bank would be capitalised with equity from the Treasury’s troubled asset relief programme (Tarp) and take on debt, possibly guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), with some Washington insiders estimating it would have about $1,000bn purchasing power.

It would acquire securities that had already been heavily marked down by financial institutions, probably using a valuation model rather than an auction-based process to determine pricing.

The US authorities may also provide insurance-style guarantees on pools of problem assets that remain on bank balance sheets. This approach is seen by some as better suited to assets that have not yet been heavily written down and for loan portfolios that are in the early stages of deterioration. The bank clean-up is likely to be paired with a revamped recapitalisation scheme, involving a thorough overhaul of Tarp.

Additional restrictions on executive pay and excessive dividends are likely, in an effort to avoid leakage of public capital to employees and shareholders, as well as to shore up public support for the unpopular process.

Treasury is also likely to announce a separate battery of moves designed to revitalise the securitised markets for credit. This could involve a scaling up of an existing Treasury-Federal Reserve joint venture called the term asset-backed securities loan facility, which provides low cost loans for investors willing to buy new securitised consumer loans.

This approach may also be used to try to restore the flow of credit for commercial mortgage-backed securities, jumbo mortgage-backed securities and municipal bonds. It is possible that the Treasury could offer some credit guarantees in a further effort to boost credit flows, though some policymakers are hesitant.

The foreclosure relief element of the package is likely to commit tens of billions of dollars to support schemes that aim to lower monthly mortgage payments to no more than 38 per cent of income, though it will probably also include backing for loan principal reductions in cases where the mortgage is worth a lot more than the value of a home.

The 38 per cent limit has emerged as a rough consensus among policymakers, as the standard used by the FDIC, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Hope Now alliance of mortgage servicers and recently the Federal Reserve.

The Fed recently announced plans to support loan modifications to reduce monthly payments to no more than 38 per cent of income and to support principal writedowns for loans worth 125 per cent of the value of a home or more, for mortgages owned or part-owned by some of its special purpose vehicles. While this is a Fed-only programme, it provides some indication of where Treasury’s thinking may come out.

Obama economic officials see the backing for banks and credit markets on the one hand, and housing on the other, as part of a three-legged stool – the other being the fiscal stimulus plan before Congress.

Many economists support this approach, but some fear that it will result in the government spreading its efforts too thinly, particularly if insufficient money is ultimately available to fund bank recapitalisation.

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From: TFF2/1/2009 7:53:08 PM
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The game changer - By George Soros
Published: January 28 2009 19:55 | Last updated: January 28 2009 19:55



In the past, whenever the financial system came close to a breakdown, the authorities rode to the rescue and prevented it from going over the brink. That is what I expected in 2008 but that is not what happened. On Monday September 15, Lehman Brothers, the US investment bank, was allowed to go into bankruptcy without proper preparation. It was a game-changing event with catastrophic consequences.
For a start, the price of credit default swaps, a form of insurance against companies defaulting on debt, went through the roof as investors took cover. AIG, the insurance giant, was carrying a large short position in CDS and faced imminent default. By the next day Hank Paulson, then US Treasury secretary, had to reverse himself and come to the rescue of AIG.
But worse was to come. Lehman was one of the main market-makers in commercial paper and a large issuer of these short-term obligations to boot. Reserve Primary, an independent money market fund, held Lehman paper and, since it had no deep pocket to turn to, it had to “break the buck” – stop redeeming its shares at par. That caused panic among depositors: by Thursday a run on money market funds was in full swing.

The panic then spread to the stock market. The financial system suffered cardiac arrest and had to be put on artificial life support.
How could Lehman have been left to go under? The responsibility lies squarely with the financial authorities, notably the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. The claim that they lacked the necessary legal powers is a lame excuse. In an emergency they could and should have done whatever was necessary to prevent the system from collapsing. That is what they have done on other occasions. The fact is, they allowed it to happen.

On a deeper level, too, credit default swaps played a critical role in Lehman’s demise. My explanation is controversial and all three steps of my argument will take the reader to unfamiliar ground.

First, there is an asymmetry in the risk/reward ratio between being long or short in the stock market. (Being long means owning a stock, being short means selling a stock one does not own.) Being long has unlimited potential on the upside but limited exposure on the downside. Being short is the reverse. The asymmetry manifests itself in the following way: losing on a long position reduces one’s risk exposure while losing on a short position increases it. As a result, one can be more patient being long and wrong than being short and wrong. The asymmetry serves to discourage the short-selling of stocks.

