|That's the predictable, law class observation, although most in law schools don't believe it. Since Wickard is no stronger than the letter upon which it is based, one has to remain in the letter of Wickard to refute it. If the Commerce Clause can be interpreted to apply to potential commerce, then it can applied to anything since anything is the potential of something. Perpend.|
"it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market."
Note the word, "would". Would would it otherwise be? (I have made no syntactical error here). How can the Court know what "would be"? That's a conditional, dependent upon facts not in evidence. Indeed, most of the arguments for the existence of FTL neutrinos at a recent CERN experiment were made using this kind of logic, called petitio principii. Buried in the assumptions were FTL elements.
This is a common 'crat logical error too. They assume the truth of what they seek to prove . In this case the Court assumes it knows what the farmer will do with the wheat and imposes constraints under that assumption without it being in hand, as it were. The Court says, "we know what farmers will do with a valuable product. They will market it". How does the Court know that the farmer won't use the wheat for mulch, or for an infinitude of non market uses that it DOES NOT KNOW. This pretentiousness lies at the heart of tyranny : I know what you, anyone wants and I will control whether anyone gets it.
The Court was clever. It knew the opposition would point this out. So it tried to close the case by asserting a false negative. "I know what you would not do" with the wheat, and by not doing what I know you would be doing, you're interfering with interstate commerce. However, the pretense remains.
It's all embedded in that word, "would", Notice the opinion wasn't written with "will". "will" won't work because then the assertion is determinatively falsifiable.