|This zero hedge article if correct spells out what JPM did. Now that it is in the open, it could be difficult to unwind, so the loss could get much bigger...perhaps $3B! For all the details check out the article below.|
Is JPM Staring At Another $3 Billion Loss?
There are a lot of moving parts in the Dismal take of Dimon's demise. The starting point is that Bruno Iksil in the JPMorgan CIO Office, under the premise of hedging the bank's credit portfolio's tail risk had placed various tranche trades (levered credit positions with various risk profiles) in the only liquid tranche market that still exists - CDX Series 9 (an 'orrible portfolio of credits with an initial maturity at the end of 2012). These positions were low cost (steepeners or equity-mezz) but needed a certain amount of day to day care and maintenance (adjusting hedges and so on). As the market rallied, the positions required increasing amounts of protection be sold to maintain hedges (akin to buying into a rally more and more as it rises). His large size in the market left a mark however that hedge funds tried to fix - that was his index trading was making the index extremely rich (expensive) relative to intrinsics (fair-value).
Evidence from the HY market suggests that the trader used more liquid on-the-run indices to hedge as the spread of the HY18 credit index blew notably wider relative to intrinsics and net notionals dropped modestly. The market calmed down a little and it appeared from net notionals and the index skews that he tried again last week to unwind some more of the huge position that had clearly tripped various risk limits and VaR controls. This is where we find ourselves now - the net notionals remain huge (and implicitly on JPM's shooulders), his lack of selling has left the credit index maybe 20bps rich to where it might trade given its rough correlation with the S&P 500 and this would imply at least $3bn of losses already in addition at fair-value.
Of course, the situation is far worse because 1) any efforts to unwind such a huge position will lead to the market yawning wide and swallowing him in illiquid bid-ask spreads; and 2) the rest of the world knows their position - so why would the hedge funds not push their position. Perhaps this explains why JPMorgan's CDS has remained relatively wide while its exuberant stock price shot up on stress-test ebullience - only to plummet back to CDS reality this evening. Critically, JPM will need to use whatever method they can to hedge this now over-hedged and over-long position - which likely means credit instruments such as JNK, HYG, HY18, and IG18 will all get their share of strange attraction as the trader mispriced not just the basis risk (the volatility between the hedge and its underlying) but the attraction of running with a trend when you have a bottomless pit of money to cover it - until now.
Of course noone knows for sure what exact positions Iksil had on - though it is clear what hedging he needed to do to manage his hedges. As Peter Tchir ( @TFMkts ) noted this evening - perhaps this mark-to-model irregularity is what the Fed discovered and gathered all the banks last week to ascertain just who has what exposure to whom? As we tweeted earlier, perhaps Iksil just got carried away - and please understand that while CDS do indeed provide leverage, so do many other financial instruments - it is not the instrument that caused this - it is the trader as "you don't hedge risk when you bet on momentum continuing you idiot!" -------------------------------------------------------------
I do not think this trader had a very good day or week. Whatever the case this can not end well....