The second step is to understand credit default swaps and to recognise that the CDS market offers a convenient way of shorting bonds. In that market the asymmetry in risk/reward works in the opposite way to stocks. Going short on bonds by buying a CDS contract carries limited risk but unlimited profit potential; by contrast, selling credit default swaps offers limited profits but practically unlimited risks.

The asymmetry encourages speculating on the short side, which in turn exerts a downward pressure on the underlying bonds. When an adverse development is expected, the negative effect can become overwhelming because CDS tend to be priced as warrants, not as options: people buy them not because they expect an eventual default but because they expect the CDS to appreciate during the lifetime of the contract.

No arbitrage can correct the mispricing. That can be clearly seen in US and UK government bonds, whose actual price is much higher than that implied by CDS. These asymmetries are difficult to reconcile with the efficient market hypothesis, the notion that securities prices accurately reflect all known information.

The third step is to recognise reflexivity – that is to say, the mispricing of financial instruments can affect the fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect. Nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in the case of financial institutions, whose ability to do business is dependent on confidence and trust. That means that “bear raids” to drive down the share prices of these institutions can be self-validating. That is in direct contradiction to the efficient market hypothesis.


Putting these three considerations together leads to the conclusion that Lehman, AIG and other financial institutions were destroyed by bear raids in which the shorting of stocks and buying of CDS amplified and reinforced each other. Unlimited shorting was made possible by the 2007 abolition of the uptick rule (which hindered bear raids by allowing short-selling only when prices were rising). The unlimited selling of bonds was facilitated by the CDS market. Together, the two made a lethal combination.




That is what AIG, one of the most successful insurance companies in the world, failed to understand. Its business was selling insurance and, when it saw a seriously mispriced risk, it went to town insuring it, in the belief that diversifying risk reduces it. It expected to make a fortune in the long run but it was destroyed in short order.

My argument raises some interesting questions. What would have happened if the uptick rule on shorting shares had been kept, in effect, but “naked” short-selling (where the vendor has not borrowed the stock in advance) and speculating in CDS had both been outlawed? The bankruptcy of Lehman might have been avoided but what would have happened to the asset super-bubble? One can only conjecture. My guess is that the bubble would have been deflated more slowly, with less catastrophic results, but that the after-effects would have lingered longer. It would have resembled more the Japanese experience than what is happening now.

What is the proper role of short-selling? Undoubtedly it gives markets greater depth and continuity, making them more resilient, but it is not without dangers. As bear raids can be self-validating, they ought to be kept under control. If the efficient market hypothesis were valid, there would be an a priori reason for imposing no constraints. As it is, both the uptick rule and allowing short-selling only when it is covered by borrowed stock are useful pragmatic measures that seem to work well without any clear-cut theoretical justification.

What about credit default swaps? Here I take a more radical view than most people. The prevailing view is that they ought to be traded on regulated exchanges. I believe they are toxic and should be used only by prescription. They could be used to insure actual bonds but – in light of their asymmetric character – not to speculate against countries or companies.

CDS are not, however, the only synthetic financial instruments that have proved toxic. The same applies to the slicing and dicing of collateralised debt obligations and to the portfolio insurance contracts that caused the stock market crash of 1987, to mention only two that have done a lot of damage. The issuance of stock is closely regulated by authorities such as the Securities and Exchange Commission; why not the issuance of derivatives and other synthetic instruments? The role of reflexivity and the asymmetries identified earlier ought to prompt a rejection of the efficient market hypothesis and a thorough reconsideration of the regulatory regime.

Now that the bankruptcy of Lehman has had the same shock effect on the behaviour of consumers and businesses as the bank failures of the 1930s, the problems facing the administration of President Barack Obama are even greater than those that confronted Franklin D. Roosevelt. Total credit outstanding was 160 per cent of gross domestic product in 1929 and rose to 260 per cent in 1932; we entered the crash of 2008 at 365 per cent and the ratio is bound to rise to 500 per cent. This is without taking into account the pervasive use of derivatives, which was absent in the 1930s but immensely complicates the current situation. On the positive side, we have the experience of the 1930s and the prescriptions of John Maynard Keynes to draw on.

The bursting of bubbles causes credit contraction, the forced liquidation of assets, deflation and wealth destruction that may reach catastrophic proportions. In a deflationary environment, the weight of accumulated debt can sink the banking system and push the economy into depression. That is what needs to be prevented at all costs.

