|Frank, thanks for the Hamilton link. It justifies many WTF? reactions as a key transportation node went dark.|
We're still missing details. In my experience, many of these failures are pre-ordained before the first concrete is poured.
In the planning stages input is sought from users and stakeholders. Normally, through a prebuild committee; its makeup and direction is usually dictated by senior management and may or may NOT be led by an experienced infrastructure person. But within such committees, typical organizational behaviour can occur.
I've seen risk mitigation denied because of personal animosities. Factional differences. And then, there's the bean counters ...
Looking back on Fukushima, I often wonder if there weren't some lowly engineer in a pre-build committee, warning of the tsunami history, and being ignored. Or over-ruled. Perhaps the matter was never considered, but it should have been.
As often discussed in the past, risk mitigation is vital in key infrastructure. It's insurance and resilience. It has costs at inception, and in ongoing maintenance. But as Hamilton notes, when those costs are juxtaposed against the cost of complete failure they're easily supportable.