It can be done – by creating money to offset the contraction of credit, recapitalising the banking system and writing off or down the accumulated debt in an orderly manner. They require radical and unorthodox policy measures. For best results, the three processes should be combined.
If these measures were successful and credit started to expand, deflationary pressures would be replaced by the spectre of inflation and the authorities would have to drain the excess money supply from the economy almost as fast as they had pumped it in. There is no way to escape from a far-from-equilibrium situation – global deflation and depression – except by first inducing its opposite and then reducing it.

To prevent the US economy from sliding into a depression, Mr Obama must implement a radical and comprehensive set of policies. Alongside the well-advanced fiscal stimulus package, these should include a system-wide and compulsory recapitalisation of the banking system and a thorough overhaul of the mortgage system – reducing the cost of mortgages and foreclosures.

Energy policy could also play an important role in counteracting both depression and deflation. The American consumer can no longer act as the motor of the global economy. Alternative energy and developments that produce energy savings could serve as a new motor, but only if the price of conventional fuels is kept high enough to justify investing in those activities. That would involve putting a floor under the price of fossil fuels by imposing a price on carbon emissions and import duties on oil to keep the domestic price above, say, $70 per barrel.

Hank Paulson, former Treasury secretary (left), and Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve chairman, arrive for their November testimony to Congress
Finally, the international financial system must be reformed. Far from providing a level playing field, the current system favours the countries in control of the international financial institutions, notably the US, to the detriment of nations at the periphery. The periphery countries have been subject to the market discipline dictated by the Washington consensus but the US was exempt from it.


How unfair the system is has been revealed by a crisis that originated in the US yet is doing more damage to the periphery. Assistance is needed to protect the financial systems of periphery countries, including trade finance, something that will require large contingency funds available at little notice for brief periods of time. Periphery governments will also need long-term financing to enable them to engage in counter-cyclical fiscal policies.

In addition, banking regulations need to be internationally co-ordinated. Market regulations should be global as well. National governments also need to co-ordinate their macroeconomic policies in order to avoid wide currency swings and other disruption.

This is a condensed, almost shorthand account of what needs to be done to turn the global economy around. It should give a sense of how difficult a task it is.

The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management and founder of the Open Society Institute. These are extracts from an e-book update to The New Paradigm for Financial Markets – The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means (PublicAffairs Books, New York)

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THE SOROS INVESTMENT YEAR:
Positions I took were too big for ever more volatile markets

Although I positioned myself reasonably well for what was coming last year, one thing I got wrong cost me dearly: there was no decoupling between markets of the developed and developing worlds.

Indian and Chinese stocks were hit even harder than those in the US and Europe. Since we did not reduce our exposure, we lost more money in India than we had made the year before. Our Chinese manager did better by his stock selection; we were also helped by the appreciation of the renminbi.

I had to push very hard in my macro-account to offset both these losses and those incurred by our external managers. This had its own drawback: I overtraded. The positions I took were too large for the increasingly volatile markets and, in order to manage my risk, I could not go against the market in a big way. I had to try to catch minor moves.

That made it difficult to maintain short positions. Although I am an experienced short-seller, I got caught several times and largely missed the biggest down-draught, in October and November.

On the long side, where I stuck to my guns, I lost an enormous amount of money. I was impressed by the potential in the new deep-water oilfield in Brazil and bought a large strategic position in Petrobras, only to see it decline by 75 per cent at one point in time. We also got caught in the developing petrochemical industry in the Gulf.

We did get out of our strategic long position in CVRD, the Brazilian iron ore producer, in time for the end of the commodity bubble and shorted the other big iron ore groups. But we missed an opportunity in the commodities themselves – partly because I knew from experience how difficult it is to trade them.

I was also slow to recognise the reversal of fortune for the dollar and gave back a large portion of our profits. Under the direction of my new chief investment officer, we did make money in the UK, where we bet that short-term interest rates would decline and shorted sterling against the euro. We also made good money by going long on the credit markets after their collapse.

Eventually I understood that the strength of the dollar was due not to people choosing to hold dollars but to their inability to maintain or roll over their dollar obligations. In a very real sense the strength of the dollar, like the fever associated with sickness, was a measure of the disruption of the financial system. This insight helped me to anticipate the downturn of the dollar at the end of 2008. As a result, we ended the year almost meeting my target of 10 per cent minimum return, after spending most of the year in the red.

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Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009